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Mary E Vicks
April, 2013
School districts have implemented filtering and safety policies in response to
legislative and social mandates to protect students from the proliferation of objectionable
online content. Subject related literature suggests these policies are more restrictive than
legal mandates require and are adversely affecting information access and instruction.
There is limited understanding of how filtering and safety policies are affecting teaching
and learning because no comprehensive studies have investigated the issues and trends
surrounding filtering and safety policy implementation. In order to improve existing
safety policies, policymakers need research-based data identifying end user access issues
that limit technology integration in the kindergarten-12th grade (K-12) educational
setting.
This study sought to examine Internet filtering and safety policy implementation
issues in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools to determine their influence on
information access and instruction. A mixed methods research design, which includes
both quantitative and qualitative approaches, was used to investigate the research
problem. Quantitative data were collected from information technology (IT)
administrators who were surveyed regarding filtering and safety policy implementation,
and school library media specialists (SLMS) were surveyed concerning the issues they
encounter while facilitating information access in a filtered environment. Qualitative data
were collected through interviews with a subset of the SLMS population, thereby
providing further insight about Internet access issues and their influence on teaching and
learning. School districts’ Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) were analyzed to determine
how they addressed recent legislative mandates to educate minors about specific Web 2.0
safety issues.
The research results support the conclusions of previous anecdotal studies which
show that K-12 Internet access policies are overly restrictive, resulting in inhibited access
to online educational resources. The major implication of this study is that existing
Internet access policies need to be fine-tuned in order to permit greater access to
educational content. The study recommends Internet safety practices that will empower
teachers and students to access the Internet’s vast educational resources safely and
securely while realizing the Internet’s potential to enrich teaching and learning.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
When the World Wide Web and graphical browsers popularized the Internet and
made it easier to use, technology enthusiasts predicted the Internet would revolutionize
every aspect of society—particularly education. Many educators envisioned a world in
which Web-based technology would be the catalyst for educational reform. Students
would no longer be passive recipients of knowledge because the Internet would empower
them to become active participants in their own education. Students would collaborate
with peers in distant lands and subject experts to solve problems. Internet-based
education would tear down classroom barriers and the classroom would become the
world. This was the promise of the Internet, but it has fallen short of such lofty
educational potential (Hope, 2012). Nevertheless, outside of the school walls, the Internet
has revolutionized daily life and work, and is at the core of nearly every aspect of society.
Gossett and Shorter (2011) state the Internet is a transformative technology that has
revolutionized the manner in which users around the world disseminate information.
The Internet has not had the same transformative effect on teaching and learning.
An ever-widening inconsistency exists between technology utilization in schools and its
utilization in the larger society. Collins and Halverson (2009) purport that outside of
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school, technology is highly influential in areas that are the major focus of schools—
reading, writing, calculating, and thinking—yet, it is marginalized in schools, fully
integrated mostly in specialized courses. The growing disparity between students’
technology experiences in and out of school is noted in the National Educational
Technology Plan (NETP), released by the U.S. Department of Education in March 2010.
The report states, “students use computers, mobile devices, and the Internet to create their
own engaging learning experiences outside school and after school hours—experiences
that too often are radically different from what they are exposed to in school” (p. 4). The
NETP concludes that if students are going to be prepared adequately to live and work in
the 21st century, they must have authentic learning experiences using Web tools such as
wikis, blogs, and digital content in the same way they are used in the real world—for
research, collaboration, and communication.
Researchers have suggested that public school Internet use policies are not
aligned with the realities of the 21st century, thus contributing to a culture where Internet
technology is fully integrated in students’ out-of-school experiences, but marginalized
within the school walls (Cramer & Hayes, 2010; Hope, 2012; Lemke, Coughlin, Garcia,
Reifsneider, & Baas, 2009). Lemke et al. state school Internet policies still restrict
students’ use of new technologies such as social networking sites, chat rooms, blogs,
wikis, visual media, instant messaging and texting, virtual worlds, and interactive games.
The NETP concludes that electronic filtering required by the Children’s Internet
Protection Act (CIPA) sometimes creates barriers to engaging learning experiences that
in-school Internet access should provide students. Increasingly, technology integration
experts are advising school boards, administrators, and teachers to re-examine their

3
technology policies to accommodate the rapidly changing technology landscape and
support the incorporation of new Web-based and mobile technologies (Consortium for
School Networking (CoSN), 2011). Policymakers must adapt Internet safety and filtering
policies so they balance the need for student safety and security with the educational
benefits of the Internet. Without Internet policy changes, schools cannot successfully
integrate new technologies and the vast educational promises of the Internet will continue
to be unrealized for students who do not have access to the Internet outside of school.
Problem Statement
Public schools have instituted Internet filtering and safety policies in response to
federal or state legislation, and public pressure to protect students from inappropriate
Internet content. Some literature reports that administrators are filtering beyond federal
and state mandates (Johnson, 2012; Fuchs, 2012) in order to combat increasing security
threats, degraded network performance, and distractions caused by non-educational
Internet content (Hua, 2011). Excessively restrictive Internet filtering policies limit
access to constitutionally protected information, often involve time-consuming and
bureaucratic procedures for unblocking acceptable Web sites, frustrate users, and could
potentially make schools vulnerable to First Amendment litigation (Willard, 2010b;
Maycock, 2011).
Moreover, proponents for less stringent filtering policies argue that overly
restrictive filtering policies prevent use of Web 2.0 applications such as wikis, blogs, and
online productivity tools, which are critical to the achievement of information literacy
and technology learning standards (Losh & Jenkins, 2012). Twenty-first century teaching
and learning necessitates access to technology resources that enable educators and
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students to collaborate, create, and share content online (Bosco & Krueger, 2011).
Ultimately, blocking of such tools inhibits public schools from accomplishing their
educational mission of preparing students to live and work in an increasingly global and
digital age.
Recently, anecdotal research has highlighted specific instances of how filtering
policies are influencing teaching and learning. In some Los Angeles schools, Losh and
Jenkins (2012) report teachers have been granted override privileges to access blocked
YouTube™ videos, but the override worked for only 20 minutes. Consequently, teachers
were unable to set up YouTube™ videos prior to class, but had to interrupt instruction to
input override codes. Losh and Jenkins report this practice “discouraged the instructional
use of Web-based materials” (p.18). Moreover, in some Indiana schools, the filtering
software blocked access to several important Herman Melville sites because his most
famous novel includes “dick” in the title. Other school districts blocked access to
participatory platforms such as Twitter™, LiveJournal™, and even materials created for
social media platforms by the White House and other government entities. Willard
(2010b) also discovered from email discussion group comments that one of the biggest
filtering policy issues was blocking of forums. A California discussion group participant
reported that any site with a comment area was blocked, including all blogs, and most
Web 2.0 sites.
The aforementioned scenarios detail how filtering and safety policies negatively
affect teaching and learning. However, not all educators have had negative experiences
with filters. Some school districts have found ways to balance safety and security
concerns with the need to provide access to the engaging educational resources available
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on the Internet (Bosco & Krueger, 2011). An examination of Internet filtering and safety
policies was needed to determine the prevalence of the aforementioned restrictive access
issues. There was also a need to uncover salient information access issues and trends of
relevance to policymakers seeking to adapt their filtering and safety policies to the everchanging technology landscape.
Goal
This dissertation examined Internet filtering and safety policy implementation in
South Carolina’s K-12 public schools. The major goal of the study was to update and
expand upon anecdotal or small-scale studies examining the influence of Internet filtering
on instruction and information access in the K-12 sector. Results of this study, coupled
with previous studies, can be used to inform filtering policy evaluation in order to
maximize access to legitimate educational content while minimizing access to
inappropriate content. Furthermore, this study expands the filtering policy research base
and validates the issues identified in previous anecdotal and less comprehensive studies.
A limited number of studies have investigated the effect of filtering policies on
teaching and learning. This research supplements existing literature by addressing
unanswered questions from previous studies. Finsness (2008) found that Internet filtering
configurations limited student access to information necessary for achieving Minnesota’s
U.S. history and health standards. The study also suggested that further research was
needed to determine if students had sufficient access to Web resources enabling them to
hone necessary 21st century information technology and literacy skills. This research
addressed Finsness’ conclusion. Holzhauer (2009) found that filters limited classroom
Internet use, but concluded that additional research was needed to learn how school
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districts decide what to filter (beyond what legal mandates require) and what changes are
necessary to improve Internet use policies. This investigation sought answers to
Holzhauer’s conclusions.
District information technology (IT) administrators were surveyed to ascertain
how filtering and safety policies were implemented. Furthermore, school library media
specialists (SLMS1), who have historically been advocates for greater information access
(Losh & Jenkins, 2012; Maycock, 2011), were surveyed and interviewed to determine
how filtered Internet access influenced teaching and learning. Data from the interviews
and surveys define Internet use policies that negatively affect teaching and learning and
practices that mitigate filtering issues. School districts need filtering and safety policy
guidelines as they seek to exploit the educational benefits 21st century digital
technologies afford. This study provides those guidelines. Combined with previous
studies, this study provides stakeholders (administrators, teachers, SLMS, technology
coordinators, and parents) with the data and information necessary to guide filtering and
safety policy decisions.
Research Questions
This research investigated the following research questions:
•

How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools?

•

What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered
computers?

•

1

How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?

SLMS acronym is used for school library media specialist or school library media specialists.
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•

In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards?

Relevance and Significance
Internet-based educational resources have become almost as ubiquitous in today’s
public schools as the traditional textbook. With the advent of the World Wide Web,
educators and government officials enthusiastically embraced the Internet as an important
educational tool because of its purported educational benefits (Ott, Beard, Blue, Cleugh,
Greenfield, Lee,…Stager, 2010; Fuchs, 2012). Education reformers contend the Internet
has not realized its educational potential (Lemke et al., 2009); however, outside of school
it has become woven into the fabric of today’s society because of its importance in
research, communication, and an abundant list of daily activities (Hall, 2011).
As Internet accessibility in public schools has increased, so has concern about
preventing students from inadvertently or deliberately accessing inappropriate online
content. Despite its educational benefits, the Internet exposes students to an everincreasing amount of objectionable content. Robinson, Brown, and Green (2010) report
that the Web is “riddled with inappropriate and undesirable content” (p. 14) such as
dangerous or illegal guides (i.e., bomb-making instructions), pornography, gruesome and
violent images, racist/hateful content, and advertising. Efforts to shield minors from
exposure to this type of content continue to fuel public debate and present “intriguing
policy and practice dilemmas” (Moyle, 2012, p. 403).
In response to rising public concern, Congress enacted legislation on several
occasions in an effort to insulate children from exposure to online indecency. The
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Communications Decency Act (CDA) (1996) and the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA) (1998) were two notable congressional attempts to restrict the distribution of
sexually explicit Internet materials to minors. However, free speech advocates challenged
the constitutionality of both laws and the Supreme Court agreed, declaring both acts
unconstitutional because they violated free speech under the provisions of the First
Amendment.
The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) (2000) is Congress’ most recent
attempt to restrict access to inappropriate online content. CIPA requires schools and
public libraries receiving federal funds for Internet access to implement “technology
protection measures” to prevent access to “visual depictions that are obscene, child
pornography, or harmful to minors” (Section 3601). Reminiscent of its predecessors, free
speech proponents promptly challenged the constitutionally of CIPA’s filtering mandate.
The American Library Association (ALA) filed suit on behalf of public libraries
contending that CIPA was unconstitutional and created an infringement of First
Amendment protections. In 2002, the United States District Court in Pennsylvania
sustained the ALA’s claim and overturned the library filtering law, concurring that
filtering software blocked access to constitutionally protected Internet expression (ALA v
United States, 2002). However, in June 2003, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s decision and endorsed CIPA’s constitutionality (United States v ALA, 2003).
Even before the Supreme Court upheld CIPA, Internet filtering had become a
political necessity in American schools as policymakers sought to provide safer Internet
access and avoid potential litigation arising from student exposure to what was deemed
harmful online content (Sutton, 2012). Following the Supreme Court’s ruling and similar
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legislation in many states, filtering became a legal necessity. However, widespread
deployment of Intent content controls and legal mandates has not settled the filtering
debate. Not only are Web 1.0 access issues fueling the debate, but also Web 2.0 access
issues continue to underscore the significance of online safety policy deliberations
(Quillen, 2010). Regarding Web filtering policies, Quillen suggests that a “seismic
showdown is brewing,” (p.20) and “something must change if schools are to continue
exploring the use of Web 2.0 tools” (p. 20). Filtering continues to be an important issue
for most schools because many schools have implemented aggressive filtering policies
that impede student research and inhibit online collaborative activities (American
Association of School Librarians (AASL), 2012)
Growing concern about sexual predators preying on minors using social
networking sites prompted the U. S. House of Representatives to pass the Deleting
Predators Online Act (DOPA) in 2006, which required education rate (E-rate) schools to
block access to all social networking sites and chat rooms. Free speech proponents
objected to the bill’s broad language claiming the law, as written, would have prohibited
access to most interactive Web 2.0 sites and services that permit users to create and edit
Web content, such as wikis and blogs (Holcomb, Brady, & Smith, 2010; Macleod-Ball,
2011). They also argued that the best approach to online safety was not filtering, but
teaching children about safe and appropriate online behavior (Willard, 2010b). After
years of deliberation, the Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act (2008), which
supplanted DOPA, became law. The act no longer required E-rate schools to restrict
access to social networking sites, but mandated that schools educate students “about
appropriate online behavior, including interacting with other individuals on social
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networking sites and in chat rooms and cyber bullying awareness and response” (Section
215).
The emergence of the read/write Web (Web 2.0) and perceived ineffectiveness of
current Internet safety policies continues to fuel deliberations that suggest school districts
need to re-examine their filtering and safety policies (Bosco & Krueger, 2011). Some
school districts, in an effort to protect children, have blocked Web 2.0 tools—not only
social-networking sites, but blogs, wikis, and other online participatory tools that allow
teachers and students to create and share content (Losh & Jenkins, 2012; Robinson,
Brown & Green, 2010). Adams (2010) suggests that current safety policies rely solely on
filters to protect children and fail to emphasize the importance of teaching students how
to evaluate information and navigate safely when using unfiltered computers outside of
school. Quillen (2010) claims the ability to override the filter rapidly has not been
established in many schools and is, therefore, hampering instructional activities. Willard
(2010b) concludes that current filtering policies prevent schools from realizing the
educational potential of the Internet because of more restrictive filtering policies,
increased bureaucracy, and lack of focus on Internet safety education. The widening gap
between policymakers and some educators is reflected in the following statement:
In many schools, any website that has “blog” in the URL or its name is off limits.
Photo sharing sites like Flickr don’t stand a chance. Even closed networks like a
Ning or an invitation-only wiki might be blocked. School administrators may
simply not understand what the tools are and how they can be used in school
settings. Many rely heavily on the judgment of technology coordinators who have
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(not unjustifiable) concerns about safety and security issues or, in some cases, the
loss of control that Web 2.0 tools imply. (Harris, 2009a, p. 58)
However, Manzo (2009) portrays the filtering dilemma from the administrators’
perspective in the following statement:
Faced with concerns about Internet predators, cyber bullying, students’ sharing of
inappropriate content on social networks, and the abundance of sexually explicit
or violent content online, many school leaders and technology directors are
placing tighter restrictions on Web access to shield students from potential harm.
(p. 23)
IT administrators’ primary mission is establishing the most efficient network
infrastructure, eliminating security threats (Web viruses, spyware, hacking tools,
malicious content, worms), and conserving network bandwidth. Consequently, filtering
software is often configured to minimize security threats and to conserve bandwidth in
addition to CIPA’s requirement to block access to pictures that are obscene, child
pornography, or are harmful to minors (Baule, 2010; Hua, 2011). Restrictive filter
configurations that block entire content categories (i.e., weapons) may lessen security
threats but prevent access to nonthreatening, constitutionally protected information about
weapons used during ancient times (Quillen; Hua). Moreover, improperly deployed or
erroneously configured filtering systems can have a downside and unintended
consequences (Fuchs, 2012; Nicoletti, 2009). An in-depth investigation of filtering
policies would elucidate the consequences of filtering policy decisions for end users and
provide a deeper understanding of factors contributing to administrators’ safety policy
decisions.
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Research evidence is a key ingredient to improved policy and practice (Tseng,
2012). Research-based evidence is deficient regarding the use and impact of filtering
technology in public schools given that there is little research-based evidence to guide
filtering and safety policy decisions. In the past decade, school districts’ Internet use
policies have been characterized by what Willard (2010a) describes as “technopanic”—
an intensified apprehension about minors’ Internet use that has not been “grounded in
actual research” ( p. 10). It is important to assess how filtering and safety policy decisions
are affecting end users in order to improve existing policies. SLMS have a unique
vantage point from which to provide a deeper understanding of the issues and trends
surrounding filtering technology implementation and its impact on end users because
they support both teachers and students in their quest for information. Consequently, this
investigation of media specialists’ experiences with filtered Internet access identified
filtering and safety policy-related problems and challenges, and provides essential
information for improved filtering policy decisions. Inclusion of IT administrators in this
investigation provided information about the technical considerations of filtering policy
implementation, which can substantially influence information access.
Barriers and Issues
Barriers, bias, and contentious issues presented challenges to accomplishing the
research goal. Since the Supreme Court upheld CIPA in 2003, many educators, including
SLMS, have accepted filters as a fact of life in American schools and have concluded that
the debate is over (Adams, 2010; Fuchs, 2012). Educators' acceptance of filters and their
inherent flaws has contributed to the misconception that further deliberations or research
on the topic will have little or no influence on filtering policy implementation. Therefore,
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reluctance to participate in a research study about policy issues believed to be beyond
participants’ influence was an issue. This barrier, combined with survey fatigue, may
have adversely affected the survey response rate.
Booth (2011) suggests the library profession lacks a research culture and often
fails to see the relevance of research to improved practice and policy. This factor has
most likely contributed to the lack of scholarly effort undertaken to provide a deeper
understanding of the challenges and issues surrounding filtered Internet access as
perceived by SLMS. The researcher was cognizant that this barrier could adversely affect
participation in the study. The researcher addressed this issue by emphasizing to potential
respondents how this research could be used to affect change in filtering and safety policy
implementation in public K-12 schools.
The ALA’s Code of Ethics urges librarians to refrain from advancing private
interests over professional concerns, and conflating personal convictions and professional
duties (American Library Association, 2013c). ALA members, many are whom are
SLMS, may feel a professional obligation to support the organization’s vehement stance
against all attempts to restrict access to what some consider inappropriate Web-based
information. Consequently, the researcher considered this as a significant barrier because
of the potential difficulty of distinguishing the study participants’ views from the ALA’s
and its affiliate associations. To overcome this barrier, survey and interview questions
were structured so that the researcher could distinguish SLMS’ individual convictions
from the ALA’s convictions.
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Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
The study was not experimental, but was primarily descriptive; therefore,
controlling variables that threatened internal validity was not a major issue. The data was
examined to discover if relationships existed between filtering and safety policy
implementation factors and the issues users encountered as they sought online
information in a filtered environment. Being that the research design was nonexperimental, safety policy implementation issues are described as they exist naturally
and relationships are described without attempting to explain the cause of the
relationships.
Another limitation of this study was the sampling technique employed. Not every
South Carolina school district granted permission for the study to be conducted. For that
reason, it was impossible to draw a random sample of all South Carolina SLMS and IT
directors. SLMS and IT directors from 36 school districts were selected using total
population sampling in order to gather sufficient data to address the research questions.
Because of the sampling technique employed, generalization of the data to the entire
population is limited.
Delimitations
The researcher limited the scope of the study to South Carolina’s public schools
to narrow the research focus and to make the research goal more manageable. South
Carolina is traditionally a conservative state in the “Bible Belt.” Moreover, the state has
enacted legislation requiring all public schools and libraries to adopt policies intended to
reduce the ability of users to access Web sites displaying obscene material (National
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Conference of State Legislatures, 2013). Unlike CIPA’s filtering mandate, South
Carolina’s filtering mandate must be implemented regardless of whether schools and
libraries elect to accept state funding. Since the inception of the Internet filtering
controversy, conservatives have typically been proponents of filtered Internet access in
public schools and libraries. Consequently, research participants’ perceptions may reflect
the state’s conservative stance regarding Internet blocking, making it difficult to
generalize the results of the study beyond South Carolina’s public schools.
Definition of Terms
This section provides definitions of key terms used in this investigation.
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP). AUPs include school board adopted rules,
regulations, rights, and responsibilities that govern users’ computer-related activities
(Rodgers, 2012). This document is sometimes referred to as a safety policy.
Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA). CIPA is a law enacted by Congress in
December 2000 to address concerns about access to offensive content over the Internet
on school and library computers. CIPA requires schools and libraries receiving certain
federal funds to use technology protection measures that prevent access to offensive
online content (Robinson, Brown, Green, 2010).
Filtering Policy. Filtering policies are an extension of an organization’s Internet
safety policy (AUP), and define the content categories that are blocked, user profiles, and
their privileges (Hidalgo et al., 2009).
Internet Filter. Internet filters are software tools that limit, block, or restrict
access to Internet content (Moyle, 2012).

16
Safety Policy. A safety policy is a CIPA-required document that addresses a
broader range of computer-related issues. A safety policy, sometimes referred to as an
AUP, encompasses access to inappropriate materials on the Internet and includes
provisions for handling security issues, for protecting children's privacy, and for dealing
with children's use of computers for illegal activity (e.g., hacking into another computer
system) (Neighbor Children’s Internet Protection Act (NCIPA), Section 254, 2000).
Web 2.0. Web 2.0, also called the read/write Web, is a term referring to online
technologies that allow users to socialize, collaborate, and share information without
requiring programming skills. Web 2.0 tools include social networking sites, blogs, wikis,
social bookmarking sites, and virtual worlds (Robinson, Brown, & Green, 2010; Simkins
& Shultz, 2010).
Summary
The Internet offers a wealth of educational resources that can potentially reform
and enhance teaching and learning. However, educators have encountered various
impediments to full realization of the Internet’s educational potential, including restricted
access to some constitutionally protected Internet resources. Filtering and safety policies
and procedures have a substantial influence on information access. This study examined
the issues surrounding the development and implementation of filtering and safety
policies in order to determine how these issues impede information access, and limit
attainment of 21st century learning standards.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Introduction
This study focused on the issues surrounding K-12 Internet filtering and safety
policies and how these issues converge to influence information access and instruction.
Several overarching themes emerged from the literature review, which provided a
conceptual framework for the study. The literature review focuses on the following
themes: the promise and perils of Internet access for K-12 education, Internet safety
legislation and First Amendment issues, the influence of Internet safety legislation on
Internet filtering and safety policies, issues related to Internet filtering technology and
how it works, filtering and safety policy implementation issues, Internet safety policy
issues and 21st century learning standards, and the implications of filtering and safety
policy implementation. The final section focuses on the contributions of the current study
to the research in this domain.
The literature, which reflects the complexity and controversial nature of Internet
content controls in public schools and libraries, is often more prescriptive and
experiential than research-based as noted by Jaeger and Yan (2009). Informational,
anecdotal, and experiential pieces have been included in the literature review because
they underscore the significance of the Internet filtering debate and pinpoint the need for
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more research-based evidence to guide filtering and safety policy decisions. Moreover,
pertinent early research and prescriptive literature has been included to frame the
background of the current study and to illustrate the manner in which the need for the
current study has evolved. Initially, Jaeger and Yan attested to the need for more research
focusing on the implications of Internet content controls when noting that CIPA and its
requirements have not generated much research into how the legislation affects schools,
libraries, and clientele of these institutions. More recently, Ahn, Bivona, & DiScala
(2011) suggested there was a need for research to advance understanding of how
technology policies influence educator practices. This investigation incorporates the
aforementioned identified gaps in the literature.
The Promise and Perils of Internet Access for K-12 Education
In its infancy, the Internet was an important communication tool for scientists and
academic researchers, but the emergence of the World Wide Web and graphical browsers
made Internet navigation easy for everyone (Hall, 2011; Internet, 2011). These
developments were instrumental in the Internet becoming a valuable commercial,
communication, entertainment, and educational tool. Public schools eagerly embraced the
Internet; its many educational resources holding promise for significant instructional
improvement and enhanced student learning. The Internet facilitates access to vast
amounts of information, enhances communication, and broadens students’ connections to
diverse people and perspectives. Supporting this conclusion, the National Educational
Technology Plan (NETP) (U.S. Department of Education, 2010) suggests online
technologies offer limitless opportunities to “create engaging, relevant, and personalized
learning experiences (p. vi).” The promise of an enormous range of educational
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experiences and materials spurred phenomenal growth of Internet connectivity and
Internet accessible technologies in the K-12 sector. According to the most recent National
Center for Educational Statistics report, public school Internet accessibility has risen from
less than 10% in 1995 to almost 100% in 2008 (U.S. Department of Education, 2012).
Much of the growth in Internet connectivity can be attributed to the education rate
(E-rate) program. Recognizing the increasing importance of the Internet and its potential
to improve education, the U. S. Congress created the E-rate program as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, to provide discounts on telecommunications, Internet
access, and internal networking to schools and libraries. The main goal of this program is
to lessen the so-called “digital divide” by ensuring Internet access equity across poor and
rich, rural, urban and suburban areas, and highly served and underserved areas (Manzo,
2010; Holt & Galligan, 2012).
A number of challenges have diminished realization of the Internet’s educational
potential. One of the most significant and controversial challenges involves the possible
exposure of minors to inappropriate online content including, pornography, hate speech,
and other controversial materials. Public concern about the proliferation of objectionable
online content has prompted various legislative attempts to shield minors from exposure
to offensive Internet content (Ott, et al., 2010; Gros & Hancock, 2011). The limited
success of these legislative attempts and ongoing debate about minors’ online safety
underscores the delicate balance between First Amendment free expression rights and
government regulation of Internet activity to protect youth from online obscenity and
indecency.
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Internet Safety Legislation and First Amendment Issues
From its inception, the Internet has been unregulated and autonomous in nature in
that anyone with technical skills could post any kind of information including offensive
and illegal content. The Internet is also a global medium. These factors have complicated
any efforts to regulate online content because it is extremely difficult to develop one
standard by which to regulate this medium (Hall, 2011; Gossett & Shorter, 2011;
Leberknight, Chiang & Wong, 2012). Legislative efforts to restrict access to
objectionable online content incorporate two kinds of technology--adult verification
technology, which restricts access on the publisher end and software filters, which restrict
access on the user end. Congressional legislation initially relied upon adult verification
technology to zone Internet speech into adult zones and minor zones, but when this
regulatory approach failed constitutional scrutiny, subsequent legislation relied upon
filtering software to protect minors (Gros & Hancock, 2011; Macleod-Ball, 2011).
Recently, congressional legislation has evolved to include more comprehensive and
proactive approaches beyond restrictive measures emphasizing technology, to focus on
Internet safety education and awareness (Essex, 2009). Table 1 provides an historical
perspective of major Internet safety legislation having direct or indirect implications for
K-12 Internet filtering and safety policy development.
The Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) (1996) was Congress' initial attempt to
regulate indecent online materials. CDA made it a criminal offense to send or post
obscene material through the Internet to youths under the age of 18. The Internet’s
democratic nature and fears that government regulation would diminish this important
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Table 1. Historical Overview of Major Internet Safety Legislation
Legislation
Summary
Internet Safety Status/Outcome
Approach
Communications
Prohibited
Adult
Ruled
Decency Act (1996)
posting/sending
Verification
Unconstitutional
obscene online
Technology
material to
individuals under
18
Child Online
Protection Act (1998)

Prohibited
Adult
commercial Web Verification
sites from
Technology
displaying
material deemed
harmful to minors

Ruled
Unconstitutional

Children’s Internet
Protection Act (2000) &
Neighborhood Children’s
Internet Protection Act
(2000)

Required schools
and libraries
receiving certain
federal funds to
use technology
protection
measures to
prevent minors
from accessing
obscene materials

Filters and
Internet Safety
Policy

Enacted into law

Protecting Children in
the 21st Century Act
(2007)

Prohibited access
to a commercial
social networking
website or chat
room unless used
for an educational
purpose with
adult supervision

Expanded
content filtering
to include social
networking sites
and chat rooms

Revised version
excluding expanded
filtering provision,
but including
Internet safety
awareness and
education passed the
Senate

Broadband Data
Improvement Act (2008);
Title II, Protecting
Children in the 21st
Century Act (2008)

Requires schools
with Internet
access to educate
minors about
appropriate
online behavior,
including online
social networking
and chat room

Internet safety
awareness and
education

Enacted into law
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Table 1 (continued)
Legislation

Summary

Internet Safety
Approach

Status/Outcome

interactions and
cyber bullying
awareness and
response

venue of free expression motivated free speech proponents such as the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), the American Library Association (ALA), the National
Education Association (NEA), Internet Free Expression Alliance, and several gay and
lesbian groups to oppose vehemently any attempts to regulate Internet activity (Hall &
Carter, 2006; Internet, 2011). Consequently, CDA was immediately challenged. The
Supreme Court ultimately struck down the CDA, ruling that the statute was too
ambiguous and not narrowly constructed to meet the government’s goal of protecting
children, while maintaining First Amendment rights (Gros & Hancock, 2011; MacleodBall, 2011).
The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) was Congress’ next attempt to protect
minors from an ever-increasing body of pornographic Internet materials. To avoid the
vagueness and constitutional problems inherent in CDA, COPA was more narrowly
focused. Instead of focusing on all online indecency, COPA (1998) targeted commercial
entities on the Internet, rather than e-mail, chat rooms, or online bulletin boards, and
criminalized “any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor
and that includes material that is harmful to minors” (Section 231). The legislation
required that minors’ access to these materials be restricted using adult verification
techniques such as credit cards, digital age verification certificates, or other verification
methods (Gros & Hancock, 2011). In 2003, a federal court blocked COPA’s initial
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enforcement because the age verification techniques it required disproportionately
infringed upon adults’ free expression rights. COPA effectively died in January 2009,
after a decade of litigation, when the Supreme Court refused to hear the government’s
final appeal (Supreme Court, 2009). During the appeals process, the Court ruled userbased filters were a less speech-restrictive, but similarly effective means of protecting
minors from objectionable online content (Macleod-Ball, 2011).
The Children Internet Protection Act and the Neighborhood Children’s Internet
Protection Act
The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), signed into law in 2000, was
Congress’ third attempt to regulate minors’ access to online obscenity and indecency.
Hoping to avoid the constitutional issues that undermined CDA and COPA, Congress
changed its approach with CIPA (Jaeger &Yan, 2009; Spurlin & Garry, 2009). Instead of
placing restrictions on Web publishers, CIPA placed restrictions on schools and libraries
receiving Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) funds, Title III of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) funds, Museum and Library Services Act funds, or
E-rate funding (Jaeger & Yan; Menuey, 2009; Sutton, 2012). CIPA (2000) required
libraries and schools receiving funds from the aforementioned sources to use technology
protection measures (filters) on all computers to restrict access to indecent online
materials.
Free speech advocates, including the ALA and ACLU, immediately brought court
challenges against the law, claiming its filtering mandate infringed upon users’ First
Amendment rights. A federal district court declared CIPA unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds because the filtering mandate prevented users from accessing
legitimate Web sites as filters inadvertently block legitimate content while blocking
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objectionable online materials (Menuey, 2009). Menuey adds that CIPA's constitutional
challenge did not include public schools and school libraries; therefore, the district court
ruling did not apply to schools. Schools were not included in the court challenge because
previous legal precedent gave them wider latitude in limiting students' free speech (Hall
& Carter, 2006; Sutton, 2012). Unlike public libraries, schools serve a subset of the
community not the entire community. Nevertheless, CIPA withstood legal challenges
when the Supreme Court ruled it constitutional in a plurality decision in 2003 (Internet,
2011).
CIPA and a related act, The Neighborhood Children’s Internet Protection Act
(NCIPA), are part of a larger appropriations law (PL 106-554).The language is similar in
the CIPA and NCIPA sections of PL 106-554, but there are important differences. CIPA
stipulates what must be filtered (visual images that are obscene, child pornography, or
harmful to minors) and requires the implementation of an Internet safety policy. NCIPA
focuses on what must be included in a school or library’s Internet safety policy and is
applicable only to schools and libraries participating in the E-rate program (Jansen,
2010). Jansen also notes that CIPA defines the phrase "harmful to minors," but
NCIPA directs the local school board or governing body to determine what is and is not
suitable for minors to access under its Internet safety policy or acceptable use
policy (AUP). CIPA and NCIPA impose three mandates on affected agencies. These
mandates include a safety policy (also called acceptable use policy), use of a technology
protection measure to prevent access to child pornography or materials harmful to
minors, and a public meeting informing the community of measures taken to keep minors
safe while using the Internet (Menuey, 2009).
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Post-CIPA Internet Safety Legislation
Enactment of CIPA and its technology protection measures have not dispelled
concerns about children’s online safety. Lawmakers continue to introduce Internet safety
legislation intended to protect children on the Internet. This suggests CIPA’s safety
strategies have not kept pace with threats posed by rapidly developing technologies,
particularly mobile technologies, wireless technologies, and burgeoning Web 2.0
applications such as social networks, blogs, wikis, video sharing, and photo sharing
(Miller, Thompson & Franz, 2009; Spurlin & Garry, 2009; Willard, 2010a). Essex (2009)
reports that 15 bills were introduced during the 109th Congress (2005-2006) and 36 bills
were introduced during the 110th Congress (2007-2008) that referenced child
exploitation, sexual predators, Internet safety, and related online threats. Essex suggests
that the growing popularity of social networking Web sites and increased awareness of
online predators prompted a significant increase in Internet safety legislation during the
110th Congress (2007-2008). Among the 36 Internet safety bills introduced during the
110th Congress, there were various responses, approaches, or solutions to Internet
dangers and online child exploitation.
Prompted by rising public concern that sexual predators were using social
networking sites and chat rooms to locate potential abuse victims, the Deleting Online
Predators Act of 2006 (DOPA) was passed in the House of Representatives (Gros &
Hancock, 2011). DOPA would have expanded CIPA's filtering mandate by requiring Erate funding recipients to prohibit minors from accessing social networks and chat rooms
in addition to blocking access to obscene, pornographic or “harmful to minors” materials.
DOPA was included in a related Senate bill, the Protecting Children in the 21st Century
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Act of 2007 (S. 49), which did not pass in the Senate chamber. However, a reworded
version of the Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act (S. 1965) passed the Senate by
unanimous consent in May, 2008 (Essex, 2009). Essex states S. 49, which incorporated
DOPA, included a filtering and an Internet safety awareness approach, but S.1965 deleted
the filtering approach, expanded the awareness approach, and added an education
approach. Senate bill 1965 subsequently became part of Public Law 110–385, the
Broadband Data Improvement Act of 2008. The law, also known as the Protecting
Children in the 21st Century Act, requires schools receiving federal E-rate funding to
educate students “about appropriate online behavior, including interacting with other
individuals on social networking sites and in chat rooms and cyber bullying awareness
and response” (Section 215). While online safety legislation has diminished with
subsequent Congresses, state legislatures continue to debate online safety and pass
legislation designed to protect students from Web 2.0-related safety threats (Adams,
2010; King, 2010; Pierce, 2012). Whether at the national or state level, most online safety
legislation either directly or indirectly influences school technology use policies.
In addition to federal Internet filtering and safety legislation, many states have
enacted filtering laws to prevent minors from accessing sexually explicit, obscene, or
harmful content. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2013), 25
states have filtering laws applicable to public schools and libraries. Most of these laws
require the affected agencies to adopt Internet safety policies that protect minors from
inappropriate online materials while some laws specifically require the installation of
filtering software.
The emergence of interactive social technologies has also prompted state

27
legislators to pass laws to protect minors from online predators and cyber bullying. Cyber
bullying legislation has been passed in 20 states according to King (2010). These laws
differ in scope, but describe the tools of cyber bullying as electronic communication,
Internet technologies, and several states include cell phones (Miller et al., 2009). King
adds that most of the state cyber bullying laws focus on public schools, requiring school
boards to establish policies prohibiting cyber bullying.
The prevalence of post-CIPA Internet safety legislation reflects legislators’
ongoing concern about Internet dangers and child exploitation on the Internet (Essex,
2009) and the inability of legislative policy to keep pace with rapidly changing
technology (Fuchs, 2012; Miller et al., 2009). Moreover, school level policy
implementation lags behind legislative enactment by several years, thereby propelling
school technology policy development and implementation into a state of flux (Adams,
2010). Educational policy emerges from multiple levels—federal, state, school district,
and building level—which complicates policy coordination. Censorship and First
Amendment issues are also inextricably linked to safety policies. Therefore,
policymakers must balance individual rights with safety concerns. Schools do not have a
significant amount of legal precedent upon which to base safety policies, making Internet
policy development a more difficult task (Miller et.al.).
Filtering and First Amendment Issues
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Constitution). The potential
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erosion of free speech rights has been at the core of the filtering debate. The ALA and
ACLU are two of the largest and most vocal organizations leading the fight against the
use of Internet content controls. Both groups believe the use of filtering software in
public schools and libraries violate the First Amendment’s assurance of free speech and
expression (Fuchs, 2012; Spurlin & Garry, 2009). Filters cannot limit blocking solely to
what CIPA mandates—materials harmful to minors, obscenity, and child pornography—
without blocking constitutionally protected information.
The First Amendment is the basis for the ALA’s Library Bill of Rights, which
affirms the library’s responsibility to uphold the principles of intellectual freedom—
unfettered access to information and ideas regardless of its source, background, or
viewpoint. Article V of The Library Bill of Rights was amended in 1980 to include “age”
and reaffirmed this stance in 1996 (American Library Association, 2013b) in response to
mounting public concerns about minors having free access to inappropriate Internet
materials in libraries. In an interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights, the library
organization contends that limiting access to non-print resources or information
technology based on age abridges library use for minors. The ALA believes minors
should have access to these resources with or without parental permission (American
Library Association, 2013a). This philosophical stance has prompted the ALA to oppose
legislation such as CIPA—the goal of which is to restrict minors’ access to inappropriate
Internet materials.
Minor’s First Amendment Rights and Court Precedents
The ALA’s philosophical position raises the question of whether minors have the
same right to access information as adults in the eyes of the courts. Generally, the courts
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have granted schools greater latitude in limiting students’ First Amendment rights
(Alexander & Alexander, 2012; Chmara, 2010; Hoover, 2009). Several landmark court
cases have framed the extent of minors’ First Amendment rights in public school settings.
These cases demonstrate the tension between balancing First Amendment ideals with
educational officials’ responsibility to inculcate values (Hall & Carter, 2006). In the
landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969),
the Supreme Court clearly protected students’ freedom of expression in the public school
settings. The Court’s famous statement—“It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate”—establishes a precedent supporting minors’ rights to free expression
within the school setting. On the other hand, the Court in handing down the Tinker
decision reiterated the school’s authority to inculcate and to intervene and take
appropriate action when student expressions cause disruptions to the educational
environment.
In another landmark case, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District, No. 26 v. Pico (1982), a New York school board had removed several books
from a high school library because they were anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic,
and just plain filthy” (Alexander & Alexander, 2012, p. 355). The Court ruled that a
school board must be allowed, “to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as
to transmit community values” (Pico, 457 U.S. at 853), but the First Amendment
precludes the removal of school library books in order to deny access to ideas believed to
be objectionable. Being that the school board’s decision was not content neutral, the
board was essentially engaging in viewpoint discrimination, a biased or political attempt
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to protect certain ideas while suppressing others. Despite its prohibition of viewpoint
discrimination, the Supreme Court has given public schools significant latitude to limit
minors’ access to information if school officials have made an objective judgment that
the information is “educationally unsuitable,” as opposed to deciding to limit access to
information based upon disagreement with or disapproval of the content of the
information (Alexander & Alexander; Chmara, 2010).
There are various opinions about how these cases apply to the constitutionality of
Internet content filters in public schools and what, if any, legal challenges could be
mounted against the use of Internet filters in public schools. In handing down the Pico
decision, the Supreme Court distinguished between the acceptable decision of school
officials not to purchase books because of pervasive vulgarity or lack of educational
suitability and the unacceptable removal of library books in order to suppress ideas
considered politically or socially objectionable (Alexander & Alexander, 2012). This
legal principle has been made analogous to filtering Internet content in recent court cases
involving the constitutionality of Internet filters.
In American Library Association v. the United States (2003), the district court
adopted the analogy that Internet filtering was like the unconstitutional removal of books
from a library; however, the Supreme Court did not agree with this analogy. The ALA
plurality opinion viewed Internet content blocking as analogous to a library’s decision not
to include certain material in its collection. In upholding CIPA, the Court concluded that
libraries should have broad discretion in determining what materials to include in their
collections (Hall & Carter, 2006). Legal precedent regarding minors’ rights to access
information, and public pressure to protect minors has driven rapid and widespread
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implementation of filters in public schools (Jaeger & Yan, 2009). Jaeger and Yan add that
there has been little resistance to CIPA in schools as compared to public libraries.
Litigation Resulting from Internet Safety Policy Implementation
Despite widespread deployment, filtering opponents argue one source of litigation
arises from the way Internet filtering and safety policies are being implemented in public
schools. First Amendment advocates purport the blocking decisions of some filtering
programs reflect a particular ideological perspective, which is analogous to viewpoint
discrimination, a practice specifically forbidden by legal precedents (Alexander &
Alexander, 2012; Willard, 2010b). Willard maintains that districts may unknowingly be
engaging in viewpoint discrimination because filtering companies, who protect what they
block as a trade secret, may block Web sites based on particular ideological perspectives.
Holzhauer (2009) concludes that when schools set filters at the most restrictive level and
deploy them based on the vendors’ default setting, viewpoint discrimination is likely to
occur.
Viewpoint discrimination has been cited in recent ACLU lawsuits against school
districts. In May 2009, the ACLU filed a lawsuit on behalf of several students and an
SLMS in Tennessee’s Knox county and metropolitan Nashville school districts. The
plaintiffs argued the districts’ filtering software blocked students from accessing sites
providing information and resources about gay and lesbian issues, but the filter did not
block sites promoting the view that homosexuals could be rehabilitated and become
heterosexuals (Manzo, 2009; Staino, 2009). According to Staino, the filtering software
the districts were using, when deployed at the default setting, blocked all sites
categorized as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT). The federal court
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dismissed the lawsuit in August 2009, when school officials agreed to unblock the sites
(Manzo, 2009).
More recently, the ACLU launched its “Don’t Filter Me” campaign to prevent
school districts from filtering pro-LGBT information. The organization contacted several
school districts asking them to reset their filters to allow access to this content. Leading
filtering software companies were also contacted and asked to remove supportive LGBT
Web sites from their blacklists. The ACLU claimed school districts using filters from
companies such as Lightspeed Systems, Blue Coat, Fortiguard, and Websense were
engaging in viewpoint discrimination (Zwang, 2011). According to the ACLU, school
districts were engaging in viewpoint discrimination because these filters reportedly
blocked educational or supportive LGBT content while permitting access to sites that
oppose LGBT lifestyles. In response to the campaign, some filtering companies,
including Lightspeed and Fortigate, changed their filter categories to prevent erroneous
blocking of supportive LGBT content (Adams, 2012). Ultimately, the ACLU filed a
lawsuit against a Missouri school district alleging improper filtering of educational
LGBT content (Quillen, 2011). The lawsuit was settled when the school district agreed to
stop blocking the content in question, submit to monitoring, and pay legal fees that were
incurred (Associated Press, 2012). The aforementioned legal actions against school
districts illustrate the legal challenges districts may encounter if filtering policies are
overly restrictive and configured in such a way that they prevent users from accessing
resources supporting a particular point of view.
Filters continue to attract legal scrutiny and expose institutions that use them to
potential legal action because they provide an imperfect solution to a far-reaching
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problem. In July 2003 the Supreme Court ultimately upheld CIPA, which settled the
constitutionally of the law. However, legal experts say subsequent challenges to the law
may arise from the way the law is implemented. Menuey (2009) explains most of these
challenges will not apply to schools, but provides three areas in which additional legal
challenges could arise for schools. First, students could raise First Amendment concerns
because filters tend to over-block thereby preventing access to materials of interest that is
neither "disruptive nor harmful to minors" (p. 45). In addition, legal experts say
challenges could also arise because filtering companies essentially decide what materials
are being blocked; therefore, school boards are delegating their legal responsibility
to make decisions about curriculum content to filtering software companies. Finally,
Menuey suggests filtering exacerbates the so-called "digital divide." The divide widens
when students with home access to computers are able to access materials at home that
are filtered at school, but students without a home computer are denied access to these
same materials.
The Influence of Internet Safety Legislation on Internet Filtering and Safety Policies
CIPA and related Internet safety legislation has far-reaching implications for
filtering and safety policy implementation. The filtering approach to minors’ online
safety has garnered most of the attention in the debate surrounding CIPA, but the
legislation employs a two-pronged approach, with the second approach being the
establishment and enforcement of a comprehensive safety policy (Jaeger & Yan, 2009).
Acceptable Use Policies
Prior to CIPA’s enactment, most schools had taken steps to address Internet safety
concerns and prevent computer and Internet abuse. One step was the development and
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implementation of Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs). AUPs include school board adopted
rules, regulations, rights, and responsibilities that govern users’ computer-related
activities (CoSN, 2011; Robinson, Brown & Green, 2010). Schools usually require all
users (and parents of minors) to sign a legally binding agreement indicating they
understand the policy’s privileges, responsibilities, and policy violation penalties. AUPs
typically prohibit use of the Internet for non-educational activities, and forbids malice,
recklessness, invasion of privacy, theft, harassment, bullying, copyright infringement,
lewd and vulgar expression in all forms (words, pictures, videos, or sounds), and use of
technologies to violate other institutional policies (Ahn et al., 2011; Robinson, Brown
and Green).
Filtering technology proponents believed AUPs were insufficient protection for
children and that limiting access to Internet content would be a better approach.
Consequently, pro-filtering groups began lobbying Congress in favor of filtering
legislation, which eventually resulted in CIPA’s enactment (Fuchs, 2012; Finsness,
2008). CIPA’s regulations have greatly influenced the content, implementation, and
importance of AUPs in schools.
CIPA-Compliant Filtering and Safety Policies
CIPA compliance requires schools and public libraries to adopt an Internet safety
policy, which is commonly referred to as an AUP (Jansen, 2010). CIPA compliance is
required if an institution’s funding sources include:
•

Universal Service (E-rate) discounts for Internet access, Internet service, or
internal connections;
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•

Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) state grant funding to buy
computers used to access the Internet or to pay direct Internet access costs; and

•

Title III funding under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to
buy computers used to access the Internet or to pay direct Internet access costs
(Gros & Hancock, 2011; Jansen 2010; Sutton, 2012).

In addition to adopting an Internet safety policy, institutions receiving E-rate funds (most
schools receive E-rate funds) must provide notice and hold at least one public meeting on
the proposed Internet safety policy, and certify annually with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) that they have adopted and implemented the policy
(FCC, 2011), which must include a technology protection measure (filters).
NCIPA, Subtitle C of CIPA, goes beyond the issue of filtering Web pages,
requiring E-rate schools to develop and implement a comprehensive policy governing
minors’ Internet usage (Jansen, 2010). The Internet safety policy must address
monitoring minors’ online activities (E-rate Central, 2012; Nicoletti, 2009); however,
Jansen states electronic monitoring is not required. According to FCC rules, the policy
must encompass the following five areas:
• Access by minors to inappropriate matter on the Internet and World Wide Web;
• The safety and security of minors when using electronic mail, chat rooms, and
other forms of direct electronic communications;
• Unauthorized access, including so-called "hacking,” and other unlawful activities
by minors online;
• Unauthorized disclosure, use, and dissemination of personal information regarding
minors; and

36
• Measures designed to restrict minors' access to materials harmful to minors
(NCIPA Section 254, 2000).
CIPA regulations do not specify any brand of filter nor specify a degree of
blocking effectiveness, but the filtering policy must be set to block three types of visual
depictions including obscenity, child pornography, and material that is “harmful to
minors” (E-rate Central, 2012). CIPA defines the phrase, “Harmful to minors,” as:
any picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that taken as a
whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion; depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with
respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual
contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or lewd exhibition of
the genitals; and taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value as to minors. (Children’s Internet Protection Act, 2000)
NCIPA (2000) does not define “inappropriate matter,” but allows the local school board
to determine what is and is not appropriate for minors to access under its Internet safety
policy (Jansen, 2010). This provision allows schools to establish filtering policies that
block content beyond the three types of visual depictions specified by CIPA (E-rate
Central, 2012).
According to E-rate Central (2012), CIPA compliance also includes enabling
filters on all Internet accessible computers regardless of whether the computer is used by
minors or adults. The law allows the filter to be disabled for adults only for bona fide
research or other lawful use by an adult (Chmara, 2010; Jansen, 2010). E-rate Central
notes that the ESEA and LSTA sections of CIPA allow filters to be disabled for both

37
adults and minors, but there is no disabling provision for minors in the E-rate section.
Furthermore, no provision precludes schools from setting different filtering policies for
students based on academic or age groups, or on an individual basis.
The Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act (2008) adds an additional Internet
safety policy requirement regarding educating minors about appropriate online behavior,
specifically including social networking and chat room interactions, and cyber bullying.
The FCC has not established specific criteria for a CIPA-compliant Internet Safety policy
or AUP, but E-rate Central (2012) suggests that a CIPA-compliant Internet safety policy
should:
•

Be applicable to minors and adults;

•

Include the use of an Internet filtering mechanism and specify conditions under
which filtering can be disabled or overridden;

•

Address staff responsibilities to monitoring minors’ online activities and
educating minors on appropriate online behavior; and

•

Address NCIPA-specific issues concerning safe use of email and other types of
electronic communication, unauthorized disclosure of personal information and
illegal online activities.

CIPA Compliance in Public Schools
Before the Supreme Court decided CIPA’s constitutionality in 2003, most schools
had become CIPA compliant by implementing various safety strategies to prevent
students from accessing inappropriate online materials (Jaeger & Yan, 2009). The
American Association of School Librarians’ (AASL) (2012) most recent School Libraries
Count filtering survey indicates that most schools have implemented filtering software
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and safety policies (AUPs) to help maintain students’ online safety. Table 2 also indicates
schools have employed additional safety measures including supervising students’ online
activities, limiting Internet access, and allowing Internet access on a case-by-case basis
(AASL, 2012).
Table 2. Internet Safety Strategies in Public Schools
Internet Safety Approach
Percent of Schools
Implementing
Filtering
94
Acceptable Use Policy

87

Supervise Internet Access

73

Limit Internet Access

27

Internet Access on a case-by-case
basis

8

Note: Data from “Filtering in Schools: AASL Executive Summary,” by the
American Association of School Librarians, 2012.
Jaeger and Yan (2009) note several reasons filters have become as ubiquitous
as computing devices in public schools. In addition to legal mandates, schools are subject
to societal pressures to filter Internet content. Minors are considered a susceptible group
for Internet crimes and child pornography; hence, society has determined schools have a
fundamental responsibility to protect children from objectionable online materials. In
addition, federal E-rate funds are essential to school budgets (Sutton, 2012). In order to
enhance and maintain technology, public schools rely heavily on these funds.
Consequently, they cannot afford to forego E-rate funding to avoid CIPA's filtering
directive. These are the primary reasons there have been few objections to the
comprehensive implementation of filtering policies in public schools as compared to
public libraries (Jaeger & Yan).

39
Although legal, political, social, and financial factors necessitate widespread
implementation of filters in public schools (Jaeger & Yan, 2009), the literature pinpoints
various Internet filtering and safety policy issues having profound implications for
policymakers, administrators, educators, and students. Recent prescriptive, anecdotal and
research literature reveals the issues related to filtering technology’s blocking techniques,
and filtering and safety policy implementation in schools.
Issues Related to Filtering Technology and its Blocking Techniques
Internet content filtering technology is employed to restrict users from accessing
Web content that violates an institution’s AUP. Much of the controversy surrounding
filtering technology emanates from the techniques these tools use to filter or block access
to Web-based information. Regardless of the position one adopts regarding the filtering
controversy, it is generally agreed that filters are an imperfect solution to a complex
problem. Filtering technology either “over-blocks” and denies access to legitimate Web
sites, or “under-blocks” and permits access to inappropriate Web sites (Moyle, 2012;
Sutton, 2012). Ineffective filtering was particularly problematic with first generation
filters. However, filtering technology has evolved from simplistic keyword and URL
blocking to more sophisticated tools employing a combination of blocking techniques
(Baule, 2010; Houghton-Jan, 2010; Hua, 2011). The latest content filters can be very
powerful, according to Houghton-Jan, when they utilize artificial intelligence, image
recognition, and complex keyword analysis algorithms at a very granular level.
Keyword Filtering
Keyword filtering is the most basic filtering method. This technique uses a
dictionary of blacklisted words or phrases with assigned positive or negative scores.
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When users request pages, the page is examined for occurrences of these words or
phrases. If a requested page exceeds a user-determined threshold, the page is blocked
(Hidalgo et al., 2009; Quillen, 2010). Blacklists have expanded to include millions of
keywords and phrases, but updates are performed manually according to Nicoletti (2009).
Some vendors allow the customer to update or fine tune the list manually to lessen the
occurrence of false positives. For example, the blacklist can be customized to allow a
page containing “wire strippers,” but block one containing “strippers” alone.
Keyword blocking is known for blocking innocuous Web pages because it filters
Web content without regard its context. However, this technique offers some advantages.
One advantage is that keyword filtering can quickly determine if a Web page has
potentially harmful content (Banday & Shah, 2010). In addition, the dictionary of
objectionable words and phrases does not require continuous updates. As the overblocking rate is usually unacceptable for most institutions, this filtering technique
typically is used in combination with other methods (Chou, Sinha, & Zhao, 2010;
Hidalgo et al, 2009).
URL Filtering
URL filtering prevents or allows Web access by checking a requested Web site's
URL against a URL database that is categorized according to content (i.e., shopping,
gambling, etc.) (Sutton, 2012). Categorization allows network administrators to make
blocking decisions based upon content categories. There are two types of URL
databases—a black list database that contains URLs of objectionable Web sites and a
white list database that contains URLs of acceptable Web sites (Chou et al., 2010). Most
filtering solutions that employ this technique use black lists (Hidalgo et al., 2009). This
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blocking method can be configured to block entire URLs or only permit access to nonoffensive content on the Web site. As with keyword blocking, vendors usually provide a
basic URL database requiring the user to perform manual updates. Updates must be
performed frequently to keep pace with rapidly expanding Internet content; otherwise, an
institution's URL blacklist could easily fall out of compliance with its AUP (Nicoletti,
2009).
This type of filtering is time consuming and resource intensive since most URL
blocking systems enlist human reviewers to maintain updated URL lists. Filter developers
are increasingly using automated tools to improve the updating process. Automated Web
spiders tag potentially offensive sites while human reviewers follow-up to validate the
automated classifications (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Houghton-Jan, 2010). Nevertheless,
creating and maintaining URL databases continues to be a labor-intensive and expensive
process (Banday & Shah, 2010; Chen & Wang, 2010). Therefore, commercial filtering
companies typically will not reveal specific Web sites by category because the
information is proprietary or a trade secret (Gossett & Shorter, 2011; Houghton-Jan;
Willard, 2010b). Since content-based decisions about what is blocked are not shared with
customers, filtering software critics argue schools and libraries are relinquishing their
responsibility to make content and selection decisions to filtering software companies
(Jaeger & Yan, 2009). Sutton (2012) adds that the proprietary claim makes it difficult to
move an incorrectly categorized Web site to a more appropriate category.
As speed and accuracy are key attributes of good filtering systems, most
commercial and open-source Web filters use URL filtering as the primary filtering
technique. Koumartzis and Veglis (2012) suggest that URL filtering technology is easier
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to implement and its fast processing speed supports implementation on a massive scale,
such as in school districts with distributed locations. However, an inherent fault of site
blocking is its focus on HTTP-based traffic, which fails to detect and block instant
messaging, email attachments, and file sharing applications that may threaten network
security. Therefore, most public schools use commercial filtering products that employ a
combination of filtering techniques in order to achieve greater content blocking
effectiveness (Chou et al., 2010; Nicoletti, 2009).
Real-time Contextual Analysis and Categorization
URL and keyword-matching filtering, the earliest filtering approaches, cannot
effectively filter the many different types of Web content and protocols of today's
Internet traffic (Selamat, Zhi Sam, Maaroff & Shamsuddin, 2011). Contextual analysis
filtering—also known as intelligent content analysis (Hidalgo et al., 2009)—uses
the latest Web filtering techniques to analyze the patterns and context of text to
achieve a semantic understanding of the context of the words and phrases on a Web page.
This process, when used in conjunction with keyword blocking, reduces over-blocking
errors that occur when Web pages contain words that can be objectionable in some
contexts. Machine learning techniques categorize Web pages according to salient
features, and then the results are cached, including offensive and non-offensive content,
to maximize accuracy and performance (Banday & Shah, 2010; Nicoletti, 2009).
With dynamic blocking, URLs and category information is updated dynamically,
eliminating the need to manage and update local blacklists manually. This real-time
categorization process reduces under-blocking—a primary weakness of URL blocking—
that occurs when emerging inappropriate content has yet to be added to the
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URL blacklist. Chen and Wang (2010) adds that this filtering approach is advantageous
because of its ability to examine various elements of a Web page for classification,
including the metadata, links, text, images, and scripts. However, Varadharajan and
Cohen (2010) contend dynamically generated content on social networking sites, secure
sockets layer security protocol (SSL) and non-HTTP protocols for email, discussion
groups, chat, news servers, and instant messaging continue to create technical and
practical challenges for filtering technology. The most important disadvantage of realtime content analysis is inadequate performance. Accurate content analysis systems can
be developed, but slow processing time makes them inappropriate for most demanding
filtering situations (Banday & Shah, 2010; Koumartzis & Veglis, 2012). Consequently,
most commercial filtering tools only use this technique to augment more efficient (faster)
filtering techniques such as URL filtering (Chou et al., 2010).
Other Filtering Techniques and Technology Protection Measures
Image processing continues to be an active filtering research area because of the
ever-increasing volume of images and multimedia on the Internet, and particularly since
pornographic images are what CIPA stipulates must be filtered. Most commercial
filtering tools classify Web content as pornographic or safe, using text on the Web page.
However, text-based processing is not effective with Web pages containing mostly
images and minimal or obfuscated text (Chen & Wang, 2010). Image filtering, based on
skin detection, is an emerging technique with a high degree of accuracy, but slow
performance makes this technique unusable in real-world systems. Consequently, most
filtering systems employ moment analysis, textures, histograms, and statistics to produce
an algorithm that Hidalgo et al. (2009) purport to be highly effective in recognizing
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pornographic images. However, Sutton (2012) and Chmara (2010) assert current filtering
technology cannot accurately block only visual depictions of child pornography,
obscenity, and material harmful to minors as CIPA mandates.
Content labeling is a self-regulating, self-labeling method of content control.
When a Web site is developed, the Webmaster describes the Web site's content using an
Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA) generated questionnaire. Content labels are
created from the questionnaire results, which are used to either block or to allow access to
online content. The RTA (Restricted to Adults) and POWDER (Protocol for Web
Description Resources) are similar self- regulating content labeling initiatives.
Webmasters are not required to submit content labeling data; therefore, many Web sites
are not labeled. Nevertheless, IRCA, RTA, and POWDER labels are available in many
different content control software and Web browsers (Bertino, Ferrari, & Perego, 2010;
Jeon, Lee, & Won, 2011; Nicoletti, 2009). Content labeling is not regulated, therefore,
some publishers intentionally or mistakenly mislabel their Web content, thereby
permitting users to access unwanted content (Banday & Shah, 2010; Jeon et al.).
Consequently, these self-labeling systems should only be used to augment other Web
filtering tools.
Filter Deployment within the Network
Web filtering solutions can be deployed in several different network scenarios,
which substantially affect their customization, performance, and manageability (Hidalgo
et al., 2009). The software can be installed on individual workstations, a networked proxy
server, a caching appliance, or firewall, or can be installed on a dedicated server (Enex
Testlab, 2011). Filtering techniques and deployment within the network can substantially
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influence information access, requiring administrators to balance a number of issues
including performance, flexibility, and costs to maximize information access.
Filters installed on individual workstations (also called client-side filters) are
usually part of a full security suite that includes antivirus, firewall, and other security
protections. Client-side filtering can be enhanced by the filtering capabilities of most
traditional Web browsers. Workstation based filtering/security solutions are only feasible
for home users or small schools/districts because of manageability issues. This type of
deployment requires individual workstation configuration and cannot accommodate sitewide policies that apply to all computers (Enex Testlab, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009).
Since most school districts have many networked computers at distributed locations,
they require standalone solutions consisting of a dedicated database server and a separate
gateway or firewall that executes the content filtering policy (Thomas & Stoddard, 2011).
Moreover, tech savvy users can easily bypass client-side filtering solutions to access
blocked content.
Filters can be deployed at various points on the network, including on a dedicated
server, bridging the filtering server between the access point and the rest of the network
or installing the filtering product on a proxy server through which all Internet traffic is
routed. Filtering at the network level is a better choice for institutions with distributed
locations because filtering policies are created once on the gateway and then pushed
down to individual desktops (Enex Testlab, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009; Thomas &
Stoddard, 2012). Networked filtering solutions require maximum performance as they
must monitor and filter traffic from many simultaneous users, a standard that is difficult
to achieve unless they are installed on dedicated high performance servers or appliances

46
with special network hardware. Networked filtering deployment is typically less
vulnerable to hacking and similar security risks (Nicoletti, 2009).
A disadvantage of the dedicated appliance solution is the added expense of
purchasing and managing two separate hardware devices along with the filtering
software. Additional storage is required for the database server as the database of Web
sites increases. Websense and SurfControl are two well-known software/server solution
vendors. Some school districts choose integrated solutions that combine management and
processing on one gateway or firewall, thus reducing hardware and operational expenses.
However, when the gateway also houses anti-virus and intrusion prevention, performance
can be degraded (Enex Testlab, 2011; Gossett & Shorter, 2012).
Filtering can also occur at the ISP (Internet Service Provider) or carrier level. ISPs
offer their customers a full suite of security services, including firewalling, antivirus,
anti-spam, and Web filtering. These security solutions, which are suitable for all kinds of
institutions and home users, are installed on servers at the ISP level. The quality
and extent of customization of this filtering solution depends on the product purchased.
Products that offer basic security services do not allow much user configuration, but if
higher quality, more expensive filtering/security products are purchased they enable the
institution-based IT administrator to implement a full suite of institution-defined filtering
policies remotely. ISP-based filtering performance (speed) is usually not an issue as they
are optimized to handle millions of concurrent users with minimum delay (Banday &
Shah, 2010; Enex Testlab, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009).

47
Content Filtering Challenges
Administrators and policymakers have many options and challenges to weigh
when selecting a filtering solution and establishing filtering policies. Increasing online
threats from email, chat rooms, peer-to-peer sharing sites, spam, viruses, worms, etc.,
demand that school districts not only filter objectionable Internet content, but also content
that could subject the network to the aforementioned threats (Thomas & Stoddard, 2011).
Additionally, filtering policies must combat non-educational use, bandwidth consuming
content, legal liability, and security breaches (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Nicoletti, 2009).
To address these challenges, the latest security solutions combine security
functions such as firewalls, antivirus protection, Web content filtering, anti-spam,
spyware prevention, intrusion detection and prevention, Internet Protocol security, and
bandwidth management. These security solutions, also known as unified treat
management (UTM) appliances, dynamically control Web traffic at the organization's
gateway providing inline examination of Web content, SSL traffic, Web 2.0 applications,
and various network protocols to classify dynamic content in real time (Ramaswami,
2010; Enex Testlab, 2011). For most school districts, the greatest challenge to
implementation of this type security appliance is cost. According to Ramaswami, “K-12
schools rarely have the budget to invest in these next-generation security tools, which
involve the cost of upgrades, maintenance, and user training (p. 27).” Consequently,
schools are relying on traditional filtering software, which typically blocks entire sites
instead of dynamically scanning Web sites to block inappropriate content and allow
appropriate content.
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Computer-savvy users have discovered numerous ways to circumvent filters and
exploit built in weaknesses of some commercial filtering tools. Some URL filters use
only the domain name, not including the IP address, allowing users to input a Web page's
IP address to access blocked content. Even when the filter uses both IP addresses and
URLs to block content, it is possible for circumventors to take each number in the IP
address and convert it to a hexadecimal, then enter it into the browser’s address bar.
Scripts to compute hexadecimal format are readily available on the Internet. Web
publishers use techniques that cause inappropriate content to be unfiltered and passed on
to the user (Fuchs, 2012). Illegal content can be disguised using JavaScript, which some
filtering software cannot parse or interpret. Another common ploy is to assign safe labels
to inappropriate content. Therefore, filtering based on labels is not very accurate (Hidalgo
et al., 2009).
The use of proxies to bypass filtering mechanisms is the greatest challenge to
content filtering implementation according to Gossett and Shorter (2011). When techsavvy users want to bypass the filter to access blocked content, they utilize a variety of
proxies including public and private Web-based proxy sites, proxy clients installed on
flash drives and on remote computers, or by simply changing the browser configuration
to use an open proxy (Chen & Wang, 2010; Varadharajan, 2010). The most effective
method to counteract circumvention is via packet inspection, certificate examination, and
other heuristic techniques (Nicoletti, 2009; Varadharajan). Nevertheless, Gossett and
Shorter (2011) claim it is virtually impossible to prevent private proxy servers from being
used to circumvent most firewall schemes. The Online Safety and Technology Working
Group (OSTWG) (2010)—a group established pursuant to the Protecting Children in the
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21st Century Act of 2008—concluded that even though software manufacturers advertise
circumvention-proof filtering products, tech-savvy users seem to find a way to outsmart
the filter to access prohibited content.
Users can also circumvent filters using other methods including alternative
protocols (i.e. FTP, telnet, HTTPS) or searching in a different language. Language
translation can be used to confuse the filter by converting a blocked Web site to a
language that the filter does not support. Even when users cannot access external proxies,
they can use low-tech circumvention methods such as viewing the cached versions of
blocked Web sites via search engines like Google (Hidalgo et al.). Effective filtering
solutions support multiple languages, and inspect/rate many different Internet protocols.
Filtering solutions have the added challenge of inspecting email traffic and making block
or allow decisions based upon the content filtering policy (Nicoletti, 2009).
Establishing a safe and secure online environment has become an ongoing
challenge. Nicoletti (2009) characterized the content filtering challenge in the following
statement: “Content filtering is a fast-paced battle of new technologies and the relentless
trumping of these systems by subversion and evasion” (p. 743). Yet, IT administrators
must allow access to information and resources that support the school district’s
education mission. In addition to supporting the district’s education mission, filtering
policies must also enforce districts' AUPs, which should work in concert with other
approaches such as online safety education, digital citizenship education, and constant
monitoring of students' online activities (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012; OSTWG,
2010). Filtering policies that are not carefully configured to minimize over-blocking can
lead to censorship, but can be effective tools “when chosen, configured, and monitored
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carefully” (Johnson, 2012, p. 87). However, the AUP must clearly delineate appropriate
online behavior and specify ramifications when the policy is violated. In summary, the
literature suggests that the enormous challenges to achieving online safety for minors can
only be accomplished through a multifaceted approach with filtering technologies being
one facet (Losinski, 2009; OSTWG; Sutton, 2012; Varadharajan, 2010).
Filtering and Safety Policy Implementation Issues
Filtering Policy Configuration Issues
Filtering policies are an extension of an organization’s Internet safety policy, and
govern filtering software configuration. Filters work in concert with AUPs to manage
users’ online access and to prevent Internet abuses such as accessing inappropriate
Internet content (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Thomas & Stoddard, 2011). The literature review
suggests that the most prevalent filtering policy concerns emanate from the way school
districts are implementing filtering policies. The filtering debate continues among
educators, not so much in regards to the constitutionality of filtering Internet content, but
regarding how filtering and safety policies are being implemented in school districts
(AASL, 2012; Fuchs, 2012; Ott et al., 2010). Establishing filtering policies involves the
consideration of several factors having considerable influence on end users’ access to
information and resources. These factors include:
•

Determining which categories to block—beyond what CIPA mandates—and
whether to fine-tune some blocked categories to allow access to non-objectionable
content within the category. Most filtering solutions provide granular category
blocking, which allows administrators to block entire content categories or limit
blocking to specific subcategories (See Figure 1);
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•

Determining the level of involvement stakeholders (IT staff, administrators,
faculty, parents, and students) will have in filtering policy decisions;

•

Determining who will be granted filter override privileges and;

•

Determining whether the same filtering policy will apply to all users or whether to
customize the filtering policy according to specific user groups (i.e., setting
different policies for elementary students, secondary students, and staff).

Figure 1. Example of Fortigate’s® granular category interface.
The literature outlines various best practices for establishing effective filtering
policies in order to maximize access to information in a secure environment. Overblocking can be minimized if the filtering product provides a granular category list that
can be expanded into subcategories (as shown in Figure 1), thereby, enabling IT
administrators to set different policy actions for each subcategory (Nicoletti, 2009; Hua,
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2011). Filtering policies and rules should be developed by a committee, including
representatives from various stakeholder groups in order to lessen filtering issues and
provide greater access to education resources (Baule, 2010; Jansen, 2010; Johnson,
2012). Collaborative content filtering decision-making increases staff buy-in as end users
will have a greater understanding of the reasons for filtering policy decisions. Hua
recommends that filtering policies be tailored for specific user groups such as elementary
students, secondary students, educators, and administrators. For example, teachers may
need to access certain Web content (i.e., pro-Nazi Web sites) for instructional purposes,
but the policy could be set to prevent students from accessing this content. Filtering/usage
policies should define what content is blocked in addition to user profiles and their access
privileges. An effective filtering solution provides a wide range of categories and makes
it possible to establish sophisticated user profiles that meet the research, educational, or
professional needs of all user groups (Hua; Ott et al., 2010). Finally, SLMS,
administrators, or technical support personnel on each campus should be granted override
privileges so users will have timely access to curriculum-related information and
resources (Ott et al.; Willard, 2010b).
Recent experiential literature suggests that policymakers, administrators, and IT
personnel may be establishing and implementing filtering policies without considering
the aforementioned best practices. The literature also implies that these policy decisions
are having adverse effects on users’ access to information and teachers’ abilities to
deliver instruction. Baule (2010) notes that districts are also blocking non-educational
content and content that threaten network bandwidth, efficiency, and security. Many
school districts are interpreting CIPA's requirements too broadly and have established
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overly restrictive filtering polices that prohibit access to any Web site that may be
potentially troublesome (Johnson, 2012; Maycock, 2011; Pierce, 2012). Issues, such as
lack of override privileges for designated school-based staff and highly restrictive filter
configurations, are impeding instructional activities and compromising student safety
(Willard, 2010b). Lastly, Willard states the override process in many districts consumes
too much time and is a major frustration for end users.
Many factors motivate school districts to implement overly restrictive filtering
policies. These factors include: fear of negative publicity or litigation, the notion that
tighter filters keep students safer, adherence to parent and community sentiment,
concerns that looser filter settings will encourage misuse of Internet resources,
and bandwidth preservation (Baule, 2010; Fuchs, 2012; Losh & Jenkins, 2012).
Additionally, proponents for less restrictive technology policies report that policymakers
are implementing more stringent Internet access policies because of fears about Internet
predators, cyber bullying, students posting inappropriate content on social networks, and
the proliferation of sexually explicit or violent online content (Ahn et al., 2011; Bush &
Hall, 2011; Rodgers, 2012).
Misinterpretation of CIPA’s regulations may result in highly restrictive filtering
policies. The U. S. Department of Education’s (2010) NETP concludes that in some cases
lack of understanding of CIPA’s mandates creates “barriers to the rich learning
experiences that Internet access should afford students” (p. 54). Willard (2010b) provides
more insight into school districts’ decisions to implement tight filtering controls. Willard
states that over-blocking is often the result of misunderstanding CIPA’s requirements or
results when administrators rely solely on filters to prevent non-educational use.
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Sometimes, filtering policies are configured according to the mistaken interpretation that
CIPA requires schools to block all controversial content and prevent students from
communicating with each other online—not strictly to block visual images that are
obscene, contain child pornography, or are harmful to minors (Jansen, 2010; Johnson,
2012). However, blocking access to content other than adult sexual materials is at the
school district’s discretion as NCIPA stipulates. Sometimes filter overriding is prohibited
because of misunderstanding CIPA’s disabling provision. The confusion stems from the
term “disabling,” which means turning the filter off and is used in the CIPA law to
prevent constitutional challenges; and the term “overriding,” which means providing
access to sites blocked erroneously. The disabling provision was the key reason the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of CIPA in United States v. American Library
Association).
Additional Safety Policy Issues
CIPA requires school districts to develop and implement Internet safety policies,
in addition to technology protection measures, to prevent the dangers of the Web from
infiltrating the educational environment. AUPs generally address users’ online rights and
responsibilities, outline ramifications for policy violations, describe acceptable and
unacceptable uses, and outline a code of ethical conduct for utilizing technology
resources (CoSN, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009). More recently, the Protecting Children in
the 21st Century Act (2008) added an Internet safety education component to the AUP,
which was to be implemented no later July 2012. The literature suggests there are various
safety policy issues that may be undermining students’ online safety. These issues
include over reliance on filtering technology and outdated AUPs.
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Internet safety authorities maintain relying solely on filtering technology can
undermine students’ online safety and is counterproductive. Willard (2010a) observes
that schools are placing too much emphasis on CIPA's filtering requirement as opposed to
its Internet safety policy requirement. Over reliance on filtering technology has resulted
in ineffective Internet safety education in schools. Content filtering can also generate a
false sense security, causing educators to be less vigilant about monitoring students'
online activities (Johnson, 2012; Nantais & Cockerline, 2010; Ott et al., 2010). Willard
(2010b) notes that the false security notion leads to a failure to teach students how to
respond to or prevent inadvertent access to inappropriate content. Adams (2010) argues
that school districts are relying mostly on filters to protect children from Internet dangers,
and concludes this approach does not teach students to be informed Internet
searchers who know how to evaluate the accuracy of information or how to navigate the
Internet safely and responsibly. Adams adds that filters only protect students when they
are using the Internet in schools and libraries, not when they access the Internet in
unfiltered locations or on wireless devices such as cell phones.
Internet use policies should be continuously reviewed and updated regularly to
ensure they are relevant and address the latest technological advances (CoSN, 2011;
Hidalgo et al., 2009). Nevertheless, Hidalgo et al. cite recent AUP research that indicated
many institutions' AUPs were outdated, inconsistent, and did not address the everincreasing range of Web-related applications including filtering circumventors (proxies
and anonymizers), Web-based file sharing applications, instant messaging, and other
Web protocols. Jansen (2010) examined 30 public school Internet safety policies in April,
2010, and found that only a few had been updated since October 2008 and even fewer

56
had updated their policies to include the Internet safety education component mandated
by the 2008 Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act. Outdated AUPs cannot
effectively address today’s online safety challenges. The literature suggests AUPs, not
filters, are the cornerstone of an effective online safety strategy. Successful AUP
implementation mandates that the policy is comprehensive, updated frequently,
developed collaboratively with all stakeholders, and focuses on safety awareness and
education (CoSN; Endicott-Popovsky, 2009).
Internet Safety Policy Issues and 21st Century Teaching and Learning Standards
Outmoded filtering and Internet use policies—developed for Web 1.0 (static, read
only Web content)—appear to be refueling the filtering debate (Quillen, 2010), which
had mostly been dormant during the years immediately following the Supreme Court’s
2003 decision upholding CIPA. The debate is not about whether or not to filter, but about
issues surrounding the use of Web 1.0 filtering techniques to filter dynamic Web 2.0
traffic. Moreover, concerns have arisen regarding the use of outdated Internet access
policies that do not effectively address Web 2.0 safety concerns (Bosco & Krueger, 2011;
Lemke et al., 2009). The evolution of Web 2.0, also known as the “Read/Write Web,”
provides additional evidence, which implies that school districts may need to re-examine
current filtering and safety policies in order to prepare students to live and work in the
21st century (Ahn et al., 2011).
The Promise and Perils of Web 2.0
Web 2.0 is a rapidly expanding and popular genre of Web applications having a
marked influence on 21st century culture. Lemke et al. (2009) define Web 2.0 as “an
online application that uses the World Wide Web . . . as a platform and allows for
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participatory involvement, collaboration and interactions among users” (p. 5). Thousands
of free Web 2.0 applications have recently become available. Some of the most used
applications include:
•

Social networking sites such as Facebook™ and Twitter™ where users create
personal pages and interact;

•

Blogs (Web logs), online diaries where the originator and readers comment on a
variety of topics;

•

Wikis such as Wikipedia, which are topical collections of information that users
collectively create, add to, and edit;

•

Social bookmarking sites such as Del.icio.us™ and Flickr™ where users share
Internet bookmarks and create descriptive tags to organize resources such as
videos and pictures; and

•

Cloud computing applications such as Google Docs™, which are online suites of
applications that allow users to import, share or collaboratively edit documents,
spreadsheets, and presentations (Bush & Hall, 2011; Lemke et al.; Simkins &
Schultz, 2010).
Just as with Web 1.0, technology enthusiasts and many educators are proclaiming

the enormous promise of Web 2.0 technologies to transform 21st century teaching and
learning. Simkins and Schultz (2010) state the hallmark of the read/write Web is its
ability to foster interaction, collaboration, and group productivity. Bush and Hall (2011)
purport the participative nature of these applications is shifting the focus from
individualized work to collaborative efforts, from isolated learning to collective
knowledge, and changing learners from passive recipients of knowledge to active
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participants in the creation of knowledge. Web 2.0 has the potential to address the needs
of different types of learners and to engage learners; make schoolwork more relevant for
learners; enhance communication, collaboration, and critical thinking skills; expand
learning beyond the classroom and the school day; and build a sense of community
(CoSN, 2011). For many of the same reasons, these collaborative tools can also enhance
professional development for educators (Bush & Hall).
There is widespread use of social, participative, and collaborative technologies in
the larger society—for personal, business, entertainment, communication, educational,
and political purposes. Despite a ubiquitous presence in the outside world and substantial
educational potential, Web 2.0 use in schools is restricted (Ahn et al., 2011). These
applications have fueled renewed Internet safety concerns and fears of misuse.
Consequently, many school districts are setting filters to block access to social
networking sites such as Twitter™ and Facebook™ (Ahn et al.; Lemke et al., 2009) to
protect students from Web 2.0 perils. Some school districts are going beyond blocking
social networking sites to block all Web 2.0 sites, including collaborative tools such as
wikis, blogs, Flickr™, Google Docs™, and Del.icio.us™ (Bush & Hall, 2011; Johnson,
2012; Losh & Jenkins, 2012). Schools are denying or restricting access to participative
online tools for several reasons including:
•

Fear that predators may be lurking on social networking sites to target susceptible
youth;

•

Concerns that Web 2.0 resources use too much bandwidth;

•

Concerns that these tools promote non-educational activities;

•

Concerns that students will post inappropriate content online;
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•

Lack of awareness of the educational value of Web 2.0 technologies;

•

The notion that social media is inundated with inappropriate content;

•

Concerns that access to these tools will subject schools to litigation; and

•

Concerns that students will be exposed to or engage in cyber bullying (Ahn et al.;
Brooks-Young, 2010; Lemke et al.; Losh & Jenkins).

Loertscher (2009) defines three categories of technology access policies being
implemented in school districts, each having a different effect on Web 2.0 and
information access:
•

Very restrictive filter settings, no access to cloud computing/Web 2.0 tools.

•

Strong firewall allowing access to selected Web sites, multimedia resources, and
Web 2.0 tools such as internal wikis, blogs, and internal communication tools.

•

Light filtering (only what CIPA requires) allows access to any online tool that has
educational potential. The focus is on teaching responsible technology use.

It is difficult to ascertain from the literature the extent to which the three technology
access categories are being implemented in school districts, or the extent of Web 2.0
access issues, because few studies have investigated school districts’ filter configuration
tendencies.
Twenty-First Century Learning Standards
Web 2.0 filtering issues have implications for teaching and attainment of 21st
century learning standards. Assessments of existing filtering technologies indicate these
technologies are not adept at distinguishing education-specific Web 2.0 content from
non-educational Web 2.0 content (Fuchs, 2012; OSTWG, 2010; Quillen, 2010).
Therefore, filtering tools typically make a “block all Web 2.0 content” decision, or “allow
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all such content” decision instead of allowing the good content and blocking the
objectionable content. When the “block all Web 2.0 content” decision is made, access to
information and resources necessary for attaining 21st century learning standards is
limited (Jansen, 2010). Full integration of Web 2.0 applications into instruction provides
a wealth of real-world learning opportunities that prepare students to live and work in an
Internet-powered world (Manzo, 2009).
A major goal of the most recent International Society for Technology in
Education (ISTE) and American Association of School Librarians (AASL) national
standards is to prepare students to thrive in a global and digital world (AASL, 2007;
ISTE, 2007). These standards enable students to acquire the Partnership for the 21st
Century’s (2011) five learning and thinking proficiencies: critical thinking and problemsolving skills, communication skills, collaboration skills, contextual learning skills, and
information and media literacy skills. Access to the read/write Web fosters achievement
of all these proficiencies, but the participative and collaborative nature of most Web 2.0
resources is particularly critical for attaining 21st century communication and
collaboration skills (Jansen, 2010; Ott et al., 2010). Table 3 includes the AASL and ISTE
standards that specifically address communication and collaboration skills. Technology
integration specialists and educators assert that Internet access policies restricting access
to Web 2.0 resources are counterproductive to attainment of these skills (Adams, 2010;
Shearer, 2010).
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Table 3. ISTE and AASL Collaboration and Communication-specific Learning
Standards
International Society for Technology in Education Standards for Students
Standard Communication and Collaboration
Students use digital media and environments to communicate and work
collaboratively, including at a distance, to support individual learning and
contribute to the learning of others. Students:
Performance Indicator a.
Interact, collaborate, and publish with peers, experts, or others employing a
variety of digital environments and media.
Performance Indicator c.
Develop cultural understanding and global awareness by engaging with
learners of other cultures.
Standard Digital Citizenship
Students understand human, cultural, and societal issues related to
technology and practice legal and ethical behavior. Students:
Performance Indicator a.
Advocate and practice safe, legal, and responsible use of information and
technology.
Performance Indicator b.
Exhibit a positive attitude toward using technology that supports
collaboration, learning, and productivity.
American Association of School Librarians Standards for the 21st Century Learner
Standard

Share knowledge and participate ethically and productively as members of
our democratic society.
Skill 3.1.2
Participate and collaborate as members of a social and intellectual network
of learners.
Responsibility 3.3.5
Contribute to the exchange of ideas within and beyond the learning
community.

Standard

Pursue personal and aesthetic growth
Skill 4.1.7
Use social networks and information tools to gather and share information.
Responsibility 4.3.1
Participate in the social exchange of ideas, both electronically and in person.
Responsibility 4.3.4
Practice safe and ethical behaviors in personal electronic communication and
interaction.
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The Implications of Filtering and Safety Policy Implementation
CIPA has been fully implemented in K-12 schools for more than a decade, yet
few studies have examined how CIPA compliant filtering and safety policies are
influencing teaching and learning in institutions implementing these policies. The
research literature in this domain is not definitive and is largely anecdotal according to
Rodgers (2012). Nevertheless, anecdotal studies provide foundational data, which
suggests restrictive technology use policies are hampering technology integration and
limiting access to online resources that enhance learning (Finsness, 2008; Fuchs, 2012;
Holzhauer, 2009). More definitive and comprehensive studies are required to advance
understanding of how technology policies influence end users, and to inform policy
development and decision-making. The current study endeavored to address these gaps in
the literature. Previous filtering and safety policy related research is described and
analyzed in this section to provide the context of the current study. Moreover, pertinent
older research (2008-2009) is included to illustrate how the need for this study has
evolved.
The Effectiveness of Internet Filters
From the inception of the filtering debate, researchers began to evaluate the
effectiveness of Internet filters. Sutton (2012) states there has been an abundance of
literature on the effectiveness of filters, including studies and opinion pieces, because of
the legal debates emanating from legislative attempts to restrict minors’ access to
offensive online content. The results of early studies were often used to support the
implementation of filters or as evidence that filters were not the best approach to protect
minors from online indecency. These evaluations continue to be useful in the filter
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selection process as an initial screening of vendors (Hidalgo et al., 2009). Filter
effectiveness studies have led to improvements in filtering technology, but both public
and private studies concur filters continue to under-block and over-block (Sutton).
Hidalgo et al. (2009) describe two approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of
Web filtering tools—industrial evaluations and scientific evaluations. Industrial
evaluations typically test several products to determine their strengths and weakness and
are performed by a magazine or a third-party laboratory. The authors note several
weaknesses of industrial tests including their subjectivity and lack of rigor. For example,
performance evaluation is reported in unknown conditions (test set size and composition),
testing conditions may favor a specific vendor, performance measures are not supported
with statistical tests, and testing procedures are not transparent. Moreover, testing
conditions do not mirror real-world scenarios.
Scientific filter evaluations, which are often reported in scientific journals,
typically are set up in the context of well-defined experiments and are supported by
rigorous procedures and metrics. The experiments are conducted under laboratory
conditions, are reproducible, and the results can be compared to similar tests. Following
CIPA’s enactment in 2001, research studies began using more statistical approaches to
determine filtering effectiveness, whereas filter effectiveness tests prior to 2001 tended to
be less scientific and more anecdotal (Finsness, 2008).
Scientific filter testing is mostly limited to filtering accuracy (effectiveness)—the
degree of over-blocking and under-blocking. Efficiency (processing speed), which is
critical to real-world conditions, is rarely evaluated. The most salient deficiency of
scientific evaluation is the absence of standard data sets, procedures, and metrics
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(Hidalgo et al., 2009). Statistical measures can also be manipulated simply by changing
the number of acceptable sites in a test set. It is also difficult to identify a truly random
sample of Internet sites; such sites represent actual Web pages that users are likely to
access. When statistical filter effectiveness studies report percentage summaries of
correctly or incorrectly blocked content, it is often based upon subjective judgments
about whether particular Web pages are appropriately blocked.
Despite the methodological issues with scientific filter tests, they persistently
conclude filters both over-block and under-block content at consistent and equivalent
rates, regardless of the filter or the filter’s settings (Houghton-Jan, 2010). Houghton-Jan
reports that for filter accuracy studies from 2001-2008, all tests combined yielded an
average accuracy rating of 78%. When isolating the results from the 2007-2008 tests, the
average accuracy rating increased to 83%, which suggests filtering technology may be
improving. However, Houghton-Jan notes filters were still wrong 17% of the time and
54% of the time on image content.
Since 2008, scientific filter tests have substantially diminished (Houghton-Jan,
2010). An exhaustive literature review uncovered only two filter evaluation studies
published after 2008, the results of which are similar to Houghton-Jan’s conclusions and
suggest filter effectiveness has not improved since 2008. Chou et al. (2010) empirically
evaluated the performance of three top-ranked filters, CyberSitter™, Net Nanny™, and
CyberPatrol™, to assess their performance against a proposed text mining filtering
approach. The average overall accuracy rating for the three commercial filtering products
was 68%, while an experimental content-based text mining approach achieved a 99%
accuracy rating. It is interesting to note the filtering product (CyberPatrol™) employing a
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combination of list-based and advanced content-based filtering techniques had an
accuracy rate of just 47%, while the two list-based products (CyberSitter™ and
NetNanny™) performed much better with accuracy rates of 78% and 66% respectively.
The researchers concluded commercial filters were particularly inadequate compared to
approaches employing classification algorithms. However, employing classification
algorithms, such as text mining, is impractical for most school districts, as they require
much more skill and resources than commercial filtering products.
Jeon et al. (2011) conducted a more recent filtering software evaluation of five
commercial products, which yielded conclusions similar to Chou et al’s (2010). Jeon et
al.’s empirical evaluation yielded an average filtering accuracy of 70% when filtering
harmful Web sites. The researchers also concluded that these products performed much
worse (below 50%) when blocking video, image, and executable files such as those often
found on social media and gaming Web sites.
The aforementioned studies indicate filtering technology continues to employ
mostly list-based filtering techniques (i.e. URL blacklists, keyword blacklists) which
result in considerable over-blocking and under-blocking. Jeon et al (2011) suggest that
until machine learning techniques are employed, filtering products will continue underperforming, and increasingly so in the era of ubiquitous social media and mobile
technologies. However, advanced filtering technologies that employ machine-learning
algorithms are impractical for most schools because of cost and efficiency (speed) issues
(Gossett & Shorter, 2011). Consequently, most school districts have implemented less
accurate, but more efficient and economical list-based filtering products (AASL, 2012).
Considering the inadequacies of technology protection measures, what remains largely
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unknown is the effect these tools are having on end users in the K-12 environment. In
addition, most filtering tools can be configured to limit over-blocking and underblocking, but are school districts configuring them to maximize information access?
The Influence of Filtering and Safety Policies on End Users
Finsness (2008) reports that the widespread implementation of filtering
technology has shifted the research focus from filter effectiveness to CIPA’s actual effect
on teaching and learning. Although, research into the influence of CIPA-inspired filtering
and safety policies is beginning to emerge, Jaeger and Yan (2009) conclude “relatively
small bodies of research have been generated about CIPA’s effects in public libraries and
public schools” (p. 6) and end users of these institutions. Nevertheless, a few notable
studies have investigated issues surrounding Internet blocking technology
implementation in public schools and libraries and how these issues affect users.
Holzhauer (2009) investigated the effects of filtering on classroom instruction in
one small, rural school district. Teachers, administrators, and technology personnel of
two elementary schools, one high school, and one alternative school participated in the
study. Using quantitative methodology, the researcher surveyed technology personnel to
determine the degree of filtering restrictiveness at the local level and surveyed
administrators and teachers to determine if filtering affected classroom Internet usage.
The study concluded that the district’s filtering policies limited access to Web-based
resources required for instruction and contributed to teacher reluctance to integrate
computers into instruction. Another significant finding of the study was the apparent lack
of communication and stakeholder involvement in the development and implementation
of the district’s filtering policy. These factors contributed to teacher frustration and
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reluctance to integrate technology fully into instruction, but administrators and
technology personnel were mostly satisfied with the effectiveness of the filtering policy.
This study was also limited in scope as it involved only one school district. A number of
filtering policy issues was identified, but what remains unknown is the pervasiveness of
these issues in other school districts. The researcher pointed out that the data and research
results were relevant specifically for the school district involved in the study, and was not
applicable to the larger population. Holzhauer recommended that similar studies be
conducted in other school districts for comparative purposes.
Finsness (2008) examined whether content filters prevented high school students
from accessing information required for Minnesota’s Academic Standards. Finsness also
explored how teachers and technology administrators reacted when students were denied
access to information required to meet learning standards. This dissertation study was
largely qualitative, including in-depth interviews with six district technology
administrators and nine high school health and social studies teachers from 9 of
Minnesota’s 339 independent school districts. The study concluded that the level of
filtering (from less restrictive to more restrictive) affected students’ ability to access
information needed to meet Minnesota’s health and social studies standards. The study
also concluded that additional research was required to inform CIPA-compliant policy
and practice. As with Holzhauer’s (2009) research, Finsness’ study was limited in scope,
involving representatives from only nine school districts. In addressing the study’s
limitations the researcher states, “The data were anecdotal data collected from a small
population” (p.154). Finsness also noted that the results of the study could provide
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baseline data for subsequent investigations into the implications of public school Internet
filtering.
Fuchs (2012) conducted a critical ethnographic investigation of how filtering the
Internet was affecting public education in North Carolina. Through the collective voices
of 50 participating IT directors, administrators, and teachers, Fuchs concluded that
misapplied local policies and insufficient staff development for using filtered Internet
instruction contributed to restricted access to online educational content. The results of
this qualitative investigation were similar to the aforementioned studies and add
supporting evidence that filtering and safety policies are adversely influencing teaching
and learning. However, generalizability of the results is limited because of inherent
weaknesses of qualitative methodology.
A few studies have focused on SLMS’s views of how filtering and safety polices
are affecting teaching and learning. Harris' (2009b) research analyzed SLMS' postings
to LM_NET, AASL's (American Association of School Librarians) online discussion
group, to determine SLMS' perceptions of online information literacy instructional
challenges. The study revealed that Internet use policies and procedures presented a
major challenge to teaching students how to search, select, and assess the meaning and
value of information found online. SLMS' LM_NET postings reflect frustrations
regarding filtering policy implementation and procedures that limited access to online
content. They described cumbersome unblocking procedures, blocking entire categories
of tools (i.e., wikis and blogs), and certain domains of Web sites (Geocities and
Wikipedia). Postings also revealed that in many cases filtering configurations were not
fine-tuned so that distinctions were made between education-related Web 2.0 applications
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and non-education-related applications. Problems of limited access were exacerbated by
SLMS not being granted filter override privileges to provide timely access to erroneously
blocked content and poorly maintained filtering and security systems. The major
limitation of this study was that it reflected only the views of SLMS who posted
messages, not the feelings of lurkers or non-members of the discussion group. Therefore,
the findings cannot be generalized to the larger population of SLMS. In addition, Harris
noted that the coding process used to analyze the data was subjective, which further
limited the applicability of the results to other settings.
More recently, AASL (2012) collected data on filtering in schools as part of its
annual School Libraries Count longitudinal survey. This survey, which involved 4,299
SLMS, was the most comprehensive filtering/safety policy research to date, relative to
the number of participants and the range of filtering/safety policy issues addressed. The
study addressed the types of filters, online safety approaches, educational content most
often blocked, timeliness of unblocking procedures, differentiated filtering for various
user groups, and the impact of filtering on learning. Major conclusions of this study
according to Devaney (2013) were that Web filtering impedes learning and prevents
students from taking advantage of learning’s social potential. More than half (52%) of
respondents indicated internet filters impeded student research, particularly keyword
searches. Even though most respondents reported filtering decreased distractions and the
need for direct supervision, AASL concluded, “filtering continues to be an important
issue for most schools” (Title page, para. 2) because many schools are filtering beyond
CIPA requirements, thereby impeding learning. This study was comprehensive in many
respects; however, it was limited in that only quantitative data were collected and did not
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investigate filtering policy decision making from the perspective of technology
administrators.
The aforementioned studies mostly focused on the effect of CIPA’s filtering
strategy on information access and end users, but CIPA employs two strategies to protect
minors while online. Few studies have focused on the effect of CIPA’s safety awareness
strategy. Yan's (2010) quasi-experimental research compared high school students’
Internet access in a filtered environment to undergraduate students’ access in an
unfiltered environment to investigate differences in basic knowledge and perceived
cognizance of Internet safety protection strategies. The study also investigated CIPA’s
influence on students' Internet use at home and school. Yan states Internet safety
awareness and sufficient Internet safety educational experiences are fundamental for
protecting students from harmful online content and encounters. However, the
study found that CIPA's Internet safety strategies did not have a beneficial impact on
students' basic knowledge of Internet safety. CIPA has reduced students' Internet use at
school, but not outside; thereby reducing exposure to potentially harmful Internet content
at school. Nevertheless, CIPA does not positively influence students' online
behaviors outside of school. The results suggests that CIPA's filtering and
safety strategies, which are only enforced in schools and libraries, are not effective as
these venues are not the only places students can be exposed to harmful online materials.
Yan’s study was also limited in scope in that it involved students from only one high
school and focused only on CIPA’s Internet safety awareness approach.
A national survey of over 1600 educators also suggests that schools may not be
fully implementing CIPA’s safety awareness strategy as part of their Internet safety
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policies (National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), Educational Technology Policy
Research and Outreach, Microsoft Corporation, & Zogby International, 2010). The
NCSA et al. study revealed no concerted effort exists among educators or administrators
to teach safe and secure digital navigation and prepare students to be responsible digital
citizens and employees. Instead, the survey showed more than 90 percent of schools
relying mostly on filtering and blocking social-networking Web sites to protect students
from potentially harmful online materials (Pierce, 2010). This study used valid sampling
techniques to choose a broad spectrum of participants, but the survey focused mostly on
one aspect of CIPA—cyber safety awareness and education. A comprehensive
investigation of other issues surrounding school districts’ filtering and safety policy
development and implementation was not conducted.
Social Media (Web 2.0) Access Policies
Research is beginning to emerge that provides an indication of how Internet
access policies may be influencing access to Web 2.0 resources in schools. To establish a
baseline for Web 2.0 policies, practices and perspectives in American K-12 schools,
Lemke et al. (2009) conducted a national study involving superintendents, curriculum
directors, and technology directors. The study reported that Web 2.0 use is mostly guided
by pre-Web 2.0 policies that include AUP’s, Web filtering, and informal practices.
Policies that specifically address Web 2.0 use are limited, typically are restrictive, and are
more reactive than proactive. The majority of the survey respondents agreed that Web 2.0
resources can positively influence teaching and learning, but acknowledged concerns
about balancing Web 2.0’s educational potential with safety issues.
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TICAL (Technology Information Center for Administrative Leadership)
conducted an informal survey of educators including principals, district administrators,
technology directors, curriculum specialists, SLMS, and classroom teachers to get their
perspective on the promise of Web 2.0 tools, obstacles to their use in teaching and
learning, and overcoming these barriers. Almost 90% believed Web 2.0 resources had the
potential to enhance instruction and increase student engagement. However, nearly half
of these respondents said district filtering and Internet safety policies were a major barrier
to realizing the educational potential of this technology (Simkins & Schultz, 2010).
More recent studies continue to show there is a stark difference in the use of
technology in and out of school, particularly social media technologies. Ahn et al. (2011)
analyzed 217 district AUPs to determine how they framed social media access in schools.
A major finding was that the majority of AUPs made no mention of social media
technologies and 14% of districts banned social media entirely. The researchers
concluded that while some AUPs implied social media tools might be useful educational
resources, just a few clearly stated that social media had potential educational value. A
major recommendation of the study was that additional studies of this nature would
forward understanding of how technology policies influence educator practices.
Contribution to the Literature
This study addressed the limitations of the aforementioned studies. These studies
were limited because they were either anecdotal or did not use a combination of data
collection methods to comprehensively investigate the filtering and safety policy issues
identified in the literature. This research enlisted a large number of participants from
thirty-six school districts and used multiple data collection methods. Investigating the
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research problem on a broader scale enabled a more comprehensive investigation of the
major safety policy issues and how they influence information access and 21st century
instruction.
This research also addressed existing gaps in the literature about districts’ filtering
and safety policy predilections. What remained to be determined was the actual level of
filtering restrictiveness schools districts were implementing, what specific categories
were being blocked, what circumstances prompt filtering category blocking decisions,
and how these decisions affect access to information and resources required for 21st
century teaching and learning. This study sought to address these unanswered questions,
which are essential for district policymakers and stakeholders seeking to revise Internet
use policies or evaluate the effectiveness of existing policies.
Filtering and safety policy related literature is largely opinion-based or
prescriptive (Sutton, 2012) and lacks a solid research base (Rodgers, 2012), which is an
essential element of informed policy making. Researchers have acknowledged the
difficulty of designing research studies that determine the effect filters have on
information access. This investigation was cumulative in that it added to existing research
about the influence of Internet filtering on student learning. It also provides descriptive
data about the types of information and resources filters block, and reveals the outcome
of filtering policy decisions on attainment of specific 21st century learning standards.
Chapter Summary
This literature review established a conceptual framework for the study of
filtering and safety policies, surveyed issues surrounding filtering and safety policy
implementation in public K-12 schools, and the manner in which these issues converge to
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influence 21st century teaching and learning. An analysis of relevant research was
conducted to establish the basis and need for this research.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Introduction
This chapter restates the research problem and reiterates the purpose of this study.
It provides an overview of the research design and the rationale for employing the
research methodology. This section also describes the data collection instruments, defines
the data collection procedures, outlines the measures used to ensure that the research
design and instruments yield valid and reliable data, and describes the participants and
sample selection procedures. Finally, the data analysis and presentation methods are
briefly explained along with a description of the resources used for this investigation.
Restatement of the Problem
School districts have implemented filtering and safety policies in response to
legislative and social mandates to protect students from the proliferation of objectionable
Internet content. The literature suggests these policies are more restrictive than legal
mandates require and are adversely affecting information access and instruction. There is
no clear understanding of the manner in which filtering and safety policies are affecting
teaching and learning because no comprehensive studies have investigated the issues and
trends surrounding filtering and safety policy implementation or the implications of these
issues for end users. Policymakers need this type of research-based data as they evaluate
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and revise Internet use policies in order to enhance instruction and provide greater access
to the most recent online learning technologies.
Purpose of the Study
The goal of this research was to examine Internet filtering and safety policy
implementation in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools to determine current trends and
issues and the way these policies influence information access and instruction. The study
investigated the following research questions:
•

How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools?

•

What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered
computers?

•

How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues

•

In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards?

Research Method
To accomplish the research goal, the researcher utilized a mixed methods research
design including both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Ivankova et al., (2006)
suggest neither quantitative nor qualitative approaches by themselves are adequate to
“capture the trends and details of a situation” (p. 3). Therefore, a mixed methods strategy
was implemented; quantitative data from mostly closed ended surveys was collected and
analyzed. Data analysis from the quantitative phase informed the second phase of the
study, which entailed the collection and analysis of qualitative data. Creswell and Plano
Clark (2007) state when researchers utilize this approach, they typically use qualitative
data to develop a better understanding of the data collected during the quantitative phase
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of the study. Moreover, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) contend a multi-method research
design is superior to single methods because it enables data triangulation, the use of a
variety of data sources in a study. The study utilized data collected from multiple surveys,
interviews, and analyses of artifacts (AUPs). Triangulation also enabled this investigation
to overcome weaknesses or inherent biases of single method studies and provides a
deeper understanding of the research problem. Creswell (2009) suggests that combining
qualitative and quantitative approaches provide a more accurate portrayal by revealing
trends and generalizations and provide an expanded understanding of the research
problem.
This investigation was primarily descriptive in nature. Gay, Mills, and Airasian
(2011) state quantitative descriptive or survey research is undertaken to answer questions
regarding the current status of the research topic or to gather information about
preferences, practices, or concerns of a target group. Accordingly, the initial quantitative
phase of this study provides an overview of the filtering and safety policy implementation
trends and issues in South Carolina’s public schools. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009)
explain that “quantitative questionnaires can be used to generate large numbers of
responses that produce information across a broad range of survey topics” (p. 240).
However, it was not possible to address the research questions sufficiently via
quantitative data only. It was therefore imperative to include a qualitative phase to answer
the research questions more conclusively.
Instrument Development and Alignment to Research Questions
Prior to developing the online surveys for this study, the researcher was cognizant
that online surveys are not as advantageous as once believed and typically have a lower
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response rate than paper-based surveys (Lefever, Dal, & Mattiasdottir, 2007). On the
other hand, they provide the timeliest and most cost efficient data collection method.
Web-based surveys are also practical for well-defined population groups whose e-mail
addresses can be obtained easily (Rea & Parker, 2005). Because the intended population
was homogeneous with respect to a key variable, profession, lower response rate was less
of an issue for this study. Lefever et al. also state online surveys provide an effective way
to access large and geographically distributed populations and are particularly useful for
collecting preliminary data. This study utilized survey data to obtain an overview of the
issues and trends relative to filtered Internet access and follow-up interviews were
utilized to gain a deeper understanding of these issues. Consequently, the inherent
disadvantages of Web-based surveys were mitigated.
Two surveys, an IT administrators’ survey and a SLMS’ survey (see Appendix B
and Appendix C), were designed to achieve the research goal and answer the research
questions. The surveys were grounded in the research literature and gathered descriptive
data that enabled a deeper understanding of South Carolina public schools’ filtering and
safety policy issues. Survey items focused on the following filtering and safety policy
issues as identified in the literature: content category blocking decisions and the rationale
for those decisions (Jansen, 2010; Johnson, 2012; Manzo, 2009; Willard, 2010b), the
implications of over-blocking and under-blocking (Jansen; Maycock, 2011; Willard,
2010b), the efficiency of unblocking procedures (AASL, 2012; Harris, 2009b; Quillen,
2010; Willard, 2010b), the effect of filtering policies on Web 2.0 access (Adams, 2010;
Losh & Jenkins, 2012; Manzo, 2009; Quillen, 2010), stakeholder involvement in
filtering/safety policy decisions (Baule, 2010; Johnson), distinct filtering policies for
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different user groups (AASL, 2012; Hua, 2011), and the role of Internet safety education
programs in overall student online safety (Adams, 2010; Willard, 2010a). It is important
to show how the research variables relate to the research questions and specific survey
items (Creswell, 2009). Table 4 provides a visual representation of the relationship
between the filtering and safety policy issues (variables) identified in the literature, the
research questions, and response items on the data collection instruments.
Table 4. Filtering/safety policy issues, research questions, and survey items
Filtering/Safety Policy
Research Question
Survey Item
Issue (Variables)
Content blocking
Research Question 1:
IT Survey questions 4, 6,7a, 7b:
considerations
How are filtering and
blocked content categories,
safety policies being
rationale for blocking decisions,
implemented in public
use of default filter settings, subschools?
category blocking
Stakeholder
involvement in policy
decisions

Research Question 1:
How are filtering and
safety policies being
implemented in public
schools?

IT survey question 5: who makes
blocking decisions
SLMS survey questions 2,7a:
who makes blocking decisions,
stakeholder input

Differentiated access
levels for specific
groups

Research Question 1:
How are filtering and
safety policies being
implemented in public
schools?

IT survey question 7e:
differentiated access
SLMS survey question 7d:
differentiated access

Over-blocking and
under-blocking

Research Question 2:
What issues do SLMS
encounter as they
facilitate information
access on filtered
computers?

IT survey question 9, 10: overblocking and under-blocking
frequency, blocking effectiveness
SLMS survey questions 3, 5, 6,
8a,8b, 8c: blocked educational
content, over-blocking and underblocking frequency, blocking
effectiveness, over-blocking
effect on instructional staff,
over-blocking effect on students,
under-blocking effect on students

Unblocking procedures

Research Question 2:

SLMS survey questions 4,7b,7c,
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Table 4 (continued)
Filtering/Safety Policy
Issue (Variables)

Research Question

Survey Item

What issues do SLMS
encounter as they
facilitate information
access on filtered
computers?

8d: timeliness of unblocking
process, filter override privileges,
blocked page notification,
unblocking efficiency
IT survey question 7c,7d, 7f,:
capability of overriding filter,
blocked page notification, filter
override privileges

Internet safety education

Research Question 3:
How are school districts
addressing Web 2.0 safety
issues?

IT survey question 8: programs
addressing cyber bullying and
social networking safety
education
SLMS survey question 7e, 8f:
programs addressing cyber
bullying and social networking
safety issues, effectiveness of
safety policies/practices

Web 2.0 accessibility

Research Question 4:
In what ways do filtering
policies impede access to
information and resources
necessary to achieve 21st
century technology and
information literacy
standards?

SLMS survey questions 4, 8e:
over-blocking of Web 2.0
resources, access to collaboration
and communication tools

The IT administrators’ survey was developed to gather descriptive data from IT
administrators and mostly addressed the first research question. The first research
question sought to determine how filtering and safety policies were being implemented in
South Carolina’s public schools. The IT survey consisted primarily of closed-ended
response items that could be easily analyzed, were less time-consuming for the
participant, and encouraged a higher response rate (Williams & Protheroe, 2008). A
comment section was included for most questions so that respondents could explain
responses or provide additional information. The IT survey sought to collect data about
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the types of content filters used in school districts, content categories that were blocked,
the rationale for blocking these categories, whether blocked categories are fine-tuned to
minimize over-blocking, Web filtering rules and how they were established, procedures
for unblocking legitimate content, and whether specific filter settings were established for
different user groups.
An SLMS survey consisting primarily of closed-ended response items was
developed to collect data about filtering/safety policy procedures/practices, and the
challenges end users encountered as a result of filtering/safety policy implementation.
The SLMS survey instrument focused mostly on the second research question regarding
the issues SLMS experience as they facilitate information access on filtered computers.
Most questions included a comment section so that respondents could explain responses
or provide additional information. The survey response items were based upon the
research literature and were designed to provide a better understanding of how content
filtering policies affect end users. Survey items focused on the effectiveness of content
filters, filtering/safety policy procedures and practices, instances when over-blocking and
under-blocking occurred, the nature of the information that was blocked, and the extent to
which filtering policies impeded access to constitutionally protected information.
The third research question sought to determine how school districts were
addressing Web 2.0 safety issues. To answer this question, the researcher examined
safety policies from 99% of the traditional school districts (excludes charter schools and
career centers). These policies, also known as Acceptable Use Policies, were examined
using an instrument designed to assess whether they had been updated to reflect the
FCC’s most recent mandate and referenced Web 2.0 safety issues. This mandate requires
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all E-rate discount recipients to amend their AUPs to provide for educating minors about
appropriate online behavior, including interacting with other individuals on social
networking Web sites and in chat rooms, and cyber bullying awareness and response
(Federal Communications Commission, 2011). This AUP amendment was to be
implemented by July 1, 2012. Additionally, the SLMS’ survey instrument and IT
administrators’ survey instrument included social networking and safety education
related response items and the SLMS’ interview protocol included response items that
investigated whether social networking safety issues were addressed via Internet safety
education programs. This data was analyzed to determine how school districts were using
Internet safety instruction to educate students about Web 2.0 safety concerns.
The fourth research question sought to determine how filtering policies impede
access to information and resources required to achieve communication and collaboration
related national technology and information literacy standards. The researcher identified
specific technology and information literacy standards that require online communication
and collaboration to address this question (see Table 3). Online communication and
collaboration necessitates access to Web 2.0 social technologies such as blogs, wikis,
podcasting, forums, and multimedia sharing for collaborative school projects. However,
proponents of less restrictive filtering polices suggest that many school districts are
configuring filters to block access to these online tools (Shearer, 2010; Losh & Jenkins,
2012). To determine how filtering policies are affecting the use of Web 2.0 collaborative
tools, the researcher reviewed school districts’ blocked content categories to determine if
Web 2.0 resources such as wikis, blogs, and social networks were blocked. The SLMS’
survey and interview responses were analyzed to determine if users were unable to access
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online communication and collaboration resources. SLMS were surveyed regarding
unblocking procedures and whether they provided timely access at the point of need
when Web 2.0 resources were blocked.
Qualitative data was collected during the second phase of the study. Qualitative
research is undertaken to deepen understandings about the way things are, why they are
that way, and how participants view them (Gay et al., 2011). Gay et al. also state
interviews are advantageous for qualitative data collection because they enable the
researcher to probe and explain phenomenon, are flexible to use, and can be recorded for
subsequent analysis. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) add that when interviews and
questionnaires (surveys) are used together in a study, they generate complex mixed data.
Quantitative survey data added breadth to the study and qualitative data allows depth of
understanding.
The interview protocol mirrored the survey in that it addressed each research
question and the issues identified in the literature (see Appendix E). The interview
protocol consisted of five question sets that addressed the following themes and
respective research questions (RQ): stakeholder involvement in policy decisions (RQ1),
unblocking/blocking procedures and practices (RQ1, RQ2), influence of over-blocking
and under-blocking on teaching/learning (RQ2), Internet safety education programs
(RQ3), and Web 2.0 safety and access issues (RQ3, RQ4). SLMS were asked to share
their perceptions of stakeholder involvement in Internet policy decisions,
unblocking/blocking procedures and practices, the influence of over-blocking and underblocking on teaching/learning, the effectiveness of Internet safety education programs,
and Web 2.0 safety and access issues. Qualitative data collected via the interview
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protocol added depth to the study by providing the personal experiences and impressions
of participants concerning filtering and safety policy implementation.
Validity and Reliability
Validity
There were various threats to the validity of the study and the researcher took
steps to minimize these threats. Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument
measures what it is supposed to measure (Gay et al, 2011). A valid instrument has
content validity. That is, it fairly and comprehensively covers the domain or issues that it
purports to cover (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2011). When designing the survey
instruments, the researcher ensured that the response items aligned with the research
questions. The researcher also ensured that the questionnaires were grounded in the
literature. That is, the questionnaires addressed the issues of concern enumerated in the
filtering and safety policy literature. Table 4 presents a visual display of significant
filtering and safety issues identified in the literature, identifies survey items that address
these issues, and aligns survey items to the research questions.
To increase validity, a panel of experts with extensive subject related background
reviewed the data collection instruments. The panel included two college professors, a
university library dean, and two IT administrators (see Appendix A), all of whom have
published articles or research relating to the research topic. Each panelist independently
rated each data collection item for relevance to the research questions, using a four-point
Likert scale: not relevant, slightly relevant, quite relevant, and very relevant. The
numerical values ranged from 4 for very relevant to 1 for not relevant. The mean score
for each item ranged from a high of 4.0 to a low of 3.2 (see Appendix A). Since the
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average rating for each item was above 3.0, no item was deleted from the instruments.
The expert evaluation instrument also included a space for reviewers to suggest changes
for each item. Appendix A outlines how each data collection item was changed in
response to expert reviewers’ recommendations.
Creswell (2009) states pilot testing is important to establish an instrument’s
content validity and to improve questions, format, and the scales. Similarly, Cohen et al
(2011) conclude that pilot testing increases an instrument’s reliability, validity, and
practicability. Cohen et al suggest that pilot testing should:
•

Assess whether survey items and instructions are clear;

•

Provide feedback on the validity of the response items (Do they measure what
they are supposed to?);

•

Identify redundant items;

•

Provide feedback on response item format;

•

Assess whether the survey’s length is appropriate; and

•

Provide feedback on the layout, sectionalizing, numbering, and itemization of the
instruments.

Accordingly, the data collection instruments were pilot tested with a subset of the
population of SLMS and IT administrators. Fourteen SLMS and IT administrators were
invited to pilot test the surveys and eight participated in the pilot test. Pilot test
participants were asked to indicate problems encountered while taking the surveys and
submit suggestions for survey improvement on the final survey screen. Participants did
not recommend any changes or encounter problems during the pilot test. Therefore, the
survey was launched with the changes the expert panel recommended. Survey pretesting
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ensured that the data collection instruments consistently collected the data required to
answer the research questions.
Nonresponse was also an important threat to external validity or generalizability
of research, particularly if non-respondents results are systematically different from the
respondents’ results (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). To minimize the threat to external
validity and to maximize the survey response rate, researchers must employ an extensive
follow-up method that consists of reminders and resending surveys to non-respondents.
Ye (2007) and Cohen et al. (2011) suggest a variety of strategies to increase response
rates. These strategies include electronic pre-notices, follow-up reminders with the survey
links, follow-up telephone calls, stressing the importance and benefits to the target group,
employing a simple and technically uncomplicated survey design, and ensuring that
respondents’ privacy was protected. The researcher utilized these strategies to maximize
the survey response rate and increase the external validity of the research conclusions.
Triangulation entails the use of two or more methods of data collection and “is a
powerful way of demonstrating concurrent validity” (Cohen et al, 2011, p.112). When
different methods of data collection yield similar results, concurrent validity is
established. Collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data enabled the
researcher to explain more completely the richness and complexity of the issues of focus.
To enhance data triangulation, the IT and SLMS surveys included identical items on
stakeholder involvement in content filtering decisions, filter effectiveness, on-campus
override privileges, blocked page notifications, different access levels for specific user
groups, and safety education programs that educate users about Web 2.0 safety issues.
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Reliability
Reliability refers to the consistency with which an instrument measures whatever
it is intended to measure (Gay et al., 2011). Developing instruments with good questions
ensures a consistent data collection experience for all respondents according to Fowler
(2009). Fowler explains that good questions, “mean the same thing to every respondent”
(p. 89), and “the kinds of answers that constitute an appropriate response to the question
are communicated consistently to all respondents” (p. 89). To design reliable survey
response items, the researcher was careful to employ the following survey design
recommendations:
•

Avoid inadequate wording;

•

Avoid terms or concepts that have multiple meanings;

•

Avoid asking two questions at once;

•

Keep response items clear and simple; and

•

Whenever possible, use closed ended questions that provide a list of
acceptable responses (Fowler).

Population and Sample
The target population included IT administrators and SLMS. IT administrators
were included because they are largely responsible for the selection, configuration, and
ongoing administration of content filtering programs. This factor allowed them to provide
important data about Internet filtering and safety policies and practices. Moreover, SLMS
have an advantageous perspective from which to provide a deeper understanding of the
issues and trends surrounding filtering technology implementation and its impact on end
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users. SLMS facilitate user information access and are keenly aware of the information
access issues end users encounter while using filtered computers.
The population of IT administrators and SLMS were well-defined; in most cases,
their e-mail addresses were readily accessible, and they had Internet access to facilitate
completion of the Web-based surveys. The researcher acquired SLMS’ email addresses
from the South Carolina Association of School Librarians (SCASL) online listserv,
school Web sites or via telephone contact. Email addresses for IT directors were obtained
from school districts’ Web sites or via telephone contact. Prior to contacting the target
population, the researcher requested school district authorization to conduct research with
the target population groups (see Appendix G).
Thirty-six of 81 traditional South Carolina school districts agreed to participate in
the study. After obtaining research authorization and IRB approval (see Appendix H), the
target population was invited to participate in the study via email (see Appendix I and
Appendix J). The email invitation included a link to the surveys, which were hosted on
the SurveyGizmo™ Web site.
Data Collection Procedures and Time Frame
The time frame for collection of data from four sources—IT survey, SLMS
survey, SLMS interviews, and analysis of AUPs—was approximately four months. The
SLMS survey was launched at the end of May 2012 and remained open until the end of
June 2012 while the IT survey was launched in mid-June and remained open until the end
of July 2012. To improve the response rate, the surveys remained open for several weeks
as much of the data collection period coincided with summer break, when the target
population is mostly away from school and may not check school email on a daily basis.
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Interviews were conducted with a subset of the SLMS population over a two-week period
in mid-August 2012. The analysis of AUPs was performed from mid-July 2012 until midSeptember 2012.
SurveyGizmo™, an online survey tool that allows users to develop, customize,
and distribute Web-based surveys, was used to conduct the surveys. This survey tool
allowed participants' responses to be recorded electronically, and summary data was
available immediately. The researcher selected SurveyGizmo™ to create, disseminate,
and collect the survey because of its reputation, ease of use, and flexibility (Marie &
Weston, 2009). Moreover, SurveyGizmo’s™ surveys are low cost and flexible. The
survey tool allows collected data to be downloaded in a variety of formats, including
Excel spreadsheet format for data analysis.
Eighty-one traditional South Carolina school districts were contacted to obtain
permission for the target population to participate in the study. School districts were sent
a letter explaining the proposed research (see Appendix G) and a copy of each survey
(see Appendix B and Appendix C). Thirty-six school districts granted permission for
their SLMS and IT directors to be contacted and invited to respond to the surveys. This
factor made it impossible to draw a random sample of the entire population of South
Carolina SLMS and IT directors. The 36 participating school districts consisted of
approximately 463 SLMS and 36 IT directors (or their designees). In an effort to increase
the number of respondents, the researcher’s goal was to email the survey to the entire
population of SLMS and IT directors, excluding pilot test participants.
The researcher collected the email addresses of 428 SLMS from the SCASL
listserv, telephone contacts, and individual school Web sites. The SLMS survey
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instrument was then launched using SurveyGizmo™. An email message containing
consent information and a link to the online survey was successfully delivered to 398
media specialists. The survey link allowed recipients to respond anonymously to the
survey. One hundred twenty-three SLMS responded to the survey for a 32% response
rate. Email addresses for 36 IT administrators were obtained from school districts’ Web
sites and telephone contact. One IT director participated in the pilot test, therefore the
survey invitation was sent to 35 IT directors. Twenty-one IT administrators responded to
the anonymous IT survey for a 60% response rate. To increase the response rate, two
reminders were sent to both groups while the surveys were open.
During the subsequent qualitative phase, the researcher conducted interviews with
a subgroup of SLMS to gain a more in-depth understanding of SLMS’ convictions and
concerns about the impact of filtering and safety policies upon end users. The last page of
the survey included a note stating the researcher was seeking four-to-five respondents to
participate in a brief follow-up interview. To preserve the anonymity of the survey
responses, respondents were asked to contact the researcher via email or telephone if they
were willing to be interviewed. Six respondents indicated they wanted to be interviewed;
ultimately, five respondents participated in the interviews. The interviews were
conducted after the IT and SLMS surveys were closed and preliminary data analyses
were completed. The researcher reviewed the interview protocol based upon the
preliminary data analyses to determine if the protocol needed modifications. No
modifications were necessary in order for the protocol to collect qualitative data that
added depth to the quantitative data. Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher
mailed a hard copy of the informed consent document to each interviewee for signature.
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After the signed consent form was returned, the researcher contacted the prospective
interviewees to review the consent form and to schedule the interview. The consent form
outlines interviewee rights and steps the investigator took to ensure the interviewee’s
confidentiality (see Appendix K). Interviews were conducted over a two-week period in
August 2012. The investigator took copious notes during each interview session.
Interview data were thematically analyzed for presentation.
An analysis of AUPs from 80 of 81 traditional school districts was conducted
over a two-month period from mid-July 2012 to mid-September 2012. The researcher
used the protocol for analyses of artifacts (see Appendix D) to assess how school districts
were updating their Internet safety policies in response to Web 2.0 safety issues and
recent legislative mandates to educate minors about Internet safety, particularly Web 2.0
safety. The researcher located school districts’ AUPs on their Web sites in most cases. If
a school district’s online AUP was outdated or was not on the district Web site, the
researcher contacted the district to request a copy. The data was quantified for
presentation to show how schools have updated their AUPs to address Web 2.0 safety
concerns.
Data Analysis and Presentation
This research sought to gain a deeper understanding of filtering and safety policy
implementation in public K-12 schools. Data collected during the survey phase were
analyzed using descriptive statistical methods, which provided an understanding of the
nature of Internet safety policy implementation issues and their relationships. According
to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009), descriptive statistical methods include techniques for
summarizing numeric data with tables, graphs, or single representations of a group of
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scores in order to understand the data, detect trends and patterns, discover relationships
between variables, and better communicate the results. The most appropriate data
analysis methods for this study include frequency tables and graphic displays. Graphic
displays and frequency tables coupled with accompanying summaries paint a realistic
picture of safety policy implementation issues and their relationships.
Follow-up qualitative interviews were conducted with a small number of SLMS.
Data collected from interviews, which took place during the second phase, were
thematically analyzed to provide a deeper understanding of filtering and safety policy
issues and how they influence information access and instruction. This phase of the study
revealed the manner in which policy issues influenced user access to Internet resources.
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) state most qualitative analytic techniques involve
generating emergent themes that evolve from the study of specific pieces of information
that the investigator has collected. Interview notes were transcribed and color-coded to
identify common themes and categories. Open-ended survey comment items were also
thematically analyzed and combined with interview data. Thematic development
facilitates comparisons among variables, thus leading to a better understanding of the
research questions (Teddlie & Tashakkori).
School districts’ AUPs were also analyzed to determine if they had been updated
to address Web 2.0 safety concerns. Wording in the AUP was also examined for
references to Internet safety education and whether they addressed cyber bullying
awareness and response, chat room interactions, and social networking interactions. This
data was quantified for presentation in table format.
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Resources
Professional experience and expertise coupled with external resources contributed
to this study. The investigator was a SLMS for 30 years and has experience facilitating
access to information at all K-12 public school academic levels. Some of the
investigator’s professional experience was in a filtered environment. This experience
provided personal knowledge of some access issues that users encounter while accessing
information in a filtered environment.
The Nova Southeastern University Library was the principal source of online and
print resources relevant to the study. SCASL’s Listserv, individual school Web sites, and
school district Web sites provided most of the email addresses of the target population.
The target population of IT administrators and SLMS coupled with school districts’
AUPs were sources of data for the study. SurveyGizmo™, a Web-based survey
development and hosting utility, allowed direct input of survey participants’ responses,
while maintaining their anonymity. SurveyGizmo™ and Excel Data Analysis ToolPak
were used for data analysis and presentation of the research results.
Summary
In order to describe filtering/safety policy implementation and its influence on
teaching and learning accurately, a mixed methods design was utilized. Quantitative
methodology during the first phase included two surveys, one for SLMS and one for IT
administrators. Additional data collection during the qualitative phase involved
interviews with a small number of SLMS and an analysis of artifacts (AUPs). Expert
review, pilot testing, and member checking was used to establish the validity and
reliability of the data. The data were used to describe the manner in which filtering and
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safety policies were being implemented, the issues users encountered as a result of
filtering and safety policy implementation, measures used to address Web 2.0 safety
issues, and the manner in which filtering and safety policies prevented access to resources
necessary to attain 21st century communication and collaboration standards.
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Chapter 4
Results

Introduction
This study was undertaken to investigate filtering and safety policy
implementation in South Carolina’s public K-12 schools and its influence on teaching
and learning. The study utilized a mixed methodology, in which both quantitative and
qualitative data were collected to answer the following research questions:
•

How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools?

•

What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered
computers?

•

How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?

•

In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards?
Quantitative data using an anonymous online survey questionnaire were gathered

from SLMS and IT directors (or their designees) to gain a general understanding of
filtering and safety policy implementation and how it influences information access.
Subsequent one-on-one telephone interviews with five SLMS provided a deeper
understanding of Internet safety practices and how these practices either impede or
enhance information access. AUPs were also examined to determine whether districts
were educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues. The data collection instruments
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contributed to a comprehensive depiction of filtering and safety policy implementation.
This portrayal is presented from the perspective of stakeholders (IT administrators) with
first-hand knowledge of safety policy development and implementation, and stakeholders
(SLMS) with first-hand knowledge of how safety policies affect end users.
The data analysis presented in this chapter summarizes the findings of the
research. The researcher drew connections from Phase 1 data, the personal experiences
and perceptions of the interviewees from Phase 2, and the AUP analysis. The researcher
looked for interconnections among the data in order to portray accurately filtering and
safety policy implementation and its effect on end users. To address the research
questions, the investigator employed both quantitative and qualitative data. As Creswell
and Plano Clark (2007) state:
It is not enough to simply collect and analyze quantitative and qualitative data;
they need to be “mixed” in some way so that together they form a more complete
picture of the problem than they do when standing alone. (p.7)
Analysis of both phases provided insight into the research questions. The data analysis
and findings are presented in reference to each research question using frequency
distribution tables, graphs, and relevant participant observations.
Demographics and Filtering/Safety Policy Context
The SLMS survey was successfully delivered to 398 email addresses, which were
obtained from public South Carolina school Web sites, SCASL’s listserv, and via
telephone contact. One hundred twenty-three usable SLMS responses were submitted via
SurveyGizmo’s™ website, constituting a 32% response rate. The IT survey was
successfully delivered to 35 email addresses, which were obtained from school districts’

97
Web sites and via telephone contact. Twenty-one usable IT responses were used in the
analysis yielding a 60% response rate.
At the beginning of each survey, demographic information was collected. The
first SLMS survey item asked respondents to specify their job title and the academic level
of the students they served. The first IT survey item asked respondents to provide their
job title. In response to the job title question, 104 (84.5%) SLMS survey respondents
specified media specialist or library media specialist, 15 (12%) specified librarian or
teacher librarian, 1 (<1%) specified computer teacher, 1 (<1%) specified information
technology specialist, and 1 (<1%) specified learning commons teacher as their job title
(see Table 5). Thirteen (62%) of IT survey respondents claimed the title, director of
technology or technology director, 2 (9.5%) stated technology coordinator, 1 (4.8%)
stated chief financial and operations officer, 1 (4.8%) stated IT security manager, 1
(4.8%) stated IT specialist, 1 (4.8%) stated infrastructure and support officer, 1 (4.8%)
stated network tech, and 1 (4.8%) stated technology support in response to the job title
question. As Table 5 indicates, there were instances when the respondents’ job title was
not, “SLMS” or “IT director.” However, in those instances the job title respondents
provided was closely related to or synonymous with the job titles identified for the target
population groups, “SLMS” and “IT director.”
Table 5. Respondents' Job Titles
Respondents’ Job Titles

1a) SLMS Survey Respondents
Library Media Specialist/Media Specialist
Librarian/Teacher Librarian
Computer Teacher
Information Technology Specialist
Learning Commons Teacher

Population
N=144
N
%
N=123
104
84.5
15
12
1
<1%
1
<1%
1
<1%
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Table 5 (continued)
Respondents’ Job Titles

No Response
1) IT Survey Respondents
Director of Technology/Technology Director
Technology Coordinator
Chief Financial and Operation Officer
IT Security Manager
IT Specialist
Infrastructure & Support Officer
Network Tech
Technology Support

Population
N=144
N
%
1
<1%
N=21
13
62
2
9.5
1
4.8
1
4.8
1
4.8
1
4.8
1
4.8
1
4.8

To gain an overview of the academic levels SLMS respondents represented, they
were asked to provide the academic level of the schools where they served. Academic
level data is summarized in Table 6. The largest percentage of respondents, 38.2%
(N=47), was elementary SLMS. Nineteen percent (N=23) were high school SLMS and
19% (N=23) were middle school SLMS. Several respondents worked at schools with a
combination of academic levels. Four percent (N=5) worked at combined middle/high
schools, 8.1% (N=10) at combined elementary/middle schools, and 2.4% (N=3) at
combined elementary/middle/high schools. Eight percent (N=10) of respondents did not
respond to this item. One respondent (<1%) indicated “Master’s Degree” for this item,
which suggests a misunderstanding of the question. Responses from SLMS who served
only elementary level students were compared to those who served middle or high school
students to determine if there was a difference in the information access issues they
encountered.
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Table 6. Respondents' Academic Level
1b) SLMS’ Academic Level

High School (9-12)
Middle School (6-8)
Elementary (K-5)
Middle/High Combined
Elementary/Middle Combined
Elementary/Middle/ High Combined
No Response
Irrelevant Response

Population
N=123
N
%
23
19%
23
19%
47
38.2%
5
4%
10
8.1%
3
2.4%
10
8%
1
<1%

To establish a context for school districts’ filtering and safety policy
implementation, the IT survey asked respondents whether their school districts
participated in the federal E-rate program and what filtering product was utilized.
Table 7. Filtering Products Used in School Districts
Filtering Products
Population
N=21
N
%
Lightspeed Systems
10
48%
Barracuda
2
9.5%
iPrism
2
9.5%
Fortinet/Fortigate Web Filtering
2
9.5%
CIPAFilter
1
4.8%
Marshall 8e6
1
4.8%
SmoothWall
1
4.8%
SonicWall
1
4.8%
SquidGuard
1
4.8%
One hundred percent (N=21) were E-rate participants, and thus were required to filter
Internet access and implement CIPA-compliant AUPs. Table 7 identifies the types of
filtering products school districts were deploying, and reveals the number and percentage
of districts in which the product is used. A review of each product’s Web site concluded
that these filtering solutions provide a variety of Web security features including URL
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filtering, gateway-based spyware and virus protection, application protocol blocking,
such as IM and P2P, and HTTPS scanning.
Research Question 1
Research Question 1 asked, “How are filtering and safety policies being
implemented in public schools?” Several items on the IT survey, the SLMS survey, and
the interview protocol addressed the question. Survey and interview items focused on
three filtering and safety policy implementation issues (variables) that were identified in
the literature review (see Table 4). These variables include content blocking
considerations, stakeholder involvement in policy decisions, and differentiated access
levels for specific user groups.
Content Blocking Considerations
Important filtering and safety policy implementation considerations include
deciding what content should be blocked, the level of blocking within each content
category, and whether to deploy the filter’s “out of the box” or default settings. Factors
that influenced filtering and safety policy decisions included CIPA compliance,
bandwidth preservation, non-educational network usage, potential litigation, network
security, student safety, and community opinions. The IT survey, SLMS survey, and
interview protocol items focused on these considerations.
IT survey question 4 solicited responses regarding the content categories that
were filtered and the level of filtering within those categories. Table 8 summarizes this
data. Some survey respondents did not select an answer choice for each content category;
therefore, the results show the frequency and percentages of survey participants who
selected an answer choice.
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CIPA requires school districts receiving E-rate discounts to block access to visual
images that are obscene, contain child pornography, or are harmful to minors. One
hundred percent (N=21) of school districts filtered adult/mature and pornography/nudity
content as CIPA requires. Most school districts (95.2%, N=20) filtered all, and 4.8%
(N=1) filtered some adult/mature and nudity/pornographic content. School districts
filtered categories in addition to obscene content, including controversial and
questionable content. Eighty-one percent (N=17) filtered all gambling content, 9.5%
(N=2) filtered some, and 4.8% (N=1) filtered none. Most (77.8%, N=14) respondents
filtered all alcohol/tobacco related content, 22.2% (N=4) filtered some, while 0% filtered
none. All hate/racism content was filtered in 76.5% (N=13) of responding school
districts, 17.6% (N=3) filtered some, and 5.9% (N=1) did not filter this content. All drug
related content was filtered in 66.7% (N=12) of responding school districts, 33.3% (N=6)
filtered some, and 0% filtered none. More than half of all respondents (66.7%, N=12)
filtered all criminal/illegal content, 27.8% (N=5) filtered some, and 5.6% (N=1) filtered
none of this content. Similarly, more than half (62.5%, N=10) filtered all cult/occult
content, 25% (N=4) filtered some, and 12.5% (N=2) filtered none. All violent content
was filtered in 53.3% (N=8) of school districts, 46.7% (N=7) filtered none, and 0%
filtered none. Most (58.8%, N=10) filtered all weapon related content, 35.3% (N=6)
filtered some, and 5.9% (N=1) filtered none of this Web content. A smaller percentage
(46.2%, N=6) filtered all alternate lifestyles (LGBT) content, 38.5% (N=5) filtered some,
and 15.4 (N=2) filtered none. Fewer than half (40%, N=6) filtered all intimate apparel
and swimsuit content, 53.3% (N=8) filtered some, while 6.7% (N=1) filtered none. A
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smaller percentage of respondents (20%, N=3) filtered the entire sex education category,
66.7% (N=10) filtered some, and 13.3% (N=2) filtered none.
Table 8. Filtered Content Categories
Content Categories
Filters N
All
%
Adult/Mature
95.2
20

Filters
some
%
4.8

N

N

Total
Responses

1

Filters
None
%
0.0

0

21

Pornography/Nudity

95.2

20

4.8

1

0.0

0

21

Alcohol/Tobacco

77.8

14

22.2

4

0.0

0

18

Gambling

81.0

17

9.5

2

4.8

1

20

Hate/Racism

76.5

13

17.6

3

5.9

1

17

Drugs

66.7

12

33.3

6

0.0

0

18

Criminal/Illegal

66.7

12

27.8

5

5.6

1

18

Cult/Occult

62.5

10

25.0

4

12.5

2

16

Violence

53.3

8

46.7

7

0.0

0

15

Weapons

58.8

10

35.3

6

5.9

1

17

Alternative Lifestyles
(LGBT)
Intimate Apparel/Swimsuits

46.2

6

38.5

5

15.4

2

13

40.0

6

53.3

8

6.7

1

15

Sex Education

20.0

3

66.7

10

13.3

2

15

Hacking/Proxy Avoidance

84.2

16

10.5

2

5.3

1

19

Malicious sites

83.3

15

16.7

3

0.0

0

18

Internet Radio/TV

55.6

10

44.4

8

0.0

0

18

Media downloads/file
sharing
Telephony (VoIP)

46.7

7

53.3

8

0.0

0

15

36.4

4

45.5

5

18.2

2

11

Social Networking

58.8

10

41.2

7

0.0

0

17

Email/Chat/Instant
Messaging
Blogs/Wikis

50.0

7

50.0

7

0.0

0

14

23.1

3

69.2

9

7.7

1

13

School districts also filtered content posing possible security threats and
bandwidth consuming content. Most districts (84.2%, N=16) filtered all hacking and
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proxy avoidance Web sites, 10.5% (N=2) filtered some, and 5.3% (N=1) filtered none.
Similarly, 83.3% (N=15) filtered all malicious sites, 16.7 (N=3) filtered some, and 0%
filtered none of this content. Bandwidth consuming content was also filtered in most
school districts. More than half (55.6%, N=10) blocked all Internet radio and television
sites, 44.4% (N=8) blocked some, 0% blocked none. Less than half (46.7%, N=7)
blocked all media download and file sharing sites, 53.3% (N=8) blocked some, and 0%
blocked none. A smaller percentage of respondents (36.4%, N=4) blocked all telephony
(VoIP) Web sites, 45.5% (N=5) blocked some and 18.2% (N=2) blocked none.
Web sites that support communication and collaborative activities (Web 2.0) were
filtered in some school districts. All social networking sites were filtered in 58.8%
(N=10) of school districts, 41.2% (N=7) filtered some, and 0% filtered none. Fifty
percent (N=7) filtered all email, chat, and instant messaging sites, 50% (N=7) filtered
some, while 0% of respondents filtered none. Less than one-fourth (23.1%, N=3) filtered
all blogs and wikis, 69.2% (N=9) filtered some, and 7.7% (N=1) filtered none of this
content.
IT survey questions 7a and 7b were asked to determine whether districts
customized filter configurations to limit content over-blocking. When asked if the district
used the filter’s default settings, 75% (N=15) of respondents answered no and 25% (N=5)
answered yes. In response to item 7b, “when appropriate, the filter is configured to block
specific sub-categories,” 95.2% (N=20) responded yes, and 4.8% (N=1) responded no.
The literature review revealed several factors that influence content filtering
decisions. To determine the extent to which these factors affected filtering and safety
policy implementation decisions, IT survey respondents were asked to indicate the degree
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to which specific factors influenced filtering decisions on a 1-5 point scale where 1
represented no influence and 5 represented substantial influence. As seen in Table 9,
Table 9. Factors Influencing Content Filtering Decisions
Influencing Factors
Mean
SD
Rank
CIPA Compliance
Maintaining Student Safety
Maintaining Network Security
Preserving Bandwidth
Preventing Litigation (Lawsuits)
Preventing Non-educational Use
Community or Parental Opinions

4.95
4.80
4.76
4.38
4.23
3.76
3.62

0.21
0.39
0.44
0.65
0.97
0.97
1.25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Total
Responses
21
21
21
21
21
21
21

CIPA compliance (M=4.95) exerted the greatest influence on policy decisions. However,
school districts blocked considerably more content than CIPA requires. Student safety
(M=4.80) and network security (M=4.76) exerted almost as much influence as CIPA
compliance. The need to preserve bandwidth (M=4.38) and prevent litigation (M=4.23)
were highly influential considerations as well. The importance of the foregoing factors
may explain why most districts elected to block more content than CIPA compliance
requires. Although still important, preventing non-educational use (M=3.76) and
community or parental opinions (M=3.62) exerted less influence on policy decisions. The
level of influence that each factor exerted on filtering and safety policy decisions was
greater than the average mean (3). This implies each factor was an important
consideration for policymakers. The relative importance of each of these factors to
filtering decisions may explain why districts implemented restrictive filtering policies.
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Stakeholder Involvement in Policy Decisions
To ascertain the level of stakeholder involvement and influence in policy decision
making, the data collection instruments included items focusing on stakeholder input in
filtering policy decisions. IT survey item 5 and SLMS survey item 2 was asked to
determine whether representatives from various stakeholder groups (i.e., teachers,
students, parents, media specialists, administrators) were involved in filtering policy
decisions. SLMS survey item 7a also asked if input from all stakeholders was considered
when content filtering decisions were made. Question set 1 of the interview protocol
asked participants to describe how stakeholders were involved in policy decisions and
whether stakeholder involvement positively influenced information access and student
safety. IT administrators’ and SLMS’ responses in Figure 2 suggest that most content
blocking decisions were made by district-based personnel or left to the software
developer. Ninety percent (N=18) of IT respondents and 41.8% (N=51) of SLMS stated

Figure 2. Who makes content filtering decisions?
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that district administrators decided what content should be blocked. Sixty-five percent
(N=13) of IT respondents and 70.5% (N=86) of SLMS said the filtering product made
content filtering decisions because the product’s default settings were used. A similar
proportion of respondents, 75% (N=15) of the IT group and 71.3% (N=87) of media
specialists, replied that IT staff decided what content was filtered. Conversely, survey
responses suggest school boards (1.6%, N=2 /SLMS, 20%, N=4/ IT respondents),
stakeholder committees (6.6%, N=8 /SLMS, 15%, N=3/ IT respondents), media
specialists (6.6%, N=8 /SLMS, 15%, N=3/ IT respondents), and other groups (5.7%,
N=7/SLMS, 15%, N=3/ IT respondents) were minimally involved in filtering decisions.
Additionally, when SLMS survey item 7a asked whether input from all stakeholders was
considered when content filtering decisions were made, 50% (N=58) said no, 40.5%
(N=47) were not sure, and 9.5% (N=11) said yes.
A thematic analysis of open-ended survey comments and interview data provided
additional insight into stakeholder involvement in filtering and safety policy decisions.
Lack of stakeholder involvement was a major theme that emerged from participant
comments. Interviewee 1 recalled being involved in AUP development at an earlier time,
but indicated SLMS were no longer involved the process. Interviewee 4 broadened
stakeholder noninvolvement to students and parents when she stated, “There is no
involvement. Students and parents have no say so whatsoever.”
Respondent statements reveal some districts’ filtering policy decision making was
largely done in the technology department without the involvement of other stakeholders.
Interviewee 3 indicated the technology department made most filtering and safety policy
decisions when she stated, “All that (filtering/safety policy decisions) is handled in the
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technology department at the district level….We have no input at this point.” An SLMS
survey respondent expressed stronger sentiment regarding technology administrators’
control of technology policy decision making in the following comment:
Our IT director makes all of these decisions single-handedly. She would say that
she gets input from our district administration, but she is the one who tells them
about content blocking and is their sole source of information on this topic (SLMS
survey comment).
Some districts attempted to get input from stakeholders; however, these attempts
were unsuccessful because of ineffective implementation. One SLMS survey respondent
commented that when the district attempted to involve a committee of stakeholders in the
decision making process, IT staff with no teaching experience ultimately decided what
content was blocked. Another SLMS survey respondent commented that the district’s
committee did not include K-2 teachers. Consequently, filtering policies continued to
block educational sites for younger students, such as Cyberchase™ and PBSKids™. The
aforementioned comments suggest a committee of stakeholders is not a panacea for the
issues that evolve from filtering and safety policy implementation, particularly when the
committee’s recommendations are disregarded or when the committee is not
representative of all end users.
Even when respondents indicated stakeholders were involved in technology
policy decisions, this involvement was limited mostly to submitting blocking and
unblocking requests. For example, an IT survey respondent commented that all
employees were “empowered to identify and report” inappropriate sites to IT and these
sites would be blocked immediately. In response to the stakeholder involvement inquiry,
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Interviewee 2 reported that parents and students could report concerns or requests to
unblock Web sites to school staff, and these requests would then go directly to the district
office. Interviewee 2 added that when teachers and media specialists voiced their
opinions about online content that should be unblocked; the district was receptive to these
requests because teachers and media specialists were viewed as professionals who would
only submit unblocking requests for educational content.
Some participants’ comments suggest end users should be more involved in
Internet use policy decisions. Interviewee 1 stated, “We’re in the trenches, we’re using
the resources. It makes perfect sense that we are involved in establishing the guidelines
that govern the use of the resources.” Interviewee 4 also thought the district should seek
input from students and teachers about content that should be blocked.
The aforementioned interview participant statements and survey respondent
comments provided a deeper understanding of stakeholder involvement in filtering and
safety policy deliberations. Survey and interview data suggest stakeholder involvement in
Internet use policy decisions was minimal, limited mostly to submitting requests to block
or unblock content. This data also provides insight into the access issues that arise when
end users are not involved in filtering and safety policy deliberations.
Differentiated Access Levels
Filtering products typically allow customization of filter settings for specific user
groups to increase access to information and educational resources. IT survey item 7e and
SLMS survey item 7d asked whether distinct access levels had been set for different user
groups such as elementary students, secondary students, and staff. Table 10 summarizes
survey data about differentiated access implementation. When asked if differentiated

109
access had been implemented, 47.5% (N=56) of SLMS said yes, 36.4 (N=43) said no,
and 16.1% (N=19) were unsure, while 76.2% (N=16) of IT administrators said yes,
23.8% (N=5) said no, and none were unsure. Substantially more IT administrators than
SLMS reported that differentiated access levels had been implemented. One explanation
of the discrepancy between SLMS’ responses and IT administrators’ responses could be
that SLMS were unaware differentiated access policies had been implemented.
Table 10. Implementation of Differentiated Access Levels
Data Source
SLMS
IT
N=118
N=21
%
%
(Survey item 7e (IT) and 7d (SLMS)
Different Access levels have been established for specific user groups
Yes
47.5
76.2
No
36.4
23.8
Not Sure
16.1
0.0

Analysis of survey comments and interviewee comments suggest that
differentiated access levels were established mostly for staff in some school districts.
Access levels were rarely differentiated according to student age levels. For instance, an
SLMS survey respondent reported that staff and students had different access levels, but
there was no difference for any student levels. In another district, teacher and staff logins
allowed them to access streaming video and other “coached” sites temporarily. Some
districts implemented different access levels in addition to time of day restrictions. In
these instances survey respondents reported that teachers could only access
TeacherTube™ and YouTube™ before and after school. Finally, another SLMS survey
respondent commented that different access levels had been discussed, but the respondent
was uncertain whether differentiated access levels had been implemented.
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Interview participant statements about differentiated access levels were similar to
survey participant comments and suggest staff and students had different access levels,
but students, regardless of age level, had the same access privileges. Interviewee 4
commented that SLMS could “roam at will,” but teachers could not access Web sites
such as YouTube™. Interviewee 5 specified that different access levels had been
established for teachers and students. Teachers could access Facebook™ and
YouTube™, but students were unable to access these Web sites. Interview and survey
data suggest differentiated access levels were implemented in some school districts, but
access levels were not tailored to meet the unique information needs of all user groups.
Research Question 2
Research question 2 asked, “What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate
information access on filtered computers?” To address this research question, the data
collection instruments focused on filtering issues that were identified in the literature (see
Table 4). To determine the scope of these issues and the way in which they affected
teaching and learning, data was collected about filter over-blocking frequency, underblocking frequency, filter effectiveness, specific types of blocked educational content,
and the efficiency of unblocking procedures.
Over-blocking and Under-blocking
Over-blocking and under-blocking are inherent issues with all Internet filtering
tools. To gauge the frequency of these filtering issues, IT survey item 9a and 9b asked
respondents how often they received requests during a typical week to block
inappropriate content and to unblock educational content that had been blocked
inadvertently. SLMS survey item 5a and 5b asked how often the filter permitted access to
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objectionable content (under-blocking) during a typical week and how often it prevented
access to educational content during a typical week.
According to Table 11, 4.8% (N=1) of IT respondents never received requests to
block inappropriate content, 47.6% (N=10) rarely received requests to block
inappropriate content, 42.9 (N=9) sometimes received requests to block inappropriate
content, and 4.8% (N=1) frequently received requests to block inappropriate content.
Table 11. Over-blocking and Under-blocking Frequency
Survey Item
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently
%
%
%
%
IT Survey Item 9
Total Responses (N=21)
During a typical week, how often do you (or the person responsible for
blocking/unblocking content) receive requests to:
a) block inappropriate content
4.8
47.6
42.9
4.8
N=1
N=10
N=9
N=1
b) unblock educational content
0.0
15
70.0
15.0
that has been unintentionally
N=0
N=3
N=14
N=3
blocked
SLMS Survey Item 5
Total Responses (N=120)
During a typical week, how often does the filter:
a) Permit access to
16.7
55.0
24.2
4.2
objectionable content
N=20
N=66
N=29
N=5
b) Prevent access to
information/resources that
support educational,
professional, or personal
growth

3.3
N=4

15.0
N=18

41.7
N=50

40.0
N=48

When asked how often they received requests to unblock educational content that the
filter had blocked inadvertently, 0.0% stated never, 15% (N=3) stated rarely, 70% (N=14)
stated sometimes, and 15% (N=3) stated frequently. When asked how often the filter
permitted access to objectionable content, 16.7% (N=20) of SLMS replied never, 55%
(N=66) replied rarely, 24.2% (N=29) said sometimes, and 4.2% (N=5) replied frequently.
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When asked how often the filter prevented access to information/resources that support
educational, professional, or personal growth, 3.3% (N=4) responded never, 15% (N=18)
responded rarely, 41.7% (N=50) responded sometimes and 40% (N=48) responded
frequently. Less than 30% of SLMS respondents reported under-blocking, which suggests
that under-blocking is less of filtering issue than over-blocking. More than 80% of SLMS
sometimes or frequently encountered over-blocking of educational content, which implies
that over-blocking was a more pervasive filtering issue.
To assess further the effectiveness of implemented filtering solutions, IT survey
items 10a and 10b, plus SLMS survey item 6 asked respondents to rate the filter’s
efficacy in blocking inappropriate content and permitting access to educational content.
Regarding the filter’s effectiveness in blocking inappropriate content, 14.3% (N=3) of IT
administrators responded very ineffective, 4.8% (N=1) responded somewhat ineffective,
9.5% (N=2) responded somewhat effective, and 71.4% (N=15) responded very effective.
In response to item 10b, which asked IT respondents to rate the filter’s effectiveness in
permitting access to educational content, 9.5% (N=2) rated it very ineffective, 9.5%
(N=2) somewhat ineffective, 19% (N=4) somewhat effective, and 61.9% (N=13) very
effective. SLMS survey item 6 asked, “Considering the filter’s over-blocking and underblocking efficiency, how would you rate the filter’s overall effectiveness?” In response,
8.3% (N=10) of SLMS replied very ineffective, 15.8% (N=19) replied somewhat
ineffective, 13.3% (N=16) replied neutral, 45.8% (N=55) replied somewhat effective,
while 16.7% (N=20) replied very effective. A comparison of IT and SLMS responses
reveals that more than 80% (N=17) of IT respondents rated filter efficacy as either
somewhat effective or very effective, while a smaller percentage (52.5%, N=75) of
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SLMS rated filter efficacy as somewhat effective or very effective. This indicates that
end users were less satisfied with the filtering products deployed in school districts than
the individuals who deployed them.
Filters are implemented to protect minors from deliberately or unintentionally
accessing inappropriate content, but under-blocking and filter circumvention sometimes
hinder technology protection measures from protecting minors. Item 8c asked SLMS
whether they agreed that the district’s filtering solution prevented users from deliberately
(circumvention) or unintentionally (under-blocking) accessing inappropriate content. In
response to this item, 1.7% (N=2) strongly disagreed, 6.8% (N=8) disagreed, 63.6%
(N=75) agreed, 22.9% (N=27) strongly agreed, and 5.1% (N=6) were neutral. This data
suggests content filtering protects students from most inappropriate content.
Although, most respondents believed filters adequately protected students,
interview participant comments convey the context of filter circumvention and underblocking in public schools. Interview participant comments show that filter
circumvention was more of an issue in the secondary school setting. When secondary
SLMS interviewees were asked whether they were aware of instances when students
bypassed the filter to access blocked content, their responses suggest filter circumvention
was a common occurrence at the secondary level. Interviewee 1 was not sure of the
correct terminology to describe how students circumvented the filter. Students knew how
to “infiltrate” or “debug” the filter, according to Interviewee 1. Moreover, students tried
to “fake it out” (the filter) so they would have more access rights than they were
supposed to. Interviewee 4 said students circumvented the filter “all the time.” Before the
district began blocking proxy avoidance sites, students would type “proxy” in as a
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Google™ search to find directions for circumventing blocked content. Even though the
district began blocking access to proxy avoidance Web sites, Interviewee 4 reported
students had figured out how to get around the filter to access YouTube™ videos. In fact,
students had shared this circumvention tactic with teachers who were using it to access
YouTube™ videos for instructional purposes. Similarly, Interviewee 5 recounted that
students circumvented the filter “on a weekly basis.” Instead of being a tool to protect
students, Interviewee 5 believed the filter provided “a personal challenge” for some
students to discover ways to outsmart the filter.
When elementary SLMS were asked whether they were aware of students
bypassing the filter, Interviewee 2 commented, “No, not in elementary school. They can’t
figure that out yet.” Similarly, Interviewee 3 replied, “I’m sure middle school and high
school students are savvier, but personally, I’ve not had any problems.” These statements
imply that filter circumvention is more of an issue at the secondary level than at the
elementary grade level.
Regarding filter under-blocking, Table 11 shows that almost half (47.7%, N=10)
of IT respondents indicated they sometimes or frequently received requests to block
inappropriate content. This suggests that filters cannot completely protect minors from
inappropriate content and must be supplemented by other safety measures. Interviewees
provided under-blocking scenarios when asked if they could give specific instances when
under-blocking adversely influenced instruction or student safety. Interviewee 1
described under-blocking issues perceived to be the result of policymakers’ failure to
involve school-based staff in policy decisions. Although school-based staff had asked for
Google™ images to be blocked, they were not blocked. As a result, students accessed
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inappropriate images several times a week. Interviewee 1 described a particularly
disruptive incident when a student typed in a pornographic actress’ name, accessed
numerous pornographic images of her, and printed them. Interviewee 4 described less
disruptive under-blocking situations. Under-blocking mostly resulted in students
accessing “borderline inappropriate” content at Interviewee 4’s school. Examples of
inappropriate access included a student who visited a chat room and used inappropriate
terms to describe himself while in the chat room. “The worse thing I’ve seen” according
to Interviewee 4, “is kids looking at pictures of local prisoners.” The aforementioned
under-blocking scenarios along with survey data suggest under-blocking was not as
pervasive as over-blocking, but when it occurs, it can disrupt the educational setting.
These under-blocking incidents further underscore that filters cannot entirely prevent
students from deliberately or inadvertently accessing inappropriate online content.
Survey item 3 asked SLMS to select the types of educational content the district’s
filtering solution over-blocked. This item, which asked respondents to select all content
that applied, was asked to ascertain how filtering policy decisions impact learning and
information access. Figure 3 shows that 18.8% (N=22) of SLMS selected business and
finance, 58.1% (N=68) selected controversial content (i.e., alternative lifestyles, hate
groups, cults, occult), 45.3% (N=53) selected educational games, 52.1% (N=61), selected
health and sex education, 25.6% (N=30) selected sports and recreation, 84.6% (N=99)
selected streaming media (i.e. YouTube, UStream.tv, Internet radio), 35.9% (N=42)
selected virtual worlds, 45.3% (N=53) selected visual images, 66.7% (N=78) selected
Web 2.0 (i.e. wikis, blogs, social bookmarking tools), and 16.2% selected other, which
included topics such as popular culture, entertainment, shopping/marketing, and travel
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information . The majority of respondents (more than 50%) encountered blocked
streaming media, health and sex education Web sites, controversial content, and Web 2.0
resources, which implies that filter settings prevented users from accessing a substantial
amount of educational content.
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Figure 3. Over-blocked content.
SLMS survey items 8a and 8b served to investigate further the influence of overblocking on teaching and learning. Item 8a asked SLMS to specify the extent of their
agreement with the following statement: “The Internet filter prevents instructional staff
from accessing resources needed for instructional or professional activities.” Four SLMS
(3.4%) strongly disagreed, 21.2% (N=25) disagreed, 50.8% (N=60) agreed, 14.4%
(N=17) strongly agreed, and 10.2% (N=12) were neutral about this statement. Item 8b
asked SLMS to select the extent of their agreement with the following statement: “The
Internet filter prevents students from accessing information and resources needed for
classroom assignments.” Seven SLMS (5.9%) strongly disagreed with this statement,
28% (N=33) disagreed, 40.7% (N=48) agreed, 8.5% (N=10) strongly agreed, and 16.9%
(N=20) were neutral about this statement. More SLMS (65.2%, N=77) agreed or strongly
agreed that filtering policies blocked access to instructional resources than SLMS
(24.6%, N=29) who disagreed or strongly disagreed that filters blocked access to
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instructional resources. Similarly, a greater proportion of SLMS (49.2%, N=58) agreed or
strongly agreed that filtering policies blocked student access to educational resources
while a lesser proportion disagreed or strongly disagreed (33.9%, N=40). This data
suggests that district filtering policies were having an adverse influence on information
access for many end users, including instructional staff and students.
Interviewees’ statements provide additional evidence of how over-blocking
influenced end user access to educational content. Interview participants were asked
whether they believed over-blocking adversely influenced student or teacher access to
educational resources. They were also asked to provide specific examples of when overblocking prevented students from accessing resources needed for assignments or teachers
from accessing resources needed for instruction or professional development.
Interviewees’ observations featured instances when over-blocking prevented
teachers from implementing lesson plans. Interviewee 5 reported that teachers often
develop lesson plans at home, but when they get to school, the Web site they need is
blocked. It was impossible to unblock Web sites immediately in Interview 5’s district
because the unblocking process required about 24 hours. Interviewee 1 recounted a
personal experience when a request to unblock a Holocaust Web site was denied. After
preparing at home to teach a lesson that required taking students to a Holocaust Web site,
the SLMS recalled that the site was blocked at school. The unblocking process entailed
submitting a request to the principal who then forwarded the request to the IT director.
After almost four weeks, the IT director informed Interviewee 1, via the principal that the
images of emaciated bodies on the site were too graphic for students; therefore, the
unblocking request was denied. Interviewee 1 expressed the kind of frustrations some
teachers feel when someone without classroom experience disregards their professional
opinion about what is appropriate for students when she stated, “It’s upsetting that they
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don’t respect my professional integrity.” Administrators restricted access to content for
reasons other than inappropriateness of the content. Interviewee 5 related how overblocking resulted from using filters to manage bandwidth when she stated, “For a while,
the teachers and everybody, we were blocked from streaming video sites because of
bandwidth problems.”
Interviewee observations suggest over-blocking adversely affected educators’
inclination to incorporate innovative online resources into classroom instruction.
Interviewee 4 described a time when she tried to convince a “techy” teacher to
incorporate an innovative online resource into his lessons. The teacher’s response was “I
gave up on that a long time ago because so much stuff is blocked.” Interviewee 4
described another instance when over-blocking prevented educators from using an online
resource. The SLMS stated, “Once I was at a conference and I learned about using
Google Earth™ for ‘lit trips.’ I emailed some of my teachers about it from the
conference. One [teacher] replied, ‘I just tried it and it was blocked.’” These observations
illustrate how over-blocking can limit integration of Web-based technology. Moreover,
end user frustration about over-blocking was evident when Interviewee 4 commented,
“I’ve talked to teachers and some feel like many Web sites shouldn’t be blocked in the
first place.”
Interviewee observations describe how over-blocking adversely influenced
students’ ability to complete assignments. Interviewee 5 suggested, “It’s hard for students
to complete assignments if they can’t get to the online resources they need.” Furthermore,
Interviewee 5 was concerned that over-blocking exacerbated the digital divide between
students with home Internet access and students without home Internet access when
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asserting, “The students with home Internet access just go home and access the sites that
are blocked at school. The students without home access just can’t get to it. It’s like we’re
back to the haves and have-nots.” Interview 4 observed that the filter prevented students
from searching for breast cancer information because it blocked Web sites that included
the word “breast.” The SLMS also described how students were unable to insert a Webbased image into a PowerPoint presentation because the download capability had been
disabled. Interviewee 5 recalled a time when several students were doing research on the
history of gaming and many of the gaming Web sites were blocked. Consequently, these
students were unable to complete their research at school. Over-blocking negatively
affected student research at all levels, including elementary students. Conducting research
on filtered computers involved “a lot of trial and error,” according to Interviewee 3, an
elementary SLMS. Interviewee 3 related an over-blocking incident involving a 5th grader
who had been conducting research at home on an immigration Web site, but when the
student tried to access the same Web site at school, it was blocked.
The aforementioned over-blocking scenarios provide a deeper understanding of
the types of information filters over-block. They also describe how over-blocking
adversely affected lesson planning, completion of student assignments, the digital divide,
and limited opportunities for educators to incorporate innovative Web based technologies
in their lessons.
Unblocking Procedures
The literature review revealed that the adverse effects of filter over-blocking
could be minimized with efficient unblocking procedures. The data collection
instruments included several items about school districts’ unblocking practices and
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procedures to determine how effectively they minimized the adverse effects of overblocking. IT and SLMS survey items asked whether filter settings could be adjusted to
unblock educational content, what staff had been granted override privileges to unblock
content, whether users were informed of unblocking procedures, and how efficiently the
procedures allowed access to over-blocked educational content. To gain a deeper
understanding of unblocking procedures and their impact on end users, interview
participants were asked to describe their district’s unblocking procedures and whether
unblocking procedures impeded or facilitated information access.
Table 12. Content Unblocking Configuration
IT Survey Item 7c
Filter settings can be overridden or adjusted to access educational content that
has been blocked unintentionally.
%
N
Yes
95.2
20
No
4.8
1
Not Sure
0.0
0
The literature review confirms that fine-tuning capability is a key feature for
effective filtering solutions, and should be implemented to provide maximum information
access. IT survey item 7c (see Table 12) asked respondents whether filter settings could
be overridden or adjusted to permit access to blocked educational content. Twenty
(95.2%) responded yes and 4.8% (N=1) responded no, and no respondent was unsure.
Configuring filters so that on-campus staff can override the filter creates a more efficient
unblocking process according to the literature review. IT survey item 7f and SLMS
survey item 7b (see Table 13) asked participants whether filter override privileges had
been granted to designated on-campus staff. Thirty-four (29.1%) of SLMS replied yes,
65% (N=76) replied no, and 6.0% (N=7) were unsure if someone on campus had been

121
granted filter override privileges. Fourteen (66.7%) IT respondents indicated that filter
bypass privileges had been granted, 33.3% (N=7) replied no, and no IT respondent was
unsure about this item.
Table 13. Filter Override Privileges and Blocked Page Notification
Survey item 7f (IT) and 7b (SLMS)
Filter override privileges have been granted for designated on-campus staff
(i.e., administrators, media specialists, technology specialists)
SLMS
IT
Responses
Responses
%
N
%
N
Yes
29.1
34
66.7
14
No
65.0
76
33.3
7
Not Sure
6.0
7
0.0
0
Survey item 7d (IT), 7c (SLMS)
When users encounter blocked content, the blocked page notification
instructs users how to get the content unblocked.
%
N
%
N
Yes
53.4
63
95.2
20
No
39.8
47
4.8
1
Not Sure
6.8
8
0.0
0

Compared to IT respondents (66.7%), a much smaller proportion of SLMS
(29.1%) said filter override privileges had been granted to on-campus staff. One possible
explanation of the disparity between SLMS and IT responses may be that some SLMS
were unaware that override privileges had been granted to on-campus staff. In some
circumstances, even though school-based staff was given override privileges, extenuating
circumstances sometime delayed access to blocked content. One SLMS survey
respondent explained that each school was given a filter override password. However, the
respondent stated, “Sometimes the password will allow the user access; sometimes it
won't, resulting in an educator sending an email to the technology office to get the Web
site unblocked.”
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SLMS survey item 7c and IT survey item 7d (see Table 13) asked respondents
whether the blocked page notification instructed users how to get blocked content
unblocked. In response to this item, 53.4% (N=63) of SLMS answered yes, 39.8%
(N=47) answered no, and 6.8% (N=8) were unsure. Twenty (95.2%) IT administrators
answered yes, 4.8% (N=1) answered no, and there were no IT respondents unsure about
this item. A smaller percentage of SLMS (53.4%, N=63) said the blocked page
notification instructed users how to get blocked content unblocked than IT administrators
(95.2%, N=20). The discrepancy between IT administrators’ and SLMS’ responses for
this item implies unblocking instructions might not have been adequately explained or
may not have been perceptible to end users on the blocked content notification page.
Interviewee 4’s comments support this conclusion. The SLMS stated, “I don’t know that
people are told how to get something unblocked. The link on the blocked page is very
subtle. The unblocking process is not well known.”
Several IT directors and SLMS survey participants submitted comments
describing unblocking procedures that had been implemented. Most unblocking
procedures required end users to submit a request to unblock content. For example, one
SLMS survey respondent wrote, “In order to get a site unblocked we have to submit a
technology work order,” and another commented, “We can ask for sites to be unblocked.”
Some districts’ unblocking procedures allowed users to submit unblocking requests
directly from the blocked page by clicking on a link. In some cases, direct input from the
blocked page allowed immediate access to blocked content. One IT survey respondent
wrote, “When a site is blocked, a request form can be completed at that moment. The
request comes to me and it is unblocked immediately if [the site is] a legitimate site. If
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[there is] a question, the superintendent is contacted.” In other cases, access to blocked
content was delayed even when users submitted unblocking requests via a link on the
blocked page, as the following IT respondent explanation illustrates:
[When] users (student or staff) receive a blocked page, they can enter the request
to unblock. The Lightspeed Company checks the site to see if it is in the correct
category and often changes it, which allows access. It takes 2-4 hours. The
following day upper level district IT checks the list of blocked sites and manually
approves or denies the request. In any case, an email is sent to the requester
explaining the action taken. (IT Respondent Comment)
The aforesaid unblocking process delayed access to content because the unblocking
request went through multiple bureaucratic layers (Lightspeed and district IT staff).
Cumbersome unblocking processes were evident in other IT respondents’ explanations as
well. For example, an IT respondent explained that unblocking requests were sent via
“email from an administrator to the director of IT.”
SLMS also described cumbersome unblocking procedures requiring requests to be
sent through multiple bureaucratic layers. These procedures likely lead to delays in
accessing blocked content. One SLMS commented, “Media specialists can forward
requests from teachers to the IT staff to request that specific sites be unblocked.” Another
SLMS commented, “If something needs to be unblocked at the school level, we tell our
principal and he/she requests that it be unblocked.” Survey respondent comments suggest
protracted delays also resulted when technology administrators were too busy with other
duties to unblock sites. Another SLMS survey respondent wrote, “[We have] very limited
override. There are unblocking instructions, but our Tech administrator is too
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overwhelmed to have the time to unblock sites.” Another SLMS survey respondent
stated, “We have to submit a request to the IT department to unblock a site. That process
takes 2-4 weeks.”
SLMS survey comments such as “Faculty members can request IT unblock
specific sites,” and “Teachers and other district employees can send requests to have Web
sites unblocked,” suggest some districts only permitted staff members to submit
unblocking requests. However, a few districts accepted requests from any user as the
following survey comment suggests: “Any user can submit requests to have sites
unblocked and any user can recommend that sites be blocked.” Although users
encountered delays in accessing blocked content, survey comments suggest most
unblocking requests were granted. A SLMS commented, “….requests are usually
honored,” and another stated, “If a site we want to use is blocked, we can request it be
unblocked and it usually is.”
An analysis of interviewee observations revealed themes similar to those that
emerged from SLMS’ survey comments about districts’ unblocking procedures.
Interviewees described similar impediments to accessing blocked educational content.
Their statements indicate some end users were required to go through multiple
bureaucratic layers, experienced long delays, or were uncertain about unblocking
procedures.
Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 5 described unblocking procedures requiring
requests to be sent through multiple bureaucratic layers. Interviewee 5 reported, “If
someone emails the principal the Web site to be unblocked, she emails someone at the
district office who looks at the site, then emails the principal, and she emails back to
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you.” Interviewee 1 described similar procedures when she stated, “When something is
blocked by the filter, I submit a request to the principal, and he submits the request to the
director of IT.” Interviewee 1’s observation that waiting “as long as four weeks to get
something unblocked” suggests these cumbersome procedures resulted in substantial
delays in accessing blocked content. Similarly, Interviewee 5 suggested the districts’
unblocking procedures were inefficient when stating, “Our access policies are
inconvenient; it takes longer than it should to get something unblocked.”
Interviewee 2 and Interviewee 3, who were elementary SLMS, expressed less
frustration about unblocking procedures than the secondary interview participants
(Interviewee 1, 4, & 5). Elementary interview participants’ comments indicate approval
of their districts’ unblocking procedures, despite having to wait several days for content
to be unblocked. Their statements suggested that unblocking procedures permitted timely
access to blocked content. For instance, Interviewee 2 stated, “It takes less than a week to
unblock a Web site….There’s great turnaround time.” Similarly, Interviewee 3
commented, “This is a good process. I’ve never had to wait more than two days.” In
Interviewee 2’s district, instructional staff contacted the help desk to submit unblocking
requests. Interviewee 2 expressed approval of the unblocking process when she stated,
“They look at requests on a daily basis. They know we’re professionals, that if we ask for
something to be unblocked, that obviously we need it. I haven’t heard of anything not
being unblocked.” Interviewee 3, who also believed her district’s unblocking procedures
were efficient, described an unblocking process that required users to click on a blocked
page link to access an unblocking request form. As part of the request, users were
required to provide the rationale as to why the requested Web site should be unblocked.
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Elementary SLMS’ willingness to tolerate the inconvenience of delayed access to
blocked content may reflect their perspective that younger students are especially
susceptible to indecent content and should have more restricted online access. This
perspective was evident when Interviewee 3 commented, “Middle school and high school
students may have the right to access more, but honestly I’m in elementary school, I’m
still concerned about what’s inappropriate.”
Interviewee statements also indicate some end users may have been uncertain
about unblocking procedures. According to Interviewee 4, there was an imperceptible
link on the blocked page that provided unblocking instructions. The unblocking process,
which took about one day, entailed sending an “email to a guy over a bunch of
technicians.” Since the unblocking link was not easily discernible, the SLMS stated, “I
don’t know how well it’s [unblocking process] known.”
Most survey and interview respondents described unblocking procedures that
required users to submit a request and wait for content to be unblocked, sometimes for up
to four weeks. To gain a better portrayal of how long users waited for content to be
unblocked, SLMS survey item 4 asked participants how long users typically waited for
unblocking requests to be granted. Figure 4 shows that in response to this survey item,
2.5% (N=3) selected immediately unblocked, 12.4% (N=15) selected less than 1 hour,
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Figure 4. Timeliness of unblocking procedures.
14% (N=17) selected several hours, 30.6% (N=37) selected 1-2 days, 10.7% (N=13)
selected 3-4 days, 5% (N=6) selected 1-2 weeks, 1.7% (N=2) selected 3-4 weeks, and
4.1% (N=5) selected more than a month. Figure 4 also shows that <1% (N=1) selected
content cannot be unblocked and 18.2% (N=22) were unsure how long it took to unblock
content. One explanation for the “not sure” selection could be that end users were not
aware that content could be unblocked or had never submitted a request to unblock
content. A large portion of respondents (66.6%) waited several hours or more to access
blocked content, which meant blocked content was inaccessible at the point when end
users needed it.
SLMS survey item 8d provided additional data about the efficiency of unblocking
procedures. To assess further the efficiency of unblocking procedures, SLMS were asked
whether they agreed that filter override procedures allowed timely access to blocked
resources and information. In response to this item, 7.7% (N=9) strongly disagreed,
27.4% (N=32) disagreed, 35% (N=42) agreed, and 7.7% (N=9) strongly agreed that filter
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override procedures allowed timely access to blocked content, while 22.2% (N=26) were
neutral about the timeliness of unblocking procedures. Despite delays, more respondents
(42.7%) agreed than disagreed (35.1%) that unblocking procedures provided timely
access to blocked content. This suggests that many SLMS accepted delayed access to
blocked content as an inevitable outcome of educators’ obligation to protect students
from online indecency.
Research Question 3
Research question 3 asked, “How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety
issues?” To answer this research question, the investigator analyzed districts’ AUPs to
determine how they have been adjusted in response to Web 2.0 safety concerns and
legislative mandates. SLMS and IT survey questions focused on the implementation of
Internet safety education programs to address specific Web 2.0 safety issues. SLMS were
also asked their opinions about the effectiveness of Internet safety approaches such as
Internet safety education.
Safety Policy Adjustments in Response to Web 2.0 Safety Issues
The investigator reviewed safety policies (AUPs) from 80 of 81 traditional school
districts in South Carolina to determine whether AUPs were addressing Web 2.0 safety
issues via Internet safety education. The Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act
(2008) required E-rate recipients to educate minors about Web 2.0 safety issues including
interacting with other individuals on social networking Web sites and in chat rooms and
cyber bullying awareness and response. The FCC required E-rate participants to include
the Web 2.0 education provision in their safety policies by July1, 2012. Safety policies
were examined to determine when they were last updated and for references to Web 2.0
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safety issues, and for references to educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues. Table
14 summarizes the data resulting from the safety policy analysis.
The safety policy analysis revealed that 66.6% (N=53) of school districts had
updated their safety policies during the last three years (2010-2012), but only 45%
(N=36) had updated them to include references to educating minors about Web 2.0 safety
issues including interacting on social networks, in chat rooms and cyber bullying
awareness and response. Of the safety policies that have been updated in the last three
Table 14. Web 2.0 Safety Policy (AUP) Adjustments
Web 2.0 Safety References
Last Updated
2010200720041996Total
2012
2009
2006
2003
%
N
%
N %
N %
N
% N
8.8
7
6.3
5
7.5
6
7.5 6 30.1 24
No references to Web 2.0, no
references to educating
minors
References Web 2.0 safety
issues, but no references to
educating minors

6.3

5

1

1

0

0

0

0

7.3

6

References instructing minors
about appropriate Internet use,
but no reference to educating
minors about Web 2.0 safety

6.3

5

7.5

6

2.5

2

1

1

17.5

14

References educating minors
about Web 2.0 safety issues,
including interacting on social
networks, in chat rooms and
cyber bullying awareness and
response
Total

45

36

0

0

0

0

0

0

45

36

66.6

53

14.8

12

10

8

8.5

7

100

80

years, 8.8% (N=7) made no mention of educating minors about Internet safety, 6.3%
(N=5) referenced Web 2.0 safety (i.e., cyber bullying, social networking, etc.), but did
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not mention educating minors about Internet safety; and 6.3% (N=5) referenced
instructing minors about appropriate Internet use, but did not include Web 2.0 safety
issues. When AUPs referenced Web 2.0 safety issues but made no reference to educating
minors about Web 2.0 safety, they included statements such as “social networking sites
are strictly prohibited.” Twelve school districts (14.8%) last updated their AUPs during
the 2007-2009 time period, none of which included references to educating minors about
Web 2.0 safety issues. In this group, 6.3% (N=5) made no mention of educating or
instructing minors about internet safety, 1% (N=1) mentioned Web 2.0 safety, but did not
mention educating minors about Internet safety. Six (7.5%) AUPs mentioned instructing
students about appropriate Internet use, but made no reference to educating minors about
Web 2.0 safety issues.
Eight (10%) school districts last updated their safety policies during the 20042006 time period, none of which referenced educating minors about Web 2.0 safety. Six
(7.5%) did not mention educating minors and 2.5% (N=2) included references to
instructing minors about appropriate Internet use, but not specific Web 2.0 safety issues.
Seven (8.5%) school districts last updated their AUPs during the 1996-2003 time period.
Of these districts, six (7.5%) made no references to educating minors or to Web 2.0
safety, 1% (N=1) referenced instructing minors about appropriate Internet use, but made
no mention of Web 2.0 safety. This safety policy analysis suggests that school districts
were relying mostly on Internet filters to protect students and were not adjusting their
AUPs in response to Web 2.0 safety concerns. Seventy-six percent of the safety policies
that referenced Web 2.0 safety education were updated within the past year (2012), which
implies that Web 2.0 safety education is in a state of flux and that district-wide safety
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education is in the beginning phase of implementation. Twenty-seven (32.5%) districts
have not updated their AUPs in more than three years, which suggests safety policies
may not be the focus of Internet safety in these districts. This analysis, IT content
blocking data, and SLMS responses to the blocked content item suggests that school
districts are mostly blocking access to Web 2.0 resources to address Web 2.0 safety
concerns.
Safety Education Implementation
IT survey item 8 and SLMS survey item 7e asked respondents if their school
district had implemented an Internet safety education program. In response to this
question, 39.8% (N=47) of SLMS replied yes, 41.5% (N=49) replied no, and 18.6%
(N=22) were unsure about this question (see Table 15). Table 15 also shows that 90%
(N=18) of IT respondents replied yes, 5% (N=1) replied no, and 5% (N=1) were unsure
about this item.
Table 15. Internet Safety Education
Survey Item

SLMS
N=118

IT
N=20

Survey Item 8 (IT), 7e (SLMS)
The district has implemented an Internet safety program that educates
students about appropriate online behavior, including social networking
and chat room interactions, and cyber bullying awareness and response.
Response
%
N
%
N
Yes
39.8
47
90
18
No
41.5
49
5
1
Unsure
18.6
22
5
1

Compared to the IT respondents, a smaller percentage of SLMS (39.8%) than IT
respondents (90%) indicated that their school district had implemented an Internet safety
education program to educate students about inappropriate online behavior, including

132
Web 2.0 safety issues. The difference in SLMS and IT responses to this survey item
suggests these programs were not being implemented district-wide in many districts or
that some SLMS may have been unaware of their district’s Internet safety education
program. Another possible explanation for the difference between SLMS and IT
responses could be that some IT respondents viewed their AUPs as the district’s Internet
safety education program. IT survey comments in response to the Internet safety
education item support this conclusion. For instance, one IT respondent commented,
“The district has an Internet safety policy in place and we are currently updating [it] to
include cyber bullying.” Likewise, another IT respondent commented, “We will be
implementing a cyber bullying policy and are already providing information to students
and parents. We do have an acceptable use policy in place.”
Interviewee and survey respondent observations clarify how Internet safety
education was implemented in school districts. Overarching themes that emerged from
analysis of these observations include lack of safety awareness programs, uncoordinated
or passive Internet safety awareness efforts, uncertainty about safety awareness programs,
and in a few situations, effective online safety awareness programs. Some respondent
statements indicated that a district-wide Internet safety awareness program had not been
adopted and implemented. Regarding district-wide safety education programs,
Interviewee 1 commented, “There’s nothing in place.” The SLMS’ comments suggest
teachers and media specialists were expected to educate minors about Internet safety, but
had not been provided specific guidelines or a curriculum. The result was haphazard
Internet safety education efforts as was evident when Interviewee 1 commented, “I do
digital citizenship units of instruction with the kids. The district leaves it up to media
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specialists and teachers. If they [teachers and media specialists] say it’s not important,
they don’t do it.” Similarly, a SLMS survey respondent commented, “An internet safety
education program is not mandatory at all schools in the district. Each school initiates its
safety education program.”
Other respondents were uncertain whether a district-wide Internet safety
awareness program had been adopted and implemented. For example, Interviewee 4
stated, I don’t know what the computer and keyboarding classes are doing. I can’t tell
you.” Uncertainty was evident when Interviewee 4 stated, “…there’s no official course or
online training program. Librarians haven’t been told officially about it. Maybe computer
and business classes have a program, but I’m not aware of any.” The school district had
made passive efforts to inform students about online safety, but these efforts did not
involve direct instruction. The SLMS stated, “A while back, a group including media
specialists developed posters on Internet safety and ways to stay safe on the Internet.
These posters were displayed in classrooms.” Interviewee 4 also described a more recent
district-wide effort to inform student about online dangers when she stated, “We also had
something this year, some information about bullying and online bullying explaining how
to protect yourself online. This came from the district. It was an instructional thing to put
in your room.”
Uncertainty about district-wide cyber safety education programs was apparent
when Interviewee 5 stated, “The only thing that I know they do is that we have a one-day
program in the freshman 101 class where the technology integration specialist does a
jeopardy game on Internet safety.” District-wide efforts to educate minors were
uncoordinated and sporadic as was evident when Interview 5 reported, “…students also
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get a little bit of instruction when they pick up their iPad devices. Teachers sporadically
address Internet safety, but it is not addressed district-wide.” Uncertainty was also
apparent when a SLMS survey respondent commented, “I am not sure if there is a
program created by the district to address these concerns.” Regarding district wide efforts
to implement cyber safety education, the respondent’ explained, “[The] media specialist
includes such information during our lessons on Internet use. Board policies are in effect,
but teachers are responsible for sharing that information with students.” This explanation
implies uncoordinated Internet safety efforts as there is no mention of an Internet safety
program or district mandated cyber safety curriculum.
On the other hand, a few participants’ statements suggest their districts had issued
clear Internet safety education guidelines or had adopted a formal Internet safety
curriculum. For example, Interviewee 2 remarked, “We were given a requirement as of
last year saying we have to have a formal program in place and we had to have proof that
every child is educated every year.” Interviewee 2’s school also made efforts to involve
parents by sending a flyer home and advertising Internet safety programs on the school’s
Web site. Similar to Interviewee 2’s observation, parental involvement was a key part of
the Internet safety program Interviewee 3 described. According to Interviewee 3, the
district Internet safety program “provides instruction for kids and workshops for parents.”
The SLMS considered the program to be effective as the statement, “It’s a good one,”
suggests.
IT survey respondent observations indicated Internet safety education was in
various stages of implementation. One IT respondent reported that the district had
implemented a multi-level program entitled, “NetSmartz from [the] Center of Missing
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and Exploited Children.” Another IT responded stated, “This is in [the] planning stages
with implementation scheduled at the beginning of next school term.” The latter
statement implies that up to this point some school districts may have been relying mostly
on filters for Internet safety instead of using multiple Internet safety approaches,
including a fully integrated district-wide safety education program.
The literature review suggested that multiple Internet safety approaches are
required to prepare students to be safe and responsible Internet users, particularly in
unfiltered environments. To ascertain the effectiveness of district-implemented Internet
safety approaches, SLMS survey item 8f asked respondents whether they agreed that
filtering and safety policies/practices (i.e., AUPs, Cyber safety education, monitoring,
etc.) prepared students to be safe and responsible users in unfiltered environments. In
response to this item, 10.3% (N=12) strongly disagreed, 23.9% (N=28) disagreed, 38.5%
(N=45) agreed, 6.8% (N=8) strongly agreed while 20.5% (N=24) were neutral about this
item. Fewer than half of SLMS respondents (45.3%) agreed or strongly agreed that their
district’s Internet safety approaches effectively prepared students to make safe and
responsible decisions while using online resources. Interview participant observation
enabled a better understanding of factors that contributed to ineffective Internet safety
approaches. Moreover, interviewee observations detail factors that contribute to effective
Internet safety approaches.
Some interview participant observations support the safety policy analysis
findings. Their observations suggested that current Internet safety efforts relied mostly on
filters to keep students safe, which resulted in overly restrictive filtering policies,
uncoordinated Internet safety education efforts, or minimal emphasis on AUPs. When
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Interviewee 5 stated, “They [the district] have the mindset that if we block all the bad
stuff, they don’t have to worry about teaching Internet safety,” the remark implied the
district was relying mostly on strict filtering policies to protect students from online
indecency instead of instructing students about online safety. Interviewee 4 was
concerned that reliance on strict filtering policies interfered with efforts to educate
students about online safety. She used the following thought-provoking analogy to
convey her concern:
You can have all the safety education you want, but if everything is blocked, we
can’t train them on how to be safe online. It’s like teaching first graders and
kindergartners all about scissor safety, but never putting scissors in their hands so
they can practice cutting. We’re blocking so much that we can’t practice. For
instance students don’t have email, can’t access blogs, forums. We can’t teach
safety when they can’t access these online tools.
Other interview participants suggested their school districts were minimizing the
importance of AUPs as an Internet safety approach. For instance, Interviewee 1
remarked, “They [the district] started something new, they’re saying more and more we
don’t need that [signed AUPs]. Students don’t sign AUPs anymore, they did away with
that saying it’s too much paperwork.” Likewise, minimal use of AUPs to promote
Internet safety was implied when Interviewee 4 stated, “We have a great AUP that
nobody knows about in the student handbook. Students are not required to sign any
forms.” Interviewee 4 added, “In the handbook there’s one page that talks about the
Internet. The handbook is sent home for parents to read, they contact the school if they
have questions or concerns,” which suggested efforts to involve parents in Internet safety
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was not proactive. It can also be construed that few students or parents read the AUP
because the policy did not require students’ or parents’ signatures.
The aforementioned participant observations highlighted factors contributing to
ineffective Internet safety strategies in school districts. Nevertheless, some participants
described effective Internet safety approaches in their districts. Constant reinforcement of
digital citizenship guidelines was a common theme that emerged when participants
described effective district-wide Internet safety education programs. When asked what
factors contributed to the success of their district’s Internet safety program, Interview
participant 3 replied, “The program they [the district] use is not a stand-alone lesson,
there’re projects. It’s not like a one-time thing. Internet safety is constantly reinforced.”
Interview participant 2 replied, “Safety education is reinforced in the library and the
computer lab.” Similar survey respondent comments include: “We have a strong Internet
safety program in place for our students and clear guidelines for our teachers and staff,”
and “The media specialist goes over Internet safety constantly.”
Interviewee observations exemplify other factors that contribute to effective
digital citizenship practices, including stakeholder involvement in Internet safety program
implementation and integrated district-wide Internet safety efforts. When Interviewee 5
remarked, “It [Internet safety] probably should be integrated into every course, and
[there] should be a system-wide plan to teach and reteach this thing of Internet safety and
etiquette,” it suggested integrated district-wide Internet safety instruction was an
important factor in implementing effective Internet safety programs. Interview
observations also suggest stakeholder involvement in program development is a critical
component of effective Internet safety program implementation. Interviewee 5 asserted
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that district Internet safety efforts were ineffective because instructional staff were not
involved in policy decisions. The SLMS explained, “….the people who are making the
decisions are not instructional staff, but are technicians.” The need for stakeholder
involvement in Internet safety program implementation was echoed in other interviewee
comments. Interview 1 stated, “They need to involve media specialists; we’ve got to be
involved in that process.” Similarly, Interviewee 4 stated, “There needs to be more input
from people who are teaching the students.” Interviewee 3, who viewed her district’s
Internet safety program as “…a good one,” described how stakeholders were involved in
the program’s implementation. The SLMS stated, “It’s a specific thing [program]. The
technology teachers got with the district office to choose what they’ll use.”
Interviewee observations, survey data, and the AUP analysis suggest Internet
safety education has not been a major focus of Internet safety policies. Safety policies
(AUPs) have not evolved to encompass 21st century computing technology and its
inherent safety issues as the following Interviewee observations suggest: “…policies have
not kept up with what it means to be a 21st century learner,” (Interviewee 1) and “...the
district’s Internet use policies reflected a 1980’s mentality” (Interviewee 4). Interviewee
observations also suggest that when safety education is implemented with stakeholder
involvement, on a district-wide basis, and reinforced often, it can be an effective Internet
safety approach.
Research Question 4
Research question 4 asked, “In what ways do filtering policies impede access to
information and resources necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information
literacy standards?” The standards that were the focus of this question include the
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communication and collaborative standards identified in Table 3. To answer this
question, IT and SLMS survey items sought to determine whether Web 2.0 resources,
which promote the acquisition of communication and collaborative skills, were accessible
or blocked. Question set 5 on the interview protocol also sought to define specific Web
2.0 access issues and safety concerns that prompted administrators to limit access to this
content.
To discover how filters impeded access to Web 2.0 resources, wikis, blogs, and
social networking sites, were included as content categories in IT survey question 4.
Table 8 shows that 23.1% (N=3) of responding school districts filtered all wikis and
blogs, 69.2% (N=9) filtered some wikis and blogs, while 7.7% (N=1) filtered no
wiki/blog content. The majority (58.8%; N=10) of school districts blocked all social
networking tools, 41.2% (N=7) blocked some, and there were no school districts that did
not block all or some social networking sites. To ascertain how filtering policies
influenced end user access to Web 2.0 tools, SLMS survey item 3 asked respondents to
select the types of educational content that were most often over-blocked. Web 2.0
content was one of the answer choices for this item. Seventy-eight (66.7%) SLMS said
Web 2.0 resources were over-blocked in their school districts (see Figure 3).
SLMS were also asked whether they agreed that their district’s filtering and safety
policies facilitated easy access to online collaboration and communication tools (Web
2.0). Eighteen (15.8%) SLMS strongly disagreed, 30.7 (N=35) disagreed, 24.6% (N=28)
agreed, and 4.4% (N=5) strongly agreed that their district’s filtering and safety policies
facilitated easy access to Web 2.0 resources. Twenty-eight respondents (24.6%) were
neutral about this item. A greater portion of SLMS strongly disagreed/disagreed (46.5%)
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than agreed/strongly agreed (39.9%) that their district’s filtering and safety policies
facilitated access to communication and collaboration tools. IT and SLMS survey data
inferred that district-implemented filtering policies impeded access to many Web 2.0
resources necessary for attainment of 21st century learning skills.
Additionally, impeded access to Web 2.0 resources was a recurring theme of
interview participant observations. Interviewees were asked if Internet access policies or
practices limited access to Web 2.0 tools that foster online communication and
collaboration. Interviewee responses described specific communication and collaboration
tools that were inaccessible. Interviewee 5 stated, “There’s no Twitter™, no Facebook™,
and no YouTube™.” The media specialist also described sporadic access to Wordle™
when she stated, “Its sporadic, sometimes we get access, sometimes we can’t.”
Interviewee 4, whose statements: “The only Web 2.0 tools we’re able to access is
Edmodo™,” and “We just can’t get to anything,” also suggest very limited access to
online communication and collaboration tools.
Even when access to specific Web 2.0 tools was allowed, some features of these
sites were disabled. For example, Interviewee 5 stated, De.lic.ious™ is available, but for
some reason they block the toolbar icon that allows you to add a Web site to your
account.” Interviewee 1, who recounted a similar experience involving disabled Web 2.0
features, stated, “When we use Web 2.0 tools, email capability is blocked. Students can’t
send articles to their personal email addresses.”
If interview respondents indicated their district’s Internet use policies restricted
access to Web 2.0 resources, they were also asked to explain how these policies limited
attainment of 21st century information literacy and technology standards. Interviewee
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responses suggest that restricted Web 2.0 access limited opportunities for students to
interact appropriately with others, to create content, connect with experts, and become
self-directed learners. Interviewee 4 stated, “….students aren’t getting to practice
interacting appropriately with people on a live interaction tool,” which illustrated how
restricted Web 2.0 access limited opportunities for students to interact appropriately.
When Interviewed 4 stated, “They [students] can’t create content, aren’t learning how to
use that,” the remark implied that Web 2.0 access policies limited opportunities for
students to create and share content.
Interviewee observations also described how Web 2.0 access policies restricted
individual student collaboration. For example, Interviewee 4 stated, “Web 2.0 makes it
easy to connect with experts, but students are almost stuck with letter writing. They can
be communicating with authors or chemists, but that’s not happening because they can’t
access the online communication tools.” Interviewee 5, who described similar Web 2.0
access restrictions, reported, “District policies restrict collaboration with others outside of
the district.” The district’s technology policy allowed teacher access to collaborative
tools, but prevented students from accessing these tools. Interviewee 5 defined how this
access policy limited opportunities for student interaction when she remarked, “If the
teacher wants to collaborate with another class, she can only do it using the teacher’s
account. I think our students should get the same opportunity to do it [collaborate]
individually.” Interviewee 1 was concerned that restricted Web 2.0 access limited
opportunities for students to become self-directed learners. The SLMS stated, “The
district says we’re supposed to develop self-directed learners, we’re supposed to be
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teaching them to be self-directed. She questioned, “How can students be in charge of
their own learning if all these restrictions are in place?”
Student safety had a substantial influence on content blocking decisions as Table
9 illustrates. When asked what safety concerns prompted policymakers to restrict Web
2.0 access, interview participants’ responses convey administrators’ concerns about
student safety. Interviewee responses include the following recurring student safety
issues: cyber bullying, online predators, and posting inappropriate content online.
Interviewee 4 stated, “They’re [policymakers] worried about cyber bullying; they’re
afraid that a student will email inappropriate messages and do inappropriate things that
would put a bad mark on the school.” Interviewee 2 added that policymakers’ “biggest
concern is bullying and students getting in contact with someone not at school who might
be a predator.” Interviewee 5 indicated that policymakers restricted Web 2.0 access
because of “all the stuff on the news about somebody being lead to meet with somebody
online. Interviewee 5 further explained that policymakers were “afraid that kids will post
inappropriate things; they’re worried about inappropriate verbiage and a whole list of
things.” These statements call attention to the inherent safety issues that accompany Web
2.0 usage. In response to these concerns, policymakers have mostly used a onedimensional Internet safety approach; block access to potentially unsafe content or
controversial content, including Web 2.0 resources. Interviewee 3 likened this Internet
safety approach to “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.”
Some data indicates that policymakers are beginning to realize the educational
benefits Web 2.0 resources afford. Though initially subjected to wholesale blocking, Web
2.0 resources were becoming more accessible for students and teachers in some school
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districts. Regarding increasing Web 2.0 access, Interviewee 2 reported, “I noticed that
access denials or blocks have opened up more.” Interviewee 2 named specific Web 2.0
tools that had become available for instructional use, including SharpSchool™ and
Edmodo™. The SLMS suggested that Web 2.0 access for students was also becoming
less restricted when asserting, “Access has been restricted more for students, but it’s
beginning to open up.” Similarly, Interviewee 1 explained, “They’re [district
administrators] starting to relax policies, but I’d love to be able to email articles to
students’ personal email addresses.” The following SLMS survey comment illustrates
that increased Web 2.0 access is an evolving process requiring communication between
educators and administrators, some trial and error, and clear usage guidelines:
We initially had and still have some difficulties in utilizing Web 2.0 tools, but are
working with IT and the administration on these issues and use of certain tools,
some being very open now and others requiring more tests and/or supervisory
guidelines (SLMS Survey Comment).
Interviewee 3’s school district was beginning to embrace social networking and online
collaboration as well. However, limited student access to Web 2.0 resources was an issue.
Interviewee 3 described this issue and district plans to expand students’ access in the
following statement:
We do the social networking thing. We do collaborative projects with people at
different schools. There’s a bigger problem though. We Skype™ under the
umbrella of the teacher login, but that’s something that’s going to be addressed.
The school district is going to be using Google™; everyone will have Google™
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accounts. As a whole the district will embrace Google™ docs and other Google™
communication apps. (Interviewee 3)
Some of the aforementioned SLMS observations described limited access to a
variety of Web 2.0 resources, which inhibited communication and collaboration within
and outside of school. However, some districts were loosening restrictions on Web 2.0
tools, but access was still hampered by access issues such as staff-only Web 2.0 access
policies, which prevented individual student collaboration and communication. The
integration of Web 2.0 resources into instruction was also hampered by disablement of
features on some sites, including email capability and toolbar features that enable users to
add Web sites to their accounts. Overall, survey and interview data regarding Web 2.0
access suggest that many end users were denied opportunities to develop 21st century
communication and collaboration skills because of restricted access to the read and write
Web.
Comparison of Elementary and Secondary School Access Issues
The investigator compared elementary (K-5) and secondary (6-12) SLMS
responses on survey items about content access issues such as over-blocking to ascertain
how filtering policies affected users in each academic group. If SLMS survey
respondents indicated that their school included any grade level beyond grade 5, they
were included with the secondary group. Figure 5 shows that a greater percentage of
secondary SLMS than elementary SLMS encountered over-blocking in all but one
content category, educational games. The percentage difference between secondary
SLMS and elementary SLMS experiencing over-blocked visual images, virtual worlds,
heath/sex education content, and other content was greater than 10 percentage points. For
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these content areas, 43.8% of secondary SLMS and 26.4% of elementary SLMS
experienced over-blocking of virtual world content, 50% of secondary SLMS and 39.6%

Figure 5. Comparison of elementary and secondary school access issues.
of elementary SLMS experienced visual image over-blocking, and 57.8% of secondary
and 45.3% of elementary SLMS experienced health/sex education content over-blocking.
Twenty-five percent of secondary SLMS compared to 5.7% of elementary SLMS
experienced over blocking of other content, such as popular culture, entertainment, online
ordering/shopping (i.e., school supply sites), and educational sites including
Scholastic.com and PBS.org. A greater proportion of elementary SLMS (52.8%) than
secondary SLMS (39.1%) encountered blocked educational games. This data suggests
that elementary users need greater access to education games and secondary users need
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greater access to virtual worlds, visual images, health/sex education subject matter, and
other specified content.
Compared to secondary SLMS, a smaller percentage (5-10 percentage points
smaller) of elementary SLMS indicated that business/finance, sports/recreational, and
controversial content was over-blocked. Fourteen secondary SLMS (21.9%) and 15.1%
of elementary SLMS reported instances when business and financial content was overblocked. A larger portion of secondary SLMS (28.1%) experienced blocked sports and
recreational content while a smaller portion of elementary SLMS (22.6%) experienced
blocked content in this domain. This finding hints that secondary users have a greater
need for business/financial and sports/recreational content. The majority (more than 50%)
of both groups experienced blocked controversial content; however, more secondary
(60.9%) than elementary (54.7%) SLMS indicated controversial content was overblocked. The fact that the majority of both academic levels encountered blocked content
of this nature could be construed that both academic levels require greater access to
subject matter that filters categorize as controversial.
Figure 5 shows that streaming media over-blocking and Web 2.0 over-blocking
occurred with a majority of both groups, as compared to every other content area except
controversial subject matter. However, the percentage difference between the elementary
and secondary SLMS is less than five percentage points for both content areas. Streaming
media content was over-blocked for 83% of elementary SLMS and 85.9% of secondary
SLMS. Web 2.0 resources were over-blocked for 64.2% of elementary SLMS and 68.8%
of elementary SLMS. This data suggests that over-blocking is an issue with both
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academic levels, and that filtering policies need to be adjusted to allow greater access to
streaming media content and Web 2.0 resources.
Table 16. Comparison of Secondary and Elementary SLMS' Perceptions of the
Influence of Filtering/Safety Policies on Instructional Staff
Survey Item
Elementary
Secondary
SLMS
SLMS
SLMS Survey Item 8a
The Internet filter prevents instructional staff from accessing resources
needed for instructional or professional activities.
N=52
N=66
Response
%
N
%
N
Strongly disagree
5.8
3
1.5
1
Disagree
30.8
16
13.6
9
Neutral
9.6
5
10.6
7
Agree
46.2
24
54.5
36
Strongly agree
7.7
4
19.7
13

Secondary and elementary SLMS’ perceptions about the influence of filtering
policies on end user access to online content was compared to ascertain whether one user
group experienced more access issues. As Table 16 shows, a greater proportion of
secondary SLMS (74.2%) than elementary SLMS (53.9%) agreed/strongly agreed that
district filtering policies prevented instructional staff from accessing resources needed for
instructional or professional activities. Likewise, Table 17 shows that a greater portion of
secondary SLMS (60.6%) than elementary SLMS (34.6%) agreed/strongly agreed
filtering policies prevented students from accessing information and resources needed for
classroom assignments. When asked whether they agreed that filtering and safety policies
facilitated easy access to online collaboration and communication tools (Web 2.0),
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Table 17. Comparison of Secondary and Elementary SLMS' Perceptions of the
Influence of Filtering/Safety Policies on Students
Survey Item
Elementary
Secondary
SLMS
SLMS
SLMS Survey Item 8b
The Internet filter prevents students from accessing information/resources
needed for classroom assignments.
N=52
N=66
Response
%
N
%
N
Strongly disagree
7.7
4
4.5
3
Disagree
36.5
19
21.2
14
Neutral
21.2
11
13.6
9
Agree
30.8
16
48.5
32
Strongly agree
3.8
2
12.1
8

a greater portion of secondary SLMS (53.9%) disagreed/strongly disagreed than
elementary SLMS (36.7%) (see Table 18). This data analysis indicates filtering and
safety policies were having a more adverse effect on secondary users’ access to
educational information. The data also implies that secondary users need greater access to
online content.
Table 18. Comparison of Secondary and Elementary SLMS' Perceptions of the
Influence of Filtering/Safety Policies on Web 2.0 Access
Survey Item
Elementary
Secondary
SLMS
SLMS
SLMS Survey Item 8e
Filtering and safety policies facilitate easy access to online collaboration
and communication tools (Web 2.0)
N=49
N=65
Response
%
N
%
N
Strongly disagree
6.1
3
23.1
15
Disagree
30.6
15
30.8
20
Neutral
24.5
12
24.6
16
Agree
34.7
17
16.9
11
Strongly agree
4.1
2
4.6
3

Interviewee statements support the foregoing supposition that filtering restrictions
need to be relaxed for older students to allow greater access to online content.
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Interviewee 4 suggested that high school students’ maturity level enabled them to make
better decisions about online content; therefore, high school students should have greater
access to online content. The SLMS stated, “I think you should treat high school students
pretty close to adults. It’s the same with a Website as with a book. Just like they put down
a book they don’t like, they can do the same with a Website.” Interviewee 5 also believed
there was a difference in the maturity levels of elementary and secondary students. The
SLMS explained, “There’s a difference between high school students and elementary
students. Things blocked for elementary can be released with no detrimental effect on
high school students.”
Interviewees 2 and 3, who were elementary SLMS, also acknowledged that
elementary and secondary students had different information needs. Interviewee 2
explained that at the elementary level there were fewer unblocking requests, but was
certain that “high schools and middle schools get more requests.” When Interviewee 2
stated, “…you’re probably going to see a big difference between middle and high school
media specialists,” it was further acknowledgement of the differences in elementary and
secondary users’ information access requirements. Interviewee 3 also acknowledged that
secondary and elementary students have different information requirements when
recommending that, “Filter access levels should be tiered so they [high school students]
can have access to more.”
The foregoing interviewee observations confirm that elementary and secondary
level students have dissimilar information needs and maturity levels, which suggests that
a one-size-fits-all filtering scheme may not be the best filtering approach for elementary
and secondary students. Moreover, a comparison of elementary and secondary SLMS’
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survey responses supports the need for fewer restrictions on Internet access at the
secondary level.
Attitudes about Filtering and Safety Policies
During the course of this investigation, other themes emerged that demonstrate
how end users reacted to filtering policy implementation. A thematic analysis of
interviewees’ and survey respondents’ comments revealed end users’ attitudes about
district-implemented filtering and safety policies. These attitudes include acquiescence,
tolerance, and frustration. Some end users have acquiesced to Internet filter
implementation and accept restrictive filtering policies as an unavoidable consequence of
legal and social mandates to protect students from harmful online content. As Table 19
shows, some end users acknowledged the technology’s over-blocking tendency, but were
willing to accept restrictive filtering policies without objection (AR1, AR2, &
Interviewee 3).
Other users tolerated restrictive filtering policies while seeking alternative ways to
access or utilize blocked educational content. These users applied work-around strategies
to access blocked educational content, such as downloading blocked content in advance
(AR3), finding similar unblocked content (Interviewee 1), and using staff logins and a
projector to share blocked content with students (Interviewee 5). Other respondent
observations revealed an unwillingness to accept filtering policies as they were
implemented (AR4, Interviewee 1). Frustration about current filtering policy
implementation was evident in the use of words like “annoying,” “aggravating,” and
“upsetting.” The attitudes summarized in Table 19 provide additional substantiation of
the issues users encountered as they sought information in a filtered environment.
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Table 19. End User Attitudes about Filtering Policies
Attitude/Reaction
Participant Statements Exemplifying Attitude/Reaction
It is very hard to find good clip art but I also understand how
Acquiescence
easily students can find inappropriate images so I try not to get
too frustrated with that content being blocking. (AR1)
You can request an override, but I have never done it. I respect
their [administrators] decisions and endeavor to set a positive
example for the students. (AR2)
I don’t see it [filtering software] as a problem anymore. It’s
evolved to the point where I feel as if it’s more of a friend than a
roadblock. (Interviewee 3)
Tolerance

Teachers should have downloaded what they need for their
lessons. We all know the filter is in place. The filter cannot catch
everything. (AR3)
If something is blocked and the students can’t get to it,
sometimes the teacher can login to it on her computer. They all
have projectors so they can share the sites with their students.
(Interviewee 5)
They [end users] use other means such as using another Web
site. They just keep trying until they come up with something
that is not blocked. (Interviewee 1)

Frustration

Not having access to Scholastic.com is annoying. As a librarian,
not being able to jump onto Amazon.com or sometimes bn.com
[Barnes and Noble] is very aggravating. (AR4)
It’s upsetting that they [administrators] don’t respect my
professional integrity. (Interviewee 1)

Note: AR=Survey Respondents’ Attitude/Reaction
Summary of Results
This chapter presented the results of the quantitative and qualitative research
undertaken for this investigation. This study endeavored to describe how filtering and
safety policies were being implemented in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools. This
investigation also sought to describe how filtering and safety policies influenced end
users’ access to information. Data collected from IT and SLMS surveys, an interview
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protocol, and an analysis of artifacts (AUPs) were combined to answer each research
question.
Survey and interview data provided insight into the issues surrounding filtering
and safety policy implementation in South Carolina’s public schools. Regarding the
implementation question and content blocking considerations, IT survey data indicated
policymakers were electing to block considerably more Web content than online
obscenity. Several factors influenced filtering decisions, the three most influential being
CIPA compliance, maintaining student safety, and maintaining network security. IT and
SLMS survey data and interview observations suggest that in most school districts,
school-based stakeholders had minimal input in policy decisions. The research results
revealed many school districts were implementing differentiated access levels for staff,
but all students, regardless of age level, had the same access level.
Survey and interview results were combined to portray the issues SLMS
encountered as they facilitated information access in a filtered environment. Survey data
revealed that filters were effective in protecting students from inappropriate content, but
overly restrictive filtering policies prevented most end users from accessing controversial
subject matter, streaming media, health and sex education resources, and Web 2.0 tools.
Interview data supplemented survey findings by providing concrete scenarios in which
filtering policies denied end users access to educational resources. In addition to the overblocking issue, end users also encountered inefficient content unblocking procedures.
Bureaucratic and poorly communicated unblocking procedures and lack of on-campus
override privileges delayed access to blocked content.
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An analysis of school districts’ AUPs coupled with survey and interview data
revealed that school districts were relying mostly on filters to protect students from
online indecency. The majority of school districts have not adjusted their AUPs to
include educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues, as the Protecting Children in the
Twenty First Century Act (2008) requires. Survey and interview data also suggests that
Internet safety education is not an important Internet safety approach in many school
districts. Over-reliance on filters to protect students from Web 2.0 safety issues has
resulted in restricted access to Web 2.0 resources that enable students to acquire 21st
century communication and collaboration skills. In essence, the research results show that
school districts’ filtering and safety policies were mostly outdated, and have not kept
pace with 21st century online technologies.
The researcher compared elementary and secondary SLMS responses on survey
items specifically related to how Internet use policies influenced end users, including
students and instructional staff. Elementary and secondary user groups encountered the
adverse effects of overly restrictive filtering policies, but these adverse effects were more
pronounced at the secondary level. Over-blocking was more prevalent among secondary
users, suggesting that their information needs require access to more of the content that
filters typically classify as controversial, potentially liable, or non-educational.
Considerable over-blocking occurs when filters are set to block such content.
Overall, school districts have mostly implemented a one-dimensional and onesize-fits-all approach to Internet safety through the application of unnecessarily restrictive
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Internet filtering policies. The outcome was frustrated end users with limited access to
resources enabling them to experience fully the Internet’s many educational benefits.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Introduction
This mixed method study examined school districts’ implementation of Internet
filtering and safety policies and the influence of these policies on end users’ access to
information. Quantitative and qualitative data collected during the course of this study,
provided insight into each of the research questions that guided the study. This chapter
will present the conclusions and implications of the research in addition to the
recommendations that evolved from analysis and interpretation of the data. Finally, a
summary of the dissertation will be presented.
Conclusions
The problem that launched this study was the need for a comprehensive
examination of Internet filtering and safety policies to determine how they were
influencing information access in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools. Specifically, this
research sought to detail filtering and safety policy decision making and factors that
influenced policy decisions. Internet use policies can be implemented in a manner that
either maximizes or minimizes user access to information. Therefore, this research
investigated end users’ experiences with content over-blocking, content under-blocking,
and unblocking practices to determine how these factors influenced teaching and
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learning. This investigation also examined the trends and issues surrounding Web 2.0
safety, and the role of filtering, AUPs, and Internet safety education in protecting students
from inappropriate online content. Finally, filtering policies were examined to ascertain
the manner in which they impeded access to Web 2.0 tools enabling students to hone 21st
century collaboration and communication skills. This research provides answers to the
aforementioned inquiries. These answers were gleaned from stakeholder groups who
were keenly aware of how filtering and safety policies were developed and implemented
(IT directors) and the resulting effect of these policies on teaching and learning (SLMS).
The conclusions from each of the four research questions will be presented following a
brief description of the methodology used to obtain the data.
Research Question 1
Research question 1 asked, “How are filtering and safety policies being
implemented in public schools?” To answer this question, survey and interview items
focused on three filtering and safety policy implementation issues (variables) that were
identified in the literature review (see Table 4). These variables include content blocking
considerations, stakeholder involvement in policy decisions, and differentiated access
levels for specific user groups. One of the most important policy considerations is
deciding what content to block and the level of blocking within each category. An
important conclusion drawn from the IT survey data was that in implementing filtering
policies, school districts were deciding to block more content than CIPA requires. CIPA
requires E-rate discount recipients to filter access to visual images that are obscene, child
pornography, or harmful to minors. As E-rate recipients, this mandate applied to all
school districts from which the research data was collected.

157
School districts’ decisions to block more than CIPA requires may be explained by
the factors that influenced filtering decisions. CIPA compliance had the greatest influence
on content blocking decisions. The decision to block more than CIPA requires may be
due to misinterpretation of CIPA’s guidelines or other factors. With the exception of
CIPA compliance, concern for student safety was the most influential factor in filtering
policy decisions. Policymakers’ concerns about student safety likely lead them to block
perceived threatening content such as weapons, violence, alcohol, tobacco, gambling,
drugs, criminal, and other illegal content. Maintaining network security and bandwidth
preservation were also highly influential on filtering decisions, which may explain why
most districts filtered access to hacking, proxy avoidance, and malicious sites in addition
to Internet radio/TV, telephony, and media downloads. Concerns about litigation exerted
considerable influence on policymakers’ filtering decisions as well, which most likely
influenced them to filter controversial content such as alternative lifestyles, hate, racism,
cult, occult, sex education, and intimate apparel. Although preventing non-educational
use and community/parental opinions exerted less influence on filtering decisions than
the aforementioned factors, both factors had a considerable influence on filtering
decisions. Community pressures and the need to prevent non-educational use could
possibly explain why school districts blocked content such as wikis, blogs, and Webbased email, and contributed to decisions to block controversial content.
A prevailing supposition from survey and interview data is that filtering policy
decisions were mostly made by district administrators, IT staff, and the filtering software
(the software’s default/recommended settings are deployed). End user stakeholder groups
such as SLMS, teachers, students, or school-based administrators had little input in

158
filtering policy decisions. Conversely, when asked if the filter’s default setting was
deployed, most IT respondents indicated the filter’s default setting was not implemented.
These competing results suggest that districts began filter implementation with the filter’s
default setting and modified these settings as needed. Nevertheless, end user input in
filtering policy decisions was mostly limited to suggesting Web sites that should be
blocked or unblocked after the filtering solution had been implemented.
The establishment of differentiated user profiles to meet the research, educational,
and professional needs of all user groups was another consideration under investigation.
Although districts had implemented some differentiated access levels, they were not
tailored to the needs of all user groups, or to provide maximum access to online content.
For instance, some SLMS could access Web 2.0 content and YouTube, but other
instructional staff could not access this content. In other instances, content such as
YouTube was unblocked for staff after school hours, but blocked during the school day
and unavailable for instructional purposes. Differentiated access levels were not
established to meet the educational and research needs of various student age groups,
such as elementary, middle, and high school groups.
School districts have implemented overly restrictive filtering policies mostly
without the input of the stakeholders with firsthand knowledge of student and staff
information needs. Moreover, minimal steps were taken to tailor filtering policies to the
needs of specific user groups.
Research Question 2
Research question 2 asked, “What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate
information access on filtered computers?” To answer this question, the data collection
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instruments focused on filtering issues that were identified in the literature (see Table 4).
To determine the scope of these issues and the way they affected teaching and learning,
survey and interview data were collected about filter over-blocking frequency, underblocking frequency, filter effectiveness, specific types of blocked educational content,
and the efficiency of unblocking procedures.
The data provided a portrayal of the issues SLMS encountered as they facilitated
information access on filtered computing devices, the most prevalent of which was filter
over-blocking. A large majority of IT directors received requests to unblock erroneously
blocked educational content, but only a few received unblocking requests on a frequent
basis. A similar majority of SLMS indicated filters over-blocked educational content, and
almost half of SLMS respondents said over-blocking was a frequent issue. End users’
acquiescence to and tolerance of filtering policies most likely resulted in fewer
unblocking requests. Lack of awareness of unblocking procedures could also have
contributed to fewer unblocking requests. These factors may explain why so few IT
administrators frequently received requests to unblock resources while many more SLMS
frequently encountered over-blocked educational content.
An investigation into the types of blocked content provided furthered
understanding of the types of filtering issues end users experienced. Most end users
encountered blocked controversial content such as alternative lifestyles, hate groups,
cults, and the occult. Most end users experienced blocked streaming media, health and
sex education, and Web 2.0 content as well. Slightly fewer than half encountered blocked
educational game and visual image sites. Over-blocking of the aforementioned subject
matter is directly related to policymakers’ decisions to filter all or some potentially liable
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content categories such as alcohol/tobacco, criminal/illegal, cult/occult, drugs, gambling,
hate/racism, social networking, sex, education, Internet radio/TV, and VoIP.
The results of the abovementioned content being over-blocked were far-reaching.
Instructional staff was prevented from accessing resources needed for instructional or
professional activities, and students were prevented from accessing information and
resources needed for classroom assignments, according to most SLMS respondents. This
effect was particularly acute at the secondary level according to a comparison of
elementary and secondary SLMS’ responses. However, over-blocking occurred at all
academic levels. Specifically, teachers were unable to carry out lessons they planned at
home because content accessible at home was blocked at school. Students also
encountered situations where they conducted research for class projects at home, but
could not complete the research at school because of over-blocking. Teachers were
reluctant to plan lessons that involved the use of Internet resources because of overblocked content. Students were unable to add images to PowerPoint presentations
because the images they needed were blocked. One specific instance noted that students
could not access all the information they needed on the history of gaming because many
gaming sites were blocked. These interviewee scenarios portrayed the far-reaching
effects of the restrictive filtering policies that have been implemented in many South
Carolina school districts.
Many of the adverse effects of over-blocking can be mitigated with efficient and
clearly communicated over-blocking procedures. Examination of districts’ content
unblocking efficiency concluded that unblocking procedures in most districts did little to
mitigate the adverse effects of over-blocking. Specifically, most end users waited 24
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hours or more for content to be unblocked, and of this group, some waited more than a
month for content to be unblocked. Another interesting factor was that almost 20 percent
of SLMS were not sure of the unblocking wait period. End-user acquiescence and
tolerance could be one explanation for SLMS’ uncertainty about unblocking wait periods
because users who acquiesce to blocked content may not seek to get it unblocked, while
those who tolerate over-blocking attempt to locate alternate content that is not blocked.
The result is these users may not submit requests to get content unblocked, therefore they
were uncertain about the unblocking wait time.
The prevalence of lengthy unblocking periods may be attributed to the absence of
on-campus individuals with filter override privileges and bureaucratic unblocking
procedures. Granting filter override privileges to school-based staff such as
administrators, SLMS, or technology specialists, facilitates timely access to blocked
content. However, most SLMS indicated school-based staff was not given filter override
privileges. When on-campus privileges were not granted, end users were required to
submit an unblocking request, some of which passed through multiple bureaucratic
layers. Even when users could submit unblocking requests directly from the blocked
page, there was a wait period. In the final analysis, only a small percentage of school
districts provided immediate access to block content.
Another prevalent unblocking issue was uncertainty about unblocking procedures.
Most SLMS indicated blocked page notifications did not provide unblocking instructions
while almost all of IT respondents indicated the blocked page notifications provided
unblocking instructions. This discrepancy suggests instructions may have been provided,
but were not clear to end users. For instance, one interviewee stated, “I don’t know that
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people are told how to get something unblocked. The link on the blocked page is very
subtle.” In addition, an IT respondent stated, “The filter instructs the end user to contact
the system administrator.” This unblocking instruction was unclear because the system
administrator is not identified; therefore, end users may not have known who to contact
to get content unblocked. In addition, most IT respondents indicated override privileges
had been granted to school-based staff; however, most SLMS, who are school-based
staff, indicated override privileges had not been granted to school-based staff. This
finding provides additional evidence that there was widespread uncertainty about
unblocking procedures.
Over-blocking was the predominant filtering issue SLMS encountered while
facilitating access in a filtered environment, but under-blocking and filter circumvention
affected end users as well. SLMS and IT administrators indicated that filter underblocking was far less of an issue than over-blocking. Almost half of IT respondents
received requests to block inappropriate content, while slightly more than one-fourth of
SLMS occasionally encountered inappropriate content. Nevertheless, most IT and SLMS
respondents believed their districts’ filters were effective in preventing users from
accessing blocked content. Interviewee observations also suggest that filter
circumvention occurred occasionally, but was mostly an issue at the secondary level,
since elementary students were not as technologically savvy. Even though underblocking and filter circumvention occurred less frequently than over-blocking, the fact
that these issues occasionally occurred, underscores the flawed nature of filtering
technology.
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Over-blocking was the most pervasive filtering issue for end users. As a result of
over-blocking, end users were denied access to a broad range of educational content.
School districts’ unblocking procedures exacerbated the negative effects of filter overblocking. Unblocking delays, uncertainty about unblocking procedures, and lack of oncampus override privileges were factors that exacerbated the negative effects of filter
over-blocking. Over-blocking coupled with under-blocking and filter circumvention were
factors that emphasized that technology protection measures cannot be the sole Internet
safety approach for school districts.
Research Question 3
Research question 3 asked, “How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety
issues?” School district AUPs were analyzed to determine how they had been adjusted in
response to Web 2.0 safety concerns. SLMS and IT survey items focused on the
implementation of Internet safety education programs to address specific Web 2.0 safety
issues such as social network interactions. SLMS were also asked their opinions about the
effectiveness of Internet safety approaches such as Internet safety education. Interview
observations concurred with the literature review and indicate that policymakers’ Web
2.0 safety concerns included inappropriate student postings, inappropriate student
interactions online, and cyber bullying.
The AUP analysis determined that the majority of school districts had not updated
their AUPs to address Web 2.0 safety issues. AUPs were examined to determine if they
stated that minors were to be educated about appropriate online behavior including social
network and chat room interactions, and cyber bullying awareness and response. Federal
CIPA guidelines required E-rate discount recipients to include this provision in their
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AUPs by July 1, 2012. This mandate applied to every school district included in the AUP
analysis, which was conducted after July 1, 2012. Two-thirds of the school districts had
recently updated their AUPs (within the last three years); however, one-third of this
group did not address educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues. Moreover, most
AUPs in compliance with the federal safety education mandate were updated in 2012,
which indicates Web 2.0 safety policies were in a state of flux, and district-wide safety
education was in the beginning phase of implementation. Essentially, a coordinated
district-wide Internet safety education program has not been a significant part of most
school districts’ online safety efforts.
SLMS’ survey and interview observations support the abovementioned
conclusion that safety education was not a significant component of most school districts’
online safety efforts. Many SLMS survey respondents indicated that a district-wide safety
education program had not been implemented. Others were uncertain whether a program
had been implemented. SLMS’ interview and survey comments largely indicated poorly
coordinated efforts to educate minors about Internet safety. Essentially, school districts
had passed the responsibility of Internet safety education to teachers and SLMS without
making it a requirement, without providing clear guidelines, or indicating that a specific
curriculum was required for compliance purposes. Others indicated that students received
safety instruction on a one-time basis at the beginning of the school year or via classroom
displays. Consequently, fewer than half of SLMS believed their district’s Internet safety
approaches (i.e., AUPs, filtering, Cyber safety education, monitoring, etc.) effectively
prepared students to navigate an unfiltered Internet environment, safely and responsibly.
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Slightly more than one-third of SLMS respondents indicated that a district-wide
safety education program had been implemented. Interviewee statements about
implemented safety programs suggested these programs were successful because of clear
guidelines, constant reinforcement of Internet safety concepts, and a concerted districtwide focus on Internet safety education.
An interesting finding was that a large majority of IT respondents indicated a
district-wide Internet safety program had been implemented while far fewer SLMS
indicated the same. One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the two groups
was that SLMS were inadequately informed about the district’s program. Another
plausible explanation is that IT respondents’ may have equated the district’s AUP as its
education program. IT respondent survey comments support the latter conclusion. For
instance, one IT respondent added the following comment to the survey item about
district-wide safety education programs: “The district has an Internet safety policy in
place and we are currently updating [it] to include cyber bullying.”
At the time of the study’s survey, safety policies were in a state of flux with Web
2.0 safety education in the early stages of implementation for less than half of South
Carolina school districts. However, most AUPs, some of which have not been updated in
more than nine years, were inadequate to address 21st century safety issues because they
were written for an earlier technological era. Safety policies and safety education have
not been the primary focus of Internet safety efforts. School districts have mostly
implemented a one-dimensional, restrictive filtering approach to Web 2.0 and other
Internet safety issues, which may be undermining student safety as well as information
access.
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Research Question 4
Research question 4 asked, “In what ways do filtering policies impede access to
information and resources necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information
literacy standards?” To answer this question, IT and SLMS survey items sought to
determine the accessibility of Web 2.0 resources, which promoted the acquisition of
communication and collaboration skills. Interview items also sought to define specific
Web 2.0 access issues. Concerns about safety issues such as cyber bullying and
inappropriate online interactions prompted policymakers in most school districts to block
some or all Web 2.0 resources including wikis, blogs, and social networking sites.
Consequently, many educational Web 2.0 sites were inaccessible to end users. SLMS’
survey data showed that almost two thirds of SLMS encountered blocked educational
Web 2.0 resources. SLMS’ survey data also revealed that school districts’ filtering
policies impeded access to communication and collaboration tools. Similarly, interview
data demonstrated that access to the read/write Web was impeded. Interviewees provided
scenarios in which Twitter™, YouTube™, blogging sites, and Wordle™ were
inaccessible, certain Web 2.0 features including emailing and site bookmarking were
disabled, and Web 2.0 access was restricted to staff logins.
Interview participants’ statements provide evidence that restrictions on Web 2.0
access limited opportunities for students to develop 21st century communication and
collaboration skills. Specifically, many students were unable to practice online interaction
with peers and were unable to create online content. Online communication with experts,
such as chemists or authors, was also inhibited because of Web 2.0 filtering. Some school
districts’ filtering policies differentiated Web 2.0 access and allowed staff access but
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prevented student access to this content. When communication and collaboration was
limited to staff accounts, individual student participation was difficult and it inhibited
self-directed student learning. The abovementioned Internet policy situations underscored
the manner by which such policies limit development of 21st century skills.
One interviewee’s observation that Internet use policies have not “kept up with
what it means to be a 21st century learner” was applicable to policies implemented in
many districts. However, some school districts were beginning to relax Web 2.0 filtering
restrictions. These districts were permitting access to Web 2.0 tools such as Edmodo™, a
social networking website for education, embracing Google™ docs and Google’s™
collaborative tools, and providing access to Web 2.0 tools via SharpSchool’s™ school
Web hosting services.
Still, Web 2.0 access was limited in most school districts. Restricted Web 2.0
access restricted student engagement in online interactions, and other online activities
that enable students to enhance 21st century communication and collaboration skills.
Implications
This study added to the Internet use policy literature by comprehensively
investigating filtering and safety policy implementation and its effect on end users. The
study enlisted a large number of participants from 36 school districts who were uniquely
positioned to inform the investigation. IT administrators, who typically play a key role in
Internet use policy implementation, provided information about content blocking
decisions, stakeholder involvement in policy decisions, factors influencing filtering
decisions, and specific filter configurations. SLMS, facilitators of end user information
access, provided information about school-based stakeholder input in policy decisions,
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filter over-blocking and under-blocking and its influence of information access, the
efficiency of unblocking procedures, and the implementation of Internet safety education.
Accordingly, this study contributed to the filtering and safety policy domain by
addressing previously unexplored dynamics such as: 1) school districts’ filter
configuration details; 2) the degree to which safety, security, and other concerns sway
policy decisions; and 3) the influence of a wide range of filtering and safety policy issues
on end users.
The study participants were not selected via random sampling; therefore,
generalization of the results may be limited. Nevertheless, the results were consistent
with related studies (Finsness, 2008; Fuchs, 2012; Holzhauer, 2009), most of which were
anecdotal and/or less comprehensive. In addition to previous investigations, the present
study supports the need for evaluation and revision of school districts’ Internet use
policies to permit more integration of 21st century online technologies into the K-12
curriculum.
An overarching theme that emerged from this investigation was that school-based
stakeholder groups (i.e., SLMS, teachers, administrators, students, etc.) had minimal
input in Internet access policy decisions. The implication of this finding is that when
Internet use policies are implemented without stakeholder input, they often fail to balance
the need for safety with the information needs of end users. Individuals (IT administrators
and district administrators) without direct knowledge of online educational resources and
their educational benefits were making all Internet policy decisions. This factor could
explain why non-teaching policymakers would elect to block access to all blogging tools,
not realizing this decision would restrict access to educational blogging sites as well. This
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is just one illustration of the access issues that emerge when school-based stakeholders
are excluded from filtering policy decisions.
Student safety, network security, network performance, lawsuits, non-educational
online activities, and community opinions are serious issues policymakers must balance
when implementing Internet access policies. This investigation revealed that these
concerns substantially influenced school districts’ filtering and safety policies. The
implication of this conclusion is tightly controlled Internet access policies that place so
much emphasis on potential safety and security threats that access to educational
resources is impeded. Robinson, Brown, and Green (2010) support this supposition when
they contend that the more school districts fear security threats, the more restrictive
district Internet access policies will be. Input from school-based stakeholders could help
policymakers develop and implement Internet access policies that maximize access and
while maintaining security.
Another important theme that emerged from this study was lack of
communication. School districts’ Internet safety policies were not clearly communicated
to stakeholders. IT respondents affirmed that end users were informed about unblocking
procedures via the blocked page notification, school-based stakeholders were granted
override privileges, differentiated access levels had been implemented, and a districtwide Internet safety education program had been implemented. To the contrary, most
SLMS respondents indicated that these filtering and safety policy measures had not been
implemented. These competing perspectives imply school-based stakeholders were not
adequately informed of Internet safety policies and procedures. The following respondent
observations confirm this supposition: “Unblocking procedures are not well known,”
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“The only thing that I know they do is that we have a one-day program [Internet safety
program],” and “I am not sure if there is a program [Internet safety] created by the
District.” Including school-based stakeholders in policy decisions would result in betterinformed end users, and increased end user support for Internet access policies.
The use of a one-dimensional approach to Internet safety—the filtering
approach—was also a significant theme emerging from this investigation. The
implications of this limited Internet safety strategy are uncoordinated efforts to educate
minors about safe and responsible Internet use and ineffective, outdated AUPs. The
research results confirmed that both circumstances were occurring, likely because of the
one-dimensional filtering approach to Internet safety. The literature suggests that the
enormous challenge of maintaining a safe online environment for minors can only be
accomplished through a multidimensional approach, with filtering technologies being one
dimension (Losinski, 2009; Sutton, 2012; OSTWG, 2010), not the only dimension.
Finally, federal legislation mandates that multiple Internet safety approaches including
filtering technology, monitoring, AUPs, and Internet safety education be components of
districts’ Internet safety efforts.
The study clearly demonstrates that significant barriers to technology integration
in K-12 education still exist, with restrictive Internet access policies being one barrier.
The most salient barrier, access to technology, has largely been overcome with the
assistance of the E-rate program and heavy investments in computing technologies. The
result has been wired schools where computing technology is available in most settings
(Robinson, Brown, & Green, 2010), which sets the stage for full integration of computing
technologies in education. Yet availability does not always equal accessibility,
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particularly in the case of online technology resources. Restrictive access policies render
many informational, interactive, and collaborative online technologies inaccessible.
Consequently, frustrated end users may be more reluctant to incorporate computing
technologies into educational activities, and technology use inside of school will continue
to be markedly different from outside of school, where computing technology is
embedded in every aspect of society.
Recommendations
Recommendations for further study
In order to further validate the results of this study and to affect educational policy
changes, this study needs to be replicated in different geographical regions and on a
larger scale. This study was limited to participants from a socially conservative state;
therefore, the results may not be applicable to other less conservative regions. Inclusion
of socially diverse participants in a similar study would yield data that are more
representative and better inform filtering and safety policy implementation. Similar
research with other end user groups such as teachers, students, and school-based
administrators would provide additional data with which to evaluate existing Internet
access policies.
This research was conducted with the assumption that less restrictive filtering
policies result in increased access to online educational resources, less user frustration,
increased technology integration, and ultimately, enhanced learning. In order to verify
this assumption, research should be conducted comparing how the most restrictive
filtering policies and the least restrictive policies affect end users. Additionally,
policymakers implementing the most restrictive policies typically cite safety and security
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as the basis for these policies, but do restrictive polices lead to safer online
environments? An examination of the effectiveness of less restrictive filtering policies
and very restrictive policies would verify the aforementioned assumptions, and provide
additional data to inform filtering and safety policy decision making.
Another assumption of this research was that consistently reinforced Internet
safety education encourages students to exhibit safer and more responsible online
behaviors in filtered and unfiltered environments. However, research into the
effectiveness of Internet safety education and awareness is lacking. The most recent
legislative Internet safety mandate requires school districts to educate minors about safe
and responsible Internet use even though little is known about the effectiveness of this
Internet safety approach. A qualitative investigation of how Internet safety education
influences students’ online behaviors within and outside of school would inform Internet
safety education and awareness program development.
Recommendations for Improved Policy and Practice
The results of this study underscored a number of filtering practices and
procedures that were impediments to information access or delayed information access.
The research results suggest that implementation of the following recommendations
would lessen the access barriers end users encounter in filtered environments.
•

Involve school-based stakeholders (i.e., teachers, SLMS, and administrators, etc.)
with direct knowledge of online educational resources and end users’ access
issues in filtering policy decisions.

•

Tailor access policies to the needs of individual user groups, including staff and
various academic levels, in order to maximize Internet access for each user group.
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•

Provide filter override privileges for designated on-campus staff such as
technology specialists, SLMS or administrators, to allow immediate access to
blocked educational content.

•

Clearly communicate unblocking procedures to all end users via the blocked page
notification, and allow end users to submit unblocking requests directly from the
blocked page to facilitate access to blocked content.

•

Implement a multifaceted Internet safety program that balances filtering
technology with continuous reinforcement of safe and responsible technology use.
This balance can be achieved with an updated safety policy that clearly defines
acceptable use and incorporates Internet safety education with the use of 21st
century communication and collaboration technologies.

Summary
School districts have implemented filtering and safety policies in response to
legislative and social mandates to protect students from the proliferation of objectionable
Internet content. Some subject related literature reports that administrators are filtering
beyond federal and state mandates in order to combat increasing security threats,
degraded network performance, and distractions caused by non-educational Internet
content. Anecdotal literature suggested restrictive Internet filtering policies limit access
to online resources, often involve time-consuming bureaucratic procedures for
unblocking acceptable Web sites, and ultimately limit educators’ ability to integrate
online technologies fully into instruction. The problem that propelled this study was the
need to verify the aforementioned filtering issues and to determine how they were
influencing information access and instruction.
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The goal of this investigation was to examine Internet filtering and safety policy
implementation in South Carolina’s public K-12 schools and its influence on teaching
and learning. A limited number of studies have investigated the effect of filtering policies
on teaching and learning. Therefore, the study intended to update and expand upon
anecdotal or small-scale studies examining the influence of Internet filtering on
instruction and information access in the K-12 sector. This study sought to provide
stakeholders (administrators, teachers, SLMS, technology coordinators, and parents) with
the data and information necessary to guide filtering and safety policy decisions.
The following research questions guided this study:
•

How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools?

•

What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered
computers?

•

How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?

•

In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards?
An extensive review of the literature determined that there were numerous issues

surrounding filtering and safety policy implementation. The study focused on the
following issues as identified in the literature:
• Content category blocking decisions and the rationale for those decisions,
• Stakeholder involvement in filtering/safety policy decisions,
• Implementation of distinct filtering policies for different user groups,
• The implications of over-blocking and under-blocking,
• The efficiency of unblocking procedures,
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• The effect of filtering policies on Web 2.0 access, and
• The role of Internet safety education in student online safety efforts.
A mixed research methodology, including quantitative and qualitative approaches,
was used to address the research questions. Anonymous online surveys, which focused on
the aforementioned filtering and safety policy issues, were designed to collect mostly
quantitative data. The research population consisted of SLMS and IT directors. IT
administrators provided data about the technical considerations of filtering policy
implementation. SLMS, information access facilitators, provided data about filtering and
safety policy issues and the influence of these issues on end users. Subsequent one-onone telephone interviews with a small number of SLMS provided qualitative data. This
data provided a deeper understanding of school districts’ Internet safety practices and
how they either impede or enhance information access. AUPs were also examined to
determine whether districts were adjusting their safety policies to include educating
minors about Web 2.0 safety issues.
Survey data was used to describe filtering and safety policy decision making and
factors influencing policy decisions. The research instruments collected data that defined
end users’ experiences with content over-blocking, under-blocking, and unblocking
practices. This data provided insight on the manner in which these issues influenced
teaching and learning. This investigation also examined Web 2.0 safety issues, and the
manner in which content filtering, AUPs, and Internet safety instruction was used to
address these safety issues. Finally, filtering policies were examined to ascertain the
manner in which they impeded access to Web 2.0 resources that enable students to
achieve 21st century collaboration and communication standards.
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The research conclusions provide a better understanding of filtering policy
implementation from the perspective of IT directors. The data indicated policymakers
were configuring filters to block considerably more than visual images that were obscene
or harmful to minors (as CIPA stipulates). As noted in the literature review, filtering
technology has not advanced to the level where it can efficiently block only images.
Nevertheless, several factors influenced filtering decisions, the three most influential
being CIPA compliance, maintaining student safety, and maintaining network security.
The data also indicated that administrators were configuring filters to preserve
bandwidth, prevent litigation, prevent non-educational use, and to a lesser extent, in
response to community opinions. IT and SLMS survey data and interview observations
suggested that in most school districts, school-based stakeholders had minimal input in
policy decisions. The research results revealed many school districts were implementing
differentiated access levels for staff, but students, regardless of age, level had the same
access level. This one-size-fits-all approach to student filtering resulted in more instances
when secondary level users experienced content over-blocking.
Survey and interview results were combined to portray the issues SLMS
encountered as they facilitated information access in a filtered environment. Survey data
revealed that filters were somewhat effective in protecting students from inappropriate
content, but overly restrictive filtering policies prevented most end users from accessing
controversial subject matter, streaming media, health and sex education resources, and
Web 2.0 tools. Interview data supplemented survey findings by providing specific
scenarios in which filtering policies denied end users access to educational resources. In
addition to the over-blocking issue, end users also encountered inefficient content
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unblocking procedures. Bureaucratic and poorly communicated unblocking procedures
and lack of on-campus override privileges delayed access to blocked content.
An analysis of school districts’ AUPs coupled with survey and interview data
revealed that school districts were relying mostly on filters to protect students from
online indecency. The majority of school districts had not updated their AUPs to include
educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues, as the Protecting Children in the 21st
Century Act (2008) required. Survey and interview data also suggested that Internet
safety education was not an important Internet safety approach in many school districts.
Over-reliance on filters to protect students from Web 2.0 safety issues resulted in
restricted access to Web 2.0 resources and thus handicapped students in acquiring 21st
century communication and collaboration skills. In essence, the research results show that
school districts’ filtering and safety policies were mostly outdated, and have not kept
pace with 21st century online technologies.
The researcher compared elementary and secondary SLMS’ responses on survey
items specifically related to how Internet use policies influenced end users, including
students and instructional staff. Elementary and secondary user groups encountered the
adverse effects of overly restrictive filtering policies, but these adverse effects were more
pronounced at the secondary level. The fact that over-blocking was more prevalent
among secondary users, suggests that secondary school users’ information needs require
access to more of the content that filters typically classify as controversial, potentially
liable or non-educational. Considerable over-blocking occurs when filters are set to block
such content.
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This study shows that South Carolina school districts were mostly using a onedimensional and one-size-fits-all approach to Internet safety that resulted in restrictive
Internet filtering policies. Consequently, end users had limited access to resources
enabling them to experience the Internet’s vast educational benefits. School districts can
improve filtering and safety policies by including end users in policy decisions;
implementing unblocking procedures that permit immediate access to blocked content;
differentiating access for staff and tailoring access according to students’ academic
levels; and using a multi-dimensional approach to Internet safety that includes filtering,
enforced AUPs, monitoring minors’ online access, and consistent Internet safety
education that is integrated with the use of 21st century online technologies.
The advent of ubiquitous Web 2.0 and mobile technologies has essentially
negated the effectiveness of “lock down” Internet access policies that aim to protect
students by blocking access to all potentially harmful content. These reactive policies not
only undermine student safety by providing a false sense of security, but they widen the
gap between students’ in-school and out-of-school technology use. Students must have
opportunities to apply safe and responsible online behaviors while using 21st century
technologies for authentic learning activities. In order to maximize these learning
opportunities, the focus of Internet safety must shift from restrictive Internet access
policies to proactive Internet safety strategies that emphasize digital citizenship
awareness and education. Otherwise, the in-school and out-of-school technology use gap
will only widen, and efforts to integrate 21st century communication and collaboration
technologies will continue to be hampered.
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Appendix A
Expert Panelists and Instrument Evaluation/Revisions

Expert Panelists
Helen R. Adams, Online Instructor, School of Library and Information Studies
Mansfield University, PA,
Scott S. Floyd, M.Ed., Director of Instructional Technology
White Oak Independent School District, TX
Doug Johnson, Director of Media and Technology
Mankato Area Public Schools, MN
Melissa P. Johnston, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, School of Library and Information
Science, University of Kentucky, KY
Lynn Sutton, Ph.D., Dean, Z Smith Reynolds Library
Wake Forest University, NC

Instrument Evaluation and Revisions
Original Item (IT Survey)

1) What is your job title?

Average
Rating
(Mean)
3.25

Item Revisions Based on
Expert Panel
Recommendations
No Revisions

2) Does your district participate in the E-rate
program?

3.75

No Revisions

3) What Internet content filtering product
does your district use?

3.25

Changed beginning of
question to: “If your district
filters Internet access”

4) Which of the following content categories
does your district filter? (Check all that
apply)?
Adult/Mature, Alcohol/Tobacco,
Alternative Lifestyles (LGBT),
Criminal/Illegal, Cult/Occult,
Blogs/Wikis, Drugs, Email/Chat/Instant
Messaging, Gambling, Hate/Racism,
Hacking/Proxy Avoidance, Internet
Radio/TV, Intimate Apparel/Swimsuits,

4.0

Revised question to state:
Please indicate the level of
filtering for the following
content categories. Select
“filters all” if the entire
content category is filtered,
“filters some” if the category
is partially filtered, or “filters
none” if the category is not
filtered.
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Original Item (IT Survey)

Media downloads/file sharing,
Malicious sites, Pornography/Nudity,
Sex Education, Social Networking,
Telephony (VOIP), Violence, Weapons

Average Item Revisions Based on
Rating
Expert Panel
(Mean) Recommendations
Added a comment section for
additional filtered categories
or explanations.

5) Who decides which content categories are
blocked?
District Administrators, Filtering
Software (district uses the program’s
default/recommended settings), IT Staff,
School Board,
Committee of Stakeholders, Other
(please specify)

4.0

Added “check all that apply,”
Added “media Specialists” as
a choice

6) Please indicate the extent to which the
following concerns influence content
filtering decisions.
(Rate 1-5, 1 no influence-2
substantial influence)
CIPA Compliance, Preserving
Bandwidth, Preventing Non-educational
use, Preventing Potential Litigation
(Lawsuits), Maintaining Network
Security, Maintaining Student Safety,
Community or Parental Opinions

3.75

Added a comment section.

7) For each statement, select the answer that
corresponds with your district’s Internet
filtering policies and practices. (Answer
choices: Yes, No, Not Sure)
a) The district uses the filter’s default
settings.
b) When appropriate, the filter is
configured to block specific subcategories instead of entire content
categories.
c) Filter settings can be overridden to
access educational content that has been
blocked unintentionally.
d) When users encounter blocked
content, the blocked page notification
provides instructions on how to get the
content unblocked.

4.0

Added a comment section.
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Original Item (IT Survey)

Average Item Revisions Based on
Rating
Expert Panel
(Mean) Recommendations

e) Different access levels have been
established for specific user groups (i.e.,
elementary students, secondary students,
teachers, staff)
f) Filter override privileges have been
granted to designated on-campus staff
(i.e., administrators, media specialists,
technology specialists)
8) The district has implemented an Internet
safety education program that includes
cyber bullying and social networking
safety issues.
Yes, No, Not Sure

4.0

No Revisions

9) During a typical week, please indicate
how often you receive request to:
Block inappropriate content ( Never,
Rarely, Sometimes, Frequently)
Unblock educational content that has
been unintentionally blocked ( Never,
Rarely, Sometimes, Frequently)

4.0

Inserted (or the person
responsible for
blocking/unblocking content)
after “how often do you.”

10) How effectively does the filter:
Block inappropriate content (Very
ineffective, Somewhat ineffective,
Somewhat effective, Very effective)
Permit access to educational content
(Very ineffective, Somewhat
ineffective, Somewhat effective, Very
effective)

Added a comment section for
respondents to describe
procedures for addressing
blocking/unblocking requests.
4.0

Added a comment section.
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Appendix B
IT Administrators’ Survey

Introduction
Thank you for responding to the filtering/safety policy survey. Your response is
vital to this research project and should take 10 minutes or less to complete.
Proceeding to the next page indicates your voluntary participation in this research study.
Background Information
1) What is your job title?
____________________________________________
2) Does your district participate in the federal E-rate program?
The E-rate program provides discounts of 20 percent to 90 percent for eligible
telecommunications services, depending on economic need and location.
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] Not sure
3) If your district filters Internet access, what Internet filtering product is used?
____________________________________________
Filtered Content Categories
4) Please indicate the level of filtering for the following content categories.
Select "filters all" if the entire category is filtered, "filters some" if the category is
partially filtered, or "filters none" if the category is not filtered.
Filters all
Filters some Filters None
Adult/Mature
()
()
()
Alcohol/Tobacco
()
()
()
Alternative Lifestyles (LGBT)
()
()
()
Criminal/Illegal
()
()
()
Cult/Occult
()
()
()
Blogs/Wikis
()
()
()
Drugs
()
()
()
Email/Chat/Instant Messaging
()
()
()
Gambling
()
()
()
Hate/Racism
()
()
()
Hacking/Proxy Avoidance
()
()
()
Internet Radio/TV
()
()
()
Intimate Apparel/Swimsuits
()
()
()
Media downloads/file sharing
()
()
()
Malicious sites
()
()
()
Pornography/Nudity
()
()
()
Sex Education
()
()
()
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Filters all
Social Networking
()
Telephony (VOIP)
()
Violence
()
Weapons
()
Additional filtered categories/Additional comments

Filters some
()
()
()
()

Filters None
()
()
()
()

Content Filtering Decisions
5) Who decides which content categories are blocked? (check all that apply)
[ ] Committee of Stakeholders
[ ] District Administrators
[ ] Filtering Software (district uses the software's default/recommended settings)
[ ] IT staff
[ ] School Board
[ ] Media Specialists
[ ] Other, please specify
Content Filtering Influences
6) On a scale of 1-5, with 1 indicating no influence and 5 indicating substantial
influence, how much do the following concerns influence content filtering decisions?
1
2
3
4
5
CIPA Compliance
()
()
()
()
()
Preserving Bandwidth
()
()
()
()
()
Preventing Non-educational Use ( )
()
()
()
()
Preventing Litigation (Lawsuits) ( )
()
()
()
()
Maintaining Network Security
()
()
()
()
()
Maintaining Student Safety
()
()
()
()
()
Community or Parental Opinions ( )
()
()
()
()
Additional Comments:
Filtering Policies
7) Please indicate whether the following filtering policies are being implemented in
your school district?
Yes
No
Not sure
a) The district uses the filter's default settings.
()
()
()
b) When appropriate, the filter is configured to ( )
()
()
block specific sub-categories instead of entire
content categories (i.e., filter settings block
non-educational Web 2.0, but allow educational
Web 2.0 tools).
c) Filter settings can be overridden/adjusted to
()
()
()
access educational content that has been
blocked unintentionally.
d) When users encounter blocked content, the
()
()
()
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blocked page notification instructs users how to
get the content unblocked.
e) Different access levels have been set for
specific user groups. (i.e., elementary students,
secondary students, staff)
f) Filter override privileges have been granted
for designated on-campus staff (i.e.,
administrators, media specialists, technology
specialists).
Additional comments:

Yes

No

Not sure

()

()

()

()

()

()

Internet Safety Education Program
8) The district has implemented an Internet safety program that educates students
about appropriate online behavior, including social networking and chat room
interactions, and cyber bullying awareness and response.
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] Not sure
Additional comments:
Blocking/Unblocking Frequency
9) During a typical week, how often do you (or the person responsible for
blocking/unblocking content) receive requests to:
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Frequently
a) Block inappropriate
()
()
()
()
Internet content?
b) Unblock educational
()
()
()
()
content that has been
unintentionally blocked?
Briefly describe the procedure for addressing blocking/unblocking requests.
Filter Effectiveness
10) How effectively does the filter:
Very
ineffective
a)Block
()
inappropriate
content
b)Permit access to ( )
educational
content
Additional Comments:

Somewhat
ineffective
()

Somewhat
effective
()

Very
effective
()

()

()

()

Thank You!
Thank you for responding to the survey!
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Appendix C
School Library Media Specialists’ Survey

Introduction
Thank you for responding to the filtering/safety policy survey. Your response is
vital to this research project and should take less than 10 minutes to complete.
Proceeding to the next page indicates your voluntary participation in this research
study.
Title/Academic Level
1) What is your:
a) Job Title?: _________________________
b) Academic Level (of your school) (i.e, K-5, 6-8, 9-12, etc. )?: ____________________
Content Blocking Decisions
2) Who decides which content categories are blocked? (check all that apply)
[ ] Committee of Stakeholders
[ ] District Administrators
[ ] Filtering Software (district uses the software's default/recommended settings)
[ ] IT staff
[ ] School Board
[ ] Media Specialists
[ ] Other, please specify
Additional Comments:
Over-blocking Content
3) If the Internet filter over-blocks, what kind of educational/instructional content
does it block? (check all that apply)
[ ] Business/Finance
[ ] Controversial content (i.e, LGBT, alternative lifestyles, hate groups, cults, occult, etc.)
[ ] Educational games
[ ] Health/Sex Education
[ ] Sports and Recreation
[ ] Streaming media (i.e. Youtube, UStream.tv, Internet Radio, etc.)
[ ] Virtual Worlds
[ ] Visual images
[ ] Web 2.0 resources (i.e., Wikis, blogs, social bookmarking tools, etc.)
[ ] Other, please specify
Additional Comments:
Unblocking Time
4) If the filter unintentionally blocks educational Web content, how long does it
usually take to get the content unblocked?
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[ ] Content is unblocked immediately
[ ] Less than 1 hour
[ ] Several hours
[ ] 1-2 days
[ ] 3-4 days
[ ] 1-2 weeks
[ ] 3-4 weeks
[ ] More than 1 month
[ ] Content cannot be unblocked
[ ] Not sure
Over-blocking/Under-blocking Frequency
5) During a typical week, how often does the filter:
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Permit access to
()
()
()
objectionable content (underblocking)
Prevent access to
()
()
()
information/resources that
support educational,
professional, or personal
growth (over-blocking)

Frequently
()

()

Filter Effectiveness
6) Considering the filter's over-blocking/under-blocking efficiency, how would you rate
the filter's overall effectiveness?
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Somewhat ineffective
( ) Neutral
( ) Somewhat effective
( ) Very effective
Additional Comments:
Filtering/Safety Policies and Practices
7) Have any of the following Internet filtering/safety policies or practices been
implemented in your school district?
Yes
No
Not sure
a) Input from all stakeholders is
()
()
()
considered when content filtering
decisions are made.
b) Designated on-campus staff have filter ( )
()
()
override privileges (i.e. administrators,
media specialists, technology specialists).
c) When users encounter blocked content, ( )
()
()
the blocked page notification instructs
users how to get the content unblocked.
d) Different access levels have been
()
()
()

187
established for specific user groups
(elementary users, secondary users, staff).
e) An Internet safety education program
that educates students about appropriate
online behavior (including social network
and chat room interactions, and cyber
bullying awareness and response) has
been implemented.
Additional Comments:

()

()

()

Filtering/Safety Policy Opinions
8) Please indicate the level of your agreement with the following statements about
the district's/school's Internet filtering policies/practices.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Disagree
Agree
a) The Internet filter
()
()
()
()
()
prevents instructional staff
from accessing resources
needed for instructional or
professional activities.
b) The Internet filter
()
()
()
()
()
prevents students from
accessing
information/resources
needed for classroom
assignments.
c) The Internet filter
()
()
()
()
()
prevents users from
deliberately or
unintentionally accessing
inappropriate content.
d) Filter override
()
()
()
()
()
procedures allow timely
access to blocked
resources/information.
e) Filtering and safety
()
()
()
()
()
policies facilitate easy
access to online
collaboration and
communication tools (Web
2.0).
f) Filtering and safety
()
()
()
()
()
policies/practices (i.e.
Acceptable Use policies,
Cyber-safety education,
monitoring, etc.) prepare
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students to be safe and
responsible users in
unfiltered environments.

Additional Comments:
Thank You!
I am seeking 4-5 survey respondents to participate in a brief follow-up telephone
interview. If you are willing to be interviewed, please email me at tyler@nova.edu or call
me at 803-699-6479 (H) or 803-553-3276 (M).
Thank you for taking the survey, your input is vital to this research study.
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Appendix D
Interview Protocol

An Examination of Internet Filtering and Safety Policy Trends and Issues in
South Carolina’s K-12 Public Schools
Interview with________________________________ Date: _________ Time: ________
Phone: ________________________________
Hello. I want to thank you for your willingness to participate in this research study on
Internet filtering and safety policy implementation. The research goal is to determine how
Internet use policies influence teaching and learning.
This interview will take 20-25 minutes. If at any time you wish to end your participation,
just let me know. If you do not wish to have the information you have provided included
in the study, I will destroy it when this conversation is terminated, along with my notes.
Let’s begin.
Question Set 1-- Stakeholder Involvement in Policy decisions (RQ1)
How are stakeholders (teachers, media specialists, students, parents, etc.) involved
in filtering and safety policy decisions? (i.e., do they have input in content blocking
decisions, developing AUPs, or establishing filter unblocking practices/procedures?)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________
If stakeholder involvement is
If stakeholder involvement is significant:
minimal or nonexistent:
Would the district’s safety/filtering
Does stakeholder involvement have a
policies be more effective if
positive influence on access to online
stakeholders were more involved in
resources and on student online safety?
filtering and safety policy decisions?
______ Why or Why not?
________Why or Why not?
________________________________ ___________________________________
________________________________ ___________________________________
________________________________ ___________________________________
___________________________________
Question Set 2 -- Unblocking/blocking procedures and practices: (RQ1, RQ2)
Please describe your district’s unblocking procedures/practices that have been
established to allow access to content the filter blocks unintentionally.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Do you believe these unblocking procedures/practices facilitate or impede access to
information?
Facilitate
Impede
What specific practices enhance
What specific practices impede or delay
information access?
access information?
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Question Set 3 – Influence of over-blocking and under-blocking on
teaching/learning: (RQ2)
In your view, has filter under-blocking (allowing access to inappropriate content) had an
adverse influence on learning or student safety?
Yes
No
Can you give specific examples of when Go to next question.
under-blocking had an adverse
influence on instruction or student
safety?
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
How frequently do students circumvent the filter to gain access to blocked content?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Has over-blocking (preventing access to educational resources) adversely influenced
student or teacher access to educational resources?
Yes
No
Go to Question Set 4
Can you give some examples of when overblocking prevented students from
information needed for assignments or
teachers from resources need for instruction
or professional development?
____________________________________
____________________________________
____________________________________
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____________________________________
What strategies do students/teachers use to
gain access to blocked content when it is
needed for instruction or classroom
assignments?
____________________________________
____________________________________
____________________________________
____________________________________
Question Set 4 – Internet safety education programs (RQ3)
What Internet safety education program(s) has your district implemented to
educate students about responsible online behavior? (If there are no programs in
place, go to question set 5)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________
In your view, are these Internet safety education programs effective in preparing
students to safely and responsibly navigate the Internet in filtered and unfiltered
settings?
Yes
No
What makes your Internet safety
What makes the Internet safety education
education program effective?
program ineffective?
________________________________ ____________________________________
________________________________ ____________________________________
________________________________ ____________________________________
________________________________ ____________________________________
________________________________ ____________________________________
________________________________ How can the Internet safety program(s)
________________________________ and policies be improved to increase overall
________________________________ effectiveness?
________________________________ _____________________________________
________________________________ _____________________________________
________________________________ _____________________________________
________________________________ _____________________________________
________________________________ _____________________________________

Question Set 5 – Web 2.0 safety and access issues: (RQ3, RQ4)
In your view, do the district’s filtering and safety policies restrict access to Web 2.0
tools that foster online communication and collaboration? (i.e., wikis, blogs, Google
docs)
Yes
No
What safety concerns prompt policymakers What specific policies/practices have
to restrict Web 2.0 access?
been implemented to facilitate access
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In what ways do these policies restrict access to online communication and
to Web 2.0 tools?
collaboration tools?
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
How does restricted access to Web 2.0 tools
limit attainment of 21st century information
literacy and technology standards?
______________________________________
______________________________________
______________________________________
______________________________________
Conclusion
Is there anything else you would like to share regarding Internet filtering/safety
policy implementation and how it affects the SLMS’s mission to provide
information in the least restrictive and most timely manner?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix E
Protocol for Analyses of Artifacts (AUPs)

Research Question: How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?
Beginning July 1, 2012, E-rate applicants are required to update their Internet safety
policy (AUP) to reflect the requirements of the 2008 Protecting Children in the 21st
Century Act. To address Web 2.0 safety issues, school districts must certify that their
Internet safety policies have been updated to provide for educating minors about
appropriate online behavior including interacting with other individuals on social
networking Web sites and in chat rooms and cyber bullying awareness and response.
School District Name:
The AUP was last updated on:
Has the AUP been updated to
provide for educating minors
about appropriate online
behavior including interacting
with other individuals on
social networking Web sites
and in chat rooms and cyber
bullying awareness and
response?

Date:
Yes

Comments -- including
references to educating
minors, social networks, cyber
bullying, etc.
________________________
________________________
________________________
________________________
________________________

No
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Appendix F
Letter to Expert Panelists

Hello,
My name is Mary Tyler and I am a Ph.D. student at Nova Southeastern University’s
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences. My dissertation research
focuses on Internet filtering and safety policy implementation in South Carolina's public
schools, and its influence on information access and instruction. I have read your
contributions to the knowledge base in this domain and am seeking your assistance.
Would you be willing to serve on my dissertation expert panel as a subject matter expert?
The expert panel’s role is to assist in validating the data collection instruments for the
proposed research. These instruments have been designed to answer the following
research questions:
• How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools?
• What issues do school library media specialists encounter as they facilitate
information access on filtered computers?
• How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?
• In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and/or resources
necessary for achieving 21st century technology and information literacy
standards?
Expert panelists are asked to rate each item for relevance to the research questions, assess
the comprehensiveness of the instruments (do they adequately cover the topic?), and
provide comments regarding content, wording, format, and clarity? If you are willing to
participate, please click on the links below to access the evaluation instruments.
IT Survey evaluation:
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/784410/IT-Administrators-Survey-Evaluation
School library media specialists survey evaluation:
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/784286/Media-Specialists-Survey-Evaluation
If you have any questions regarding this study, you may contact me at tyler@nova.edu.
Thank you in advance for your time and expertise.
Mary Tyler
tyler@nova.edu
(803) 553-3276
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Appendix G
Letter to School Districts Requesting Authorization to Conduct Research

January 24, 2012
Dear Superintendent and School Board Members,
I am a retired educator and Nova Southeastern University doctoral student in the
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences department. The goal of my
dissertation research is to investigate Internet filtering and safety policy implementation
in South Carolina’s public schools and its influence on teaching and learning. This
investigation requires surveying a sampling of technology directors and media specialists
in the state. Therefore, I am requesting permission to invite your district’s technology
director and media specialists to participate in the survey.
The media specialists and IT surveys, which are attached, will consist of about ten items
asking about your district’s Internet filtering policies and practices, the effectiveness of
your filtering software and safety policies (AUPs), how Internet filtering/safety policies
influence teaching and learning, and how Web 2.0 safety issues are being addressed.
The surveys will be completely anonymous and can be accessed via SurveyGizmo’s
Website. Survey participants will be sent a Web link to access the surveys. At no time
will participants’ or school districts’ names be used in this research.
The research results will provide district policymakers and stakeholders with researchbased data to inform Internet access policy decisions, and prescribe practices that
optimize access to the most recent online educational resources. Thank you in advance
for supporting and advancing this research study.
Sincerely,
Mary E. Tyler-Vicks
Doctoral Candidate, Nova Southeastern University
Please mail your approval in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope or fax it to the
above toll-free fax number.
_________________School District _____grants permission _____ does not grant
permission for media specialists and the technology director to be sent invitations to
participate in the proposed research study.
___________________________________ and/or ____________________________
Superintendent’s Signature
School Board Chairman’s Signature
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Appendix H
IRB Approval
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Appendix I
Media Specialists’ Survey Invitation Email

Dear Colleague,
I am requesting your participation in a research study about Internet filtering and safety
policies in South Carolina’s public schools. This research is being conducted as part of a
doctoral dissertation at Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The
purpose of the study is to determine how these policies affect information access and
instruction in South Carolina’s public schools. The results of this study will provide
stakeholders and policymakers with useful data for evaluating and improving existing
Internet use policies.
I am seeking your input because media specialists facilitate information access and are
keenly aware of the issues users encounter when they search for information on filtered
computing devices. You also play a critical role in educating users about safe and
responsible Internet use.
Below is a secure link to the online survey. Your responses will be anonymous and your
name will not be attached to any results. The survey is user-friendly and should take no
more than 10-15 minutes. Completing the survey indicates your voluntary participation in
this research study.
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/940684/Media-Specialists-Survey
I appreciate your willingness to participate in the survey. If you have any questions
please feel free to contact me.
Mary Tyler,
Principal Investigator,
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314
Contact Information:
tyler@nova.edu
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Appendix J
IT Administrators’ Survey Invitation Email

Dear Colleague,
I am requesting your participation in a research study about Internet filtering and safety
policies in South Carolina’s public schools. This research is being conducted as part of a
doctoral dissertation at Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The
purpose of the study is to determine how filtering and safety policies affect information
access and instruction in South Carolina’s public schools. The results of this study will
provide stakeholders and policymakers with useful data for evaluating and improving
existing Internet use policies.
I am seeking your input because IT administrators play a critical role in establishing and
implementing filtering and safety policies. You are also knowledgeable of the technical
considerations of filtering software selection and configuration.
Below is a link to the online survey. Your responses will be anonymous and your name
will not be attached to any results. The survey is user-friendly and you should be able to
complete it within 15 minutes. Completing the survey indicates your voluntary
participation in this research study.
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/958372/IT-Survey
I appreciate your willingness to participate and value your input. If you have any
questions before or after completing the survey please feel free to contact me.

Mary Tyler,
Principal Investigator,
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314
Contact Information:
tyler@nova.edu
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Appendix K
Interview Consent Form

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled An Examination of
Internet Filtering and Safety Policy Trends and Issues in South Carolina’s K-12
Public Schools
Funding Source: None
IRB protocol #: 04151204
Principal investigator(s)
Mary E. Tyler
422 Ridge Trail Dr.
Columbia, SC 29229
803-699-6479
803-553-3276

Co-investigator/Committee Chair
Steven Zink, Ph.D.
Nova Southeastern University,
3301 College Avenue
DeSantis Building, #4108
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
(954) 262-2020 or 800-541-6682

For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact:
Institutional Review Board
Nova Southeastern University
Office of Grants and Contracts
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790
IRB@nsu.nova.edu
Description of the Study:
What is the study about?
You are being asked to take part in a research study about Internet filtering and
safety policies in South Carolina’s public schools. The purpose of the study is to
examine filtering and safety policy practices and procedures to determine how
they may be influencing information access and instruction. The study utilizes
multiple surveys and interviews to collect data.
Why are you asking me?
You are being asked to participate in the interview phase of the study because you
responded to the initial media specialists’ survey and you agreed to take part in
the post-survey telephone interview.
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?
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If you participate in the interview phase of the study, you will be interviewed
about your district’s filtering and safety policy practices/procedures. The
interview will also address your convictions and concerns about how Internet use
policies influence end users’ access to information and resources.

Audio/Video Recording
Is there any audio recording?
Interviews will not be audio recorded. The researcher will take extensive notes
during the interviews.
Risks/Benefits to the Participant:
What are the dangers to me?
All studies have some risks, whether direct or indirect. However, the present
research involves no more than minimal risks as it seeks to investigate your
district’s Internet filtering/safety policies and your perception of how these
policies may be affecting teaching, learning, and students’ online safety. The
procedures or activities in this study may have unknown or unforeseeable risks. If
you have any concerns about the risks or the benefits of participating in this study,
you can contact Mary E. Tyler, Dr. Steven Zink, or the IRB office at the numbers
indicated above.
Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study?
There are no direct benefits, but the proposed study will arm school district
stakeholders with the data and information necessary to guide filtering and safety
policy decisions. The study will also prescribe filtering practices that may lead to
improved Internet filtering and safety policies.
Costs and Payments to the Participant:
Will I get paid for being in the study?
No payments will be made to participants in this study.
Will it cost me anything?
There are no costs to you for participating in this study.
Confidentiality and Privacy:
How will you keep my information private?
Every effort will be made to keep participants’ information entirely confidential.
No risk of exposure of sensitive information due to the research process is
anticipated and data collected during the interviews will be handled and stored
securely to protect participants’ privacy. Interview data will be retained in a
secure digital file for 36 months from the conclusion of the study. No personally
identifiable information will be revealed in the final report. That is, all
information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is
required by law.
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Research records identifying you may be examined by the principal investigator’s
dissertation chair, the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board,
and other regulatory Agencies.
Participants Right to Withdraw from the Study:
What if I want to leave the study?
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide
to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are entitled. If you choose to withdraw, any information collected
about you before the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for 36
months from the conclusion of the study, but you may request that it not be used.
Other Considerations:
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate
to your willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you by
the investigator.
Voluntary Consent:
By signing below, you indicate that
• this study has been explained to you
• you have read this document or it has been read to you
• your questions about this research study have been answered
• you have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions in
the future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury
• you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel
questions about your study rights
• you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it
• you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled “An Examination of
Internet Filtering and Safety Policy Trends and Issues in South Carolina’s K-12
Public Schools.”
Participant's Signature: ___________________________ Date: ________________
Participant’s Name: ______________________________ Date: ________________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: _____________________________
Date: _________________________________
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